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Abstract 
Discarding, or returning unwanted catch to the sea, is a common feature of European fisheries, 
and is widely acknowledged as morally wrong. It wastes food and economic resources, and has 
contributed to overfishing in EU stocks. However, under the current Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), catch that is below minimum landings sizes, exceeds quota, or does not match catch 
composition regulations must be discarded.  
The high profile of discarding in recent years has put pressure on the European Commission (EC) 
to reform the CFP. A key objective is to eliminate discards and reduce unwanted catches. A 
discard ban and catch quotas for regulated species will be implemented. The EC argues that this 
will create strong incentives for more selective fishing, but little supporting evidence from EC 
fisheries is available. This thesis aims to present such evidence. 
A desk based analysis of a number of global fisheries found that a discard ban in isolation created 
little or no incentive to avoid unwanted catches; supporting measures were required to 
encourage more selective fishing practices. Analysis of the potential impact of introducing a 
discard ban on English North Sea otter trawlers supported this finding. Models using economic, 
logbook and observer data showed that the cost of capturing unwanted catch is minimal unless a 
cap is placed on total catches. Catch quotas cap fishing mortality, creating a strong incentive to 
reduce catches of limiting species. This incentive is unequally distributed between and within 
fleets, and is strongest for the least selective vessels. If catch compositions are not adjusted to 
match available quota, substantial reductions in revenue could occur.  
So under the reformed CFP discards of regulated species could be eliminated, the cost of catching 
unwanted fish will be passed onto the fishers, and strong incentives for more selective fishing 
practices will be generated. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
At least 7.3 million tonnes of catch is estimated to be thrown away in global fisheries each year 
(Kelleher, 2005). Unwanted or non-mandated catch is thrown back into the sea, often dead, in a 
process known as “discarding” (Alverson and Hughes, 1996). In some cases the level of discards 
may even exceed landings (Alverson and Hughes, 1996). Over the past few decades, increasing 
concern has been raised over biodiversity and the poor state of many global fisheries. 57% of 
global fish stocks are fully exploited whilst 30% are overexploited (FAO, 2012), and a key factor is 
the accidental capture and waste of non-target fish (Hall and Mainprize, 2005, Hilborn, 2007a, 
FAO, 2010). “Fish Fight” (Fish Fight, 2011) and other environmental groups have drawn the 
public’s attention to the scale of waste and the fishing industry has increasingly acquired a “dirty” 
reputation (Alverson and Hughes, 1996). With over 1 billion people relying on fish as their primary 
source of protein (The World Bank Washington, 2008) and in the face of declining stocks, the 
scale of such potential waste of food, biological and economic resources has angered the public 
and is viewed as socially unacceptable (Alverson et al., 1994, Stockhausen et al., 2012). 
So what are discards? The widely used definition of discards was developed by Kelleher (2005) in 
his assessment of global discards and bycatch. He defines discards as that portion of catch which 
is returned to the sea, alive or dead, excluding plant material and offal (Kelleher, 2005). Discards 
include the unwanted or un-mandated component of “bycatch”, or incidentally caught non-target 
catch, but also includes individuals of the target species that may be discarded due to a whole 
host of reasons that are described below (Kelleher, 2005).  
Discarding occurs to some degree in all fisheries operations (Bellido et al., 2011), and has been 
occurring for thousands of years (Alverson et al., 1994). Reference is even made to discarding in 
the Bible (Matthew 13: 47-48); 
“Again the kingdom of heaven is like unto a net that was cast into the sea and gathered of every 
kind. Which when it was full, they drew onto the shore, and sat down and gathered the good into 
the vessels, but cast the bad away.” 
But, it is only in the last few decades that reducing the capture and discarding of unwanted catch 
has become a target of fisheries management (Kennelly and Broadhurst, 2002). Below we discuss 
the scale of discards, particularly in European and UK fisheries, what is causing these discards and 
what has and is being done about it. The research of this thesis then goes on to focus on the 
current reforms of the European Union’s (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), at the heart of 
which is the objective to eliminate discards and reduce unwanted catches (European Commission, 
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2013a). In Chapter 2 we explore if such an objective has been met in other fisheries around the 
world, and what factors have determined any success. In Chapters 3 and 4 we examine the 
potential for this objective to be met in UK fisheries through incentives for the adoption of more 
selective fishing practices, using the English otter trawler fleet as a case study. In Chapter 5 we 
examine if these incentives could be generated on a large scale and how they might be distributed 
between the many European fleets of the North Sea mixed fisheries. 
 
1.1. What is the most recent scale of discards? 
In the latest attempt to calculate the level of global discards, Kelleher (2005) estimated that 8% of 
the world’s fish catch is thrown back into the sea annually, equating to 7.3 million tonnes. This is a 
decline from previous estimates of 27 million tonnes (Alverson et al., 1994). The two estimates 
are derived using different methodologies and data which may explain the large reduction, 
however Kelleher argues that the reduction may also be due at least in part to improved fishing 
practices such as increases in mesh size, increased utilisation of the total catch, and a reduction in 
fishing effort (Kelleher, 2005).  
Discard rates and estimates vary dependent upon the region. The Northeast Atlantic and the 
Northwest Pacific show the highest discarding levels, accounting for 40% of the global total 
(Kelleher, 2005). Area specific discard rates or estimates inside the European Commission’s 
jurisdiction are unavailable for many regions (Kelleher, 2005). However, Davies et al (2009) 
estimated that 19.8% of catch in the North-East Atlantic is discarded, whilst the aggregated 
discard rate of the Baltic Sea was 1.4% (Kelleher, 2005). In total, an estimated 1 million tonnes of 
biomass is discarded annually in the North Sea (Tasker et al., 2000).  
1.1.1. Scale of discards in UK fisheries 
Catchpole et al (2013) estimated that between 2002 and 2010 23,000 to 45,500 tonnes were 
discarded annually by all English and Welsh vessels sampled in the Cefas (Centre for Environment, 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Science’s) Observer Programme (COP). The COP places fisheries 
observers on a sample of randomly selected English and Welsh vessels allowing the 
documentation of total catches (Catchpole et al., 2011). Enever et al (2009b) used this COP data 
to estimate the discard rates of all English and Welsh vessels in the North Sea; data suggest that 
between 2003 and 2006 discarding of fish, cephalopods and Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus, 
hereafter referred to as Nephrops) occurred at an annual rate of 36% by number and 25% by 
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weight (Enever et al., 2009b). Dab (Limanda limanda), whiting (Merlangius merlangus), plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa), Nephrops, gurnards (Trigla spp.), cod (Gadus morhua), haddock 
(Melonogrammus aeglefinus) and sole (Solea solea) were amongst the top 10 most discarded 
species by number (Enever et al., 2009b). Cotter et al (2002) showed similar estimates for discards 
by English vessels over 12m in length operating from ports on the North East English coast; 20-48% 
of cod, 30-41% of haddock and 51-61% of whiting by number were discarded during 1997 to 1998. 
Similar levels have been observed in the Scottish demersal fleets; 15, 50 and 35% of cod, whiting 
and haddock by weight  were discarded annually between 1988 and 1993 (Stratoudakis et al., 
1999). The COP data also showed that 63% by number of fish caught annually in the English 
Channel, Western approaches, Celtic and Irish Seas by English and Welsh vessels were discarded 
between 2002 and 2005 (Enever et al., 2007). 53% of discards were accounted for by 10 species, 
including gurnards, dab, plaice and dogfish (Scyliorhinus canicula) and whiting (Enever et al., 
2007), many of which also dominate discards in the North Sea (Enever et al., 2009b). Total 
discarding by English and Welsh vessels has reduced since 2002, from 48% of the total catch by 
weight to 33% in 2008, but discarding of commercial species has remained fairly constant since 
2005 (Catchpole et al., 2011). The reduction is at least partly explained by a reduction in allowable 
fishing effort (Catchpole et al., 2011). 
 
1.2. What is the cause? 
1.2.1. The selectivity of fishing gear 
The root causes of discarding lie in the design of modern fishing gear (Alverson et al., 1994). 
Developments in fishing technology were traditionally focused on improving fishing power rather 
than the selectivity of gear (Crean and Symes, 1994). Consequently many gear types are 
inefficient at catching only the species, sex and sizes that are targeted, resulting in the accidental 
capture of unwanted individuals (Alverson et al., 1994). The problem is exacerbated due to the 
majority of target species occurring in mixed assemblages, fishers targeting one species are likely 
to also catch those species associated with it (Cook, 2003, Gezelius, 2008).  
Some types of fishing gear are more selective than others. If the target species is small the 
capture of unwanted fish is particularly likely; capturing small species such as Nephrops requires 
relatively non-selective gear that will also capture larger non-target species (Drewery et al., 2010, 
Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Consequently, over 27% of global discards are contributed by shrimp 
trawl fisheries. Beam and pair demersal trawl fisheries also have high discard rates varying from 
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14 to 69% in the EU (Kelleher, 2005). Much lower rates are seen amongst fisheries using purse 
seines, handlines, jigs, pots or traps (Kelleher, 2005, Uhlmann et al., 2013, AFMA, 2009). Gears 
targeting pelagic species tend to be more size and species selective as these species tend to form 
dense, single species schools reducing interactions with non-target species (Cook, 2003, Borges et 
al., 2008). For example, matje herring (pre-spawning Atlantic herring, Clupea harengus) shoals 
targeted off Scotland have a distinct sonar profile reducing the likelihood of catching non-target 
species (Pierce et al., 2002).  
In the North Sea, Europe’s Science, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) 
estimate that discard rates vary from around 20% to 60% by weight. Three mixed-species fisheries 
are responsible for the majority of discards in the North sea; the flatfish beam trawl fishery, the 
Nephrops otter trawler fishery and the roundfish otter trawler fishery (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). 
Since 1929, the Belgian flatfish and roundfish fisheries have accounted for 39% and 34% by weight 
of Belgium’s discards in the North Sea respectively (Lescrauwaet et al., 2013). In the Irish Sea, 
Borges et al (2005) estimated that Irish beam trawlers discarded 67% of their catch by weight, 
mostly dab and plaice, whilst otter trawlers discarded mainly whiting, haddock, bluemouth 
(Heliocolenus dactylopteus) and dogfish, accounting for 20-60% of their catch. Scottish seine 
vessels discarded relatively less, 25% of their catch, mainly whiting, haddock and grey gurnard 
(Eutrigla gurnardus) (Borges et al., 2005). Similarly, Uhlmann et al (2013) found that Danish seines 
are more selective showing lower discard rates of plaice in the North Sea than other fisheries. 
In UK fisheries, Enever et al (2009b) found that 42% of North Sea discards by number between 
2003 and 2006 were contributed by beam trawlers, whilst Nephrops and otter trawlers were 
responsible for 33% and 24% respectively. Netters accounted for less than 1% of discards (Enever 
et al., 2009b). Catchpole et al (2005a) estimated that in 2001-2002 the English north east coast 
Nephrops trawlers discarded 43% of catch by weight, 72% of which was whiting. These vessels 
were responsible for 16% of whiting discarded by all commercial fleets in the North Sea during 
this period (Catchpole et al., 2006a). Stratoudakis et al (2001) found comparable levels for 
Nephrops trawlers in the Firth of Clyde, where up to 60% by weight of non-target fish were 
discarded. Whiting was the dominant species and accounted for almost 40% of discards 
(Stratoudakis et al., 1999). As in the North Sea, English and Welsh beam trawlers in the English 
Channel, Western Approaches and Celtic and Irish Seas accounted for the majority of UK discards, 
58% by number, whilst otter trawlers contributed 35%. Beam trawlers discarded at a rate of 71% 
of their total catch by number, whilst otter trawlers discarded 65% of their catch (Enever et al., 
2007). 
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1.2.1.1. Factors influencing capture rates of unwanted catch  
The likelihood that fishing gear captures unwanted catch will vary dependent upon a number of 
factors including the condition of the exploited stocks (Cook, 2003), and where (Morizur et al., 
2004) and when fishing takes place (Bellman and Heery, 2013). If the stocks of target species 
being exploited are in a poor condition the capture of unwanted individuals by fishing gear is 
more likely (Alverson et al., 1994). Cook (2003) describes the change in the levels of bycatch as 
exploitation progresses; initially more selective gear can be used to target the largest most 
valuable individuals but as the numbers of these individuals decline a fisher must use a finer mesh 
to retain more of the smaller but still marketable catch. This reduction in the mesh size will 
continue as fishers target smaller and smaller marketable individuals. However, the less selective 
gear will also catch more and more non-target and small unmarketable individuals which will be 
discarded (Cook, 2003). Alverson et al (1994) argue that it was this absence of larger individuals 
that triggered fishers of the Northwest Atlantic groundfish fishery to exploit strong year classes of 
haddock or yellowtail flounder (Pleuronectes ferruginea) when they first entered a fishery, despite 
the likelihood of high discard rates of small unmarketable fish. In such a situation, a stronger year 
class will result in more discards of small unmarketable individuals (Alverson et al., 1994, Borges 
et al., 2005). Icelandic fisheries biologists state that the variation in the recruitment of exploited 
stocks was responsible for the annual changes in discarding levels and compositions in national 
fleets (Sanchirico et al., 2006). 
The geographic location of fishing activities has been shown to influence the level, species and 
size composition of discards (Borges et al., 2005, Stratoudakis et al., 1998), even if the same gear 
is used (Morizur et al., 2004). The level and species diversity of discards was significantly higher in 
Nephrops trawlers operating in the north of the Clyde Sea compared to the south (Bergmann et 
al., 2002). Lewison et al (2009) found that spatial patterns of bycatch per unit of fishing effort did 
not vary randomly within the US Pacific and Atlantic longline fisheries, indicating that some 
locations were hotspots for both high levels of bycatch and high bycatch diversity (Lewison et al., 
2009). Similarly, Enever et al (2007) identified “hotspots” in the Irish Sea and English Channel, 
where discard rates were higher than average. 
The timing of fishing can also influence the levels of unwanted fish captured by fishing gear 
(Bellman and Heery, 2013). The level of discards exceeded  landings during spring but not at other 
times of the year in a study of two trawlers targeting deep sea decapods off the Balearic Islands 
(Moranta et al., 2000). Moreover, the species discarded in two Portuguese trammel net fisheries 
were shown to vary throughout the year with particular species associated with particular 
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seasons (Batista et al., 2009). Discarding by English and Welsh beam trawlers was highest during 
winter months, whilst otter trawlers discarded more in summer months (Enever et al., 2007).  
Other factors such as weather conditions, tidal state and depth of fishing can influence discarding. 
Catchpole et al (2005a) found discarding of Nephrops was higher on sunny days in the Farns Deep 
Nephrops fishery, with more than a 50% increase compared to cloudy days. During periods of 
thicker cloud cover the lower light intensity was associated with an increase in the number of 
large Nephrops individuals being retained (Catchpole et al., 2005a).Tidal range also influenced 
discarding in the same fishery, with more fish discarded close to spring tides and more Nephrops 
discarded during neap tides (Catchpole et al., 2005a). Depth of fishing may also alter discarding 
activities (Damalas and Vassilopoulou, 2013); in the Mediterranean 20-70% of the total catch is 
discarded by trawlers fishing at depths less than 150m compared to 20-40% at depths below 
350m (European-Commission, 2002). Discarding levels in the deep sea decapod trawl fishery off 
the Balearic Islands decreased and the relative contribution of different species varied with depth; 
fish species dominated all of the discards however the contribution of crustaceans and 
cephalopods increased at 489m and 616m respectively (Moranta et al., 2000). 
1.2.2. A fisher’s decision to discard 
Whether the unwanted fish are then discarded ultimately results from a fishers decision to keep 
all or only part of their catch (Bellido et al., 2011). This decision is largely based on two main 
factors; i) regulations: catch is discarded to comply with fisheries regulations and ii) economics: 
catch is discarded to maximise income (Alverson et al., 1994, Crean and Symes, 1994).  
1.2.2.1. Regulatory Discards 
Prohibited species - A fisher may be obliged to return individuals to the sea if they are listed as 
prohibited species, and are illegal to land (Hall et al., 2000, Grafton et al., 2005). In the Northeast 
Pacific prohibited species include herring (Clupea pallasii), halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis), and 
salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.)  and commercial crab species (Paralithodes scamtschaticus, 
Chionoecetes opilio, Chionoecetes bairdi) (Alverson et al., 1994). The capture of certain species 
may also be prohibited during particular seasons or by certain gear types, requiring discarding of 
the incidental catch (Clucas, 1997).  
Illegally sized discards - Current EU regulations require individuals to be discarded if they fall 
outside the size or age classes that may be legally landed, or if they are not of the appropriate sex 
(European-Commission, 2002). Minimum Landing Size (MLS) limits are in force for a number of 
species, individuals that fall below this limit are illegal to land and must be discarded at sea (Casey, 
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1996). In overexploited stocks the majority of individual fish within a population will be 
approaching the minimum size due to progressive size selection, forcing fishers to target the 
smallest legal sizes in order to maintain a profit and increasing the likelihood of capturing and 
having to discard undersized individuals due to the use of less selective gear (Alverson et al., 
1994). Higher levels of discarding occur when the MLS is set too high compared to the size of fish 
caught by fishing gear; undersized fish are still retained by the gear but are illegal to land and 
must be discarded, a major management issue in EU fisheries (European-Commission, 2002, 
Bullough et al., 2007). The required mesh size of 100mm for the Dutch beam trawl fishery 
primarily targeting sole does not correlate with the MLS of plaice and has resulted in the 
substantial discarding of undersized fish (Cappell, 2001). The situation is exacerbated where there 
are multiple target species, each with a different MLS (Cappell, 2001). The whitefish fishery of the 
North Sea targets multiple species, including cod, haddock and whiting (Cappell, 2001). When 
targeting whiting, which has the smallest MLS, fishers will also capture undersized cod and 
haddock, which are illegal to land and must be discarded (Cappell, 2001). At the end of the 1990s, 
66% of discards in this fishery were estimated to be commercial species, the majority of which 
were thought to be undersized (Cappell, 2001). Fishers may also discard catch that is close to but 
above the MLS to ensure they are in compliance with the regulation (Arkley and Dunlin, 2002). 
Quota associated discards - Quotas that restrict the number or weight of fish that may be 
extracted from stocks have been linked to high discarding rates (Graham et al., 2007, Bergmann 
et al., 2002). If a fisher does not hold sufficient quota to cover their catch, or the fleet quota has 
been fulfilled, there may be a requirement to discard any excess catch (Hall et al., 2000). This is 
particularly common if quotas are set for landings rather than the total catch (Pope, 2002). Over-
quota discards are a common problem in mixed fisheries where quotas for different target species 
are fulfilled at different times; as a fisher continues to fish for species with available quota, the 
catch of over-quota species must be discarded (Cappell, 2001, Turner, 1997). This situation occurs 
when quotas are not set in accordance with the relative ability of a fisher to catch that species 
(Borges et al., 2008).  
Catch composition regulations - Fishers may also be forced to discard catch to ensure that their 
landings match specific catch compositions stipulated for the target species and gear in use 
(European-Commission, 2002). For example, only 20% of the catch of Nephrops trawlers using a 
minimum codend mesh size of 80mm can be cod (Catchpole et al., 2006a). 
The different regulations that are present in different fisheries and regions explains some of the 
variation that is seen in discarding rates, for example the MLS for hake is 27cm in the Celtic Sea 
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and only 20cm in the Mediterranean, which may contribute to the higher discard rates 
(proportion of the total catch that is discarded) of this species seen in the Celtic Sea (Uhlmann et 
al., 2013). Similarly, Bergmann et al (2002) found that more Nephrops were discarded by vessels 
operating in the south of the Clyde Sea than in the north, as more Nephrops fell below MLS 
restrictions in this area (Bergmann et al., 2002). 
1.2.2.2. Economic discards 
Many authors highlight that it makes economic sense for fishers to discard some of their catch, 
even when it is not required by regulations (Arnason, 1994, Vestergaard, 1996), at least in the 
short-term. If the value of a fish is too low to cover landing and processing costs, discarding is the 
optimal economic course of action (Clucas, 1997, Turner, 1997). Consequently, discarding is likely 
to increase for lower grade fish, especially if the cost of landing catch is high (Arnason, 1994). This 
agrees with Morizur’s et al (1999) statement that a substantial proportion of discarded catch may 
be of species or market grades which have little or no economic value. Batista et al (2009) found 
that 35% of catch in two Portuguese trammel net fisheries was discarded due to a lack of 
commercial value. The size composition of catches may also influence a fisher’s opinion on what is 
marketable; Rochet and Trenkel (2005) found that the capture of larger fish increased the length 
at which other individuals would be retained. As market values for a catch fluctuate so will 
discarding levels; discards of roundfish and flatfish, or rockfish, in Alaskan and British Columbian 
fisheries respectively increased by more than 10% when prices were low (Melnychuk et al., 2013). 
High prices or high catch rates were associated with increased retention of catch in Portuguese 
trammel net fisheries (Batista et al., 2009). Similarly, Catchpole et al (2005a) found that whiting 
were more likely to be discarded in the Farns Deep Nephrops fishery if catches or market prices 
were considered to be too low. Whether a species has a market value will also be determined by 
where it is landed; Dutch and Danish fishers discarded much higher levels of North Sea whiting 
compared to French fishers due to a lower local popularity of the species (Crean and Symes, 1994). 
High grading - Individual fish of more commercial species may still be discarded in a process 
known as high grading. A fisher can try to maximise the economic value of his landings through 
discarding lower value fish and replacing them with higher value individuals of the same or 
different species  (Hall et al., 2000, Piet et al., 2009). Crean and Symes (1994) observed that even 
valuable bycatch was not retained in the peanid shrimp fishery as the cost of handling and storing 
it was outweighed by relative ease and low cost of catching more shrimp. Karagiannakos (1996) 
argues that in fisheries managed under quota systems high-grading is encouraged as fishers try to 
maximise the value of a quota. Fishers may retain only the higher grade individuals that will 
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achieve the best prices at auction in order to maximise the economic value of the quota, 
particularly if the quota is small (Cappell, 2001, Borges et al., 2008). In addition, if a market has 
been flooded with a glut of a particular species the value of catch may be depressed, particularly 
for lower grades, encouraging fishers to high grade when more valuable individuals are readily 
available (Cappell, 2001). A limit on hold capacity or refrigeration may also encourage high 
grading; a fisher may choose to discard lower value species to free space or resources  for more 
valuable individuals, maximising  the economic yield of his catch (Anderson, 1994, Gillis et al., 
1995). Where it is prohibitively expensive to increase hold capacity, high grading is more likely to 
occur (Anderson, 1994). Similarly, fishers may choose to discard small catches at the beginning of 
a trip. Once catch is on board fishers only have a limited time left to continue fishing before catch 
starts to deteriorate; by discarding small catches early on in a trip fishers can spend longer 
searching for more valuable larger catches (Gezelius, 2006). Those species that may damage other 
catch due to their morphology (spines, mucus etc.) may also be discarded in favour of more 
valuable catch, or in protecting the value of the other catch (Hall et al., 2000, Alverson et al., 
1994). Whether high-grading occurs will depend on the cost and effort required to replace 
discarded catch; Anderson (1994) and Turner (1997) argue that high grading is more likely to 
occur when catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is high relative to the cost of fishing. Where CPUE has 
fallen, each individual fish caught becomes more valuable in relation to the cost of catching it, 
with a higher cost of fishing and a lower chance of replacing discarded fish the incentive to high 
grade is reduced (Anderson, 1994). So, whether high grading is economically favourable will vary 
with each trip and throughout the year (Anderson, 1994, Turner, 1997). 
Catch Quality - Individuals, including those with high commercial value, may be discarded due to 
their quality (Hall et al., 2000, Catchpole et al., 2005b). Pierce et al (2002) found that damaged 
individuals of valuable matje herring were discarded due to a strong consumer demand for high 
quality products. Fish damaged by scavengers or during the capture process are also commonly 
discarded (Bjordal, 2002, European Commission, 2002). Rochet and Trenkel (2005) argue that 
discarding increases nonlinearly with the duration of fishing. Over the period of a trawl fish are 
more likely to be damaged by the weight of fish in the codend, simultaneously the mesh is more 
likely to become clogged as trawling continues preventing the escape of undersized fish and 
increasing crowding in the codend. 90% of the marketable fish discarded in two Portuguese 
trammel net fisheries (Batista et al., 2009) and more than 50% of discarded elasmobranchs in the 
Portuguese trammel net fishery were discarded due to damage (Baeta et al., 2010). Diseased 
catch may also be discarded, as occurs in the fisheries targeting southern blue whiting 
(Micromesistius australis) where individuals may be infected with parasites (Clucas, 1997). Catch 
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that has deteriorated to a point where it will be of little or no value will also be discarded; for 
example if stormy conditions prevent the retrieval of gear, catch can deteriorate, as described in 
the Portuguese trammel net fisheries (Batista et al., 2009, Baeta et al., 2010). This may be a 
particular problem in the tropics due to elevated water temperatures (Clucas, 1997). Trip length is 
a related influence, with fishers choosing to discard some species early on in the trip to ensure 
that all catch is fresh when landed (Bellman and Heery, 2013). 
Other factors - The choice to discard part of the catch may also be social in nature.  A study into 
the UK whitefish trawl fishery found that skippers may encourage discarding to reduce the 
workload of the crew on a successful trip, or if the trip is near its end (Cappell, 2001). Bad weather 
may also encourage discarding (Cappell, 2001).  
1.2.3. Major causes in EU fisheries and in the UK 
Under the CFP the exploitation of many commercial stocks by European fisheries is managed by 
quotas in the form of Total Allowable Catches (TACs); these define the amount of catch that can 
be landed rather than how much can be caught (Daw and Gray, 2005). Numerous technical 
measures support these TACs and help conserve other non-quota species (Daw and Gray, 2005). 
These measures include MLSs, catch composition regulations, temporal and spatial closures, and 
gear regulations. Capacity and effort regulations have also been implemented to try to restrict 
fishing to more sustainable levels (Daw and Gray, 2005). 
Under the CFP it is illegal to retain any catch that does not comply with catch compositions or MLS 
regulations. Instead this catch can be legally discarded (European-Commission, 2002). Over-quota 
catch can also be discarded, the alternative is to stop fishing and incur the associated economic 
losses (Bellido et al., 2011). Consequently regulatory discards are a common feature of EU 
fisheries (European Commission, 2002). MLS restrictions are responsible for all discards of hake 
(Merluccius merluccius) from EU vessels in the North East Atlantic (STECF, 2006). MLS regulations 
are also a major cause of cod discards. In 1997, 73% by weight of cod discarded by UK whitefish 
trawlers in the North Sea were under the MLS (Cappell, 2001). However, economic reasons may 
be a more important driver of discards in other species. Megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) 
caught in in the North East Atlantic are discarded at sizes well above the designated MLS; the 
STECF suggests this may be due to a miscorrelation between legal size regulations and the size at 
which fish acquire a market value (STECF, 2006). Similarly, MLS restrictions appear to have no 
influence on the discarding of whiting and saithe (Pollachius virens) in the North Atlantic, and 
horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus), haddock and whiting in the North East Atlantic, with the 
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majority of discards being larger than the MLS (STECF, 2006). Catchpole et al (2013) estimated 
that between 2002-2010 17% of discards in English fleets sampled in the COP were <MLS, 37% 
were non-marketable (non-commercial species or not of a marketable size), 24% were due to 
inconsistencies in markets or catch sorting and 22% due to quota restrictions. The main drivers of 
discarding were also found to vary with location. Discards in the North Sea were driven mainly by 
regulations; MLS and quota restrictions. Discarding in the Irish Sea was mostly driven by a 
mismatch between gear selectivity and MLS or minimum marketable sizes. In the Western 
Channel and Celtic Sea, a fulltime or occasional lack of market and inconsistencies in catch sorting 
were the main drivers of discarding (Catchpole et al., 2013).  
 
1.3. Why does discarding matter?  
Despite the general opinion of the public, fishers and scientists, that discarding is “bad” (Bellido et 
al., 2011), for relatively resilient species such as crustaceans it may be best practice and 
contribute to the sustainability of fisheries (Kelleher, 2005). Discarding becomes a social, 
ecological and economic problem when the survival of individuals is low (Johnsen and Eliasen, 
2011, Mesnil, 1996, Morizur et al., 2004, Clucas, 1997). The survival rates of discarded fish may be 
very low  due to the cumulative stress of being caught, exposed, handled and thrown back into 
the sea (Broadhurst et al., 2006). Discarding of dead or dying catch results in fishing mortality with 
no economic benefit, the catch cannot be sold or eaten, and cannot contribute to the fishery in 
future years (Bellido et al., 2011).  
1.3.1. Economic impact 
The economic cost of discarding is hard to assess on a global level due to a lack of accurate 
discard data, however Alverson et al (1994) suggest that the foregone value of discards may 
match that of landings, equating to potentially billions of dollars lost. An instant economic loss 
occurs if discarded individuals are of commercial species, as the value of that catch is foregone 
(Alverson et al., 1994, Alverson and Hughes, 1996, Campos and Fonseca, 2004). The economic 
value of discarded cod, haddock and whiting in 1999 was estimated conservatively through a 
skipper survey of the North Sea whitefish trawl fishery at around £6.3 million, £14.9 million, and 
£2.7 million respectively, assuming 100% mortality of discarded individuals (Cappell, 2001). 
Scotland’s marine authority, Marine Scotland, estimated much higher values of the discards for 
1999, £10.5 million of cod, £29.6 million of haddock, and £5.2 million of whiting (Cappell, 2001). 
Whiting discards from the English Nephrops fishery in 2001-2002 had an estimated value of £1.6 
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million (Catchpole et al., 2006a). The value of cod discards equated to 11% of the value of cod 
landings whilst haddock discards would have had a value equal to 37% of the landed catch for this 
species (Catchpole et al., 2006a). If the target of one fleet is an incidental catch of another and is 
subsequently discarded, catches of the targeted fishery may be reduced, potentially endangering 
its economic status (Alverson and Hughes, 1996, Fonseca et al., 2005).  
A future economic loss results from the capture and discarding of small and juvenile fish of 
commercial species. These individuals could have grown to a more valuable size and contributed 
to future catches (Catchpole et al., 2005b). Their reproductive potential has also been lost, dead 
fish cannot contribute to future stock replenishment (Catchpole et al., 2005b). Najmudeen and 
Sathuadhas (2008) analysed the economic impact of catching juvenile finfish in the fisheries of the 
Kerala coast of India, where they are landed for sale opposed to being discarded. They argued 
that the removal of individuals before they have reached mature sizes could result in a reduction 
in the future yield of a fishery through a decline in biomass and future recruitment, thereby 
resulting in an economic loss through foregone catch. Moreover, juvenile fish have a much lower 
market value than the adults of the same species, if capture or natural mortality had not occurred, 
the individuals could reach a much larger size and attain higher prices. The annual potential 
economic loss of market sales through the capture of juveniles was estimated to be roughly 
US$ 19,445 million, compared to the US$ 836 million actually generated through the capture and 
sale of these individuals (Najmudeen and Sathiadhas, 2008).  
Capture and discarding of non-commercial species may also result in a loss in future income, as 
new markets may develop for these species (Stockhausen et al., 2012). These economic losses will 
not only be felt by fishers, but also by the processing and marketing industries further down the 
supply chain (Gillis et al., 1995). Other economic costs associated with discarding include the cost 
of enforcement and observer programmes; the reduction of fishing operations and or catch of 
target species through bycatch quotas; the cost of new gear or gear modifications to reduce 
bycatch levels; the banning of particular gear types reducing fishing opportunities; the loss of 
target catch after the subtraction of discarded individuals from target species fishing quotas; and 
the costs of catching, sorting and discarding individuals (Alverson et al., 1994). 
1.3.2. Ecological impact 
The ecological impact will vary dependent upon the discarded species, and the levels at which 
discarding occurs. High discarding levels of a particular species may not necessarily be damaging 
to a species or ecosystem, for instance large amounts of discarded walleye pollock (Theragra 
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chalcogramma) in the Bering Sea represent less than 1% of the fished stock (Alverson et al., 1994). 
In other situations a very low incidental catch can represent a significant fraction of the local 
population potentially endangering those stocks (Morizur et al., 2004), for example capture of the 
endangered vaquita (Phocoena sinus) in the gillnets of the Gulf of California (D'Agrosa et al., 2000). 
Commercial species - For commercial species discarding not only represents a waste of resources 
but may also threaten the future of stocks, endangering  fisheries and the livelihoods of many 
fishers (Crean and Symes, 1994).  One of the major issues associated with discarding commercial 
species, particularly in EU fisheries, is that it means that catches are in excess of the TACs, which 
can result in fishing mortality exceeding targets (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006, Morizur et al., 2004, 
Eliasen et al., 2009). Landings accounted for only 32-56% of the total catch of North Sea cod in 
2005-2009, with the remainder contributed by discarding <MLS cod and high grading, as well as a 
large percentage due to unreported over-quota catches (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011). On top of this, 
the capture and discarding of dead fish results in the loss of potential productivity (Crean and 
Symes, 1994); dead fish cannot grow and reproduce, and make no contribution to stock biomass 
(Catchpole et al., 2005b, Bellido et al., 2011). Discarding has been linked to the decline of cod off 
the North East coast of Canada (Kulka, 1997) and the overfishing of European fish stocks 
(European Commission, 2011b). 
Discarding is particularly detrimental for commercial stocks when it is undocumented, affecting 
the accuracy of fisheries data (Eliasen et al., 2013) and stock forecasts (Alverson and Hughes, 
1996). Inaccurate data could result in under or over-optimistic targets being set and under or over 
exploitation of stocks (Cotter, 2010, Chen et al., 2007, Cook, 2003). This reduces the confidence 
fishers have in fisheries regulation and can result in higher levels of non-compliance (Bellido et al., 
2011, Catchpole et al., 2005b).  
Non-commercial stocks - Non-target species may also be overexploited as a result of incidental 
capture and discarding (Hall et al., 2000). Piet et al’s (2009) model suggests that fishing mortality 
of non-target species may match or even exceed that of target species in the North Sea (Piet et al., 
2009). Cook (2003) suggests that this capture and mortality of non-target species, is likely to 
result in a decline in species diversity and abundance. Such changes in community structure will 
have an impact on the economic and ecological status of commercial species (Catchpole et al., 
2006a). For example, the viability of commercial stocks may be reduced if declining non-target 
species are consumed as prey (Alverson et al., 1994). 
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Impacts on the wider ecosystem - The impacts of discarding extend beyond the commercial and 
non-target fish species (Witherell et al., 2000, Jennings and Kaiser, 1998). Discarding may affect 
the balance, diversity and functioning of ecosystems (Bellido et al., 2011). For example, discarding 
can result in a disruption of ecosystem nutrient cycles (Eliasen et al., 2013, Groenewold and Fonds, 
2000). It may take many years for the nutrients of discarded biomass that is not consumed to be 
recycled back to the original ecosystem from which it was removed by fishing (Hall et al., 2000), 
whilst consumption of discards may alter benthic communities (Alverson et al., 1994). Discards 
that reach the seabed create an additional food source of a magnitude that is not usually available 
for facultative scavengers (Furness et al., 2007). Castro et al (2005) found that 60% of discards 
from the Portuguese deep water crustacean fishery reached the sea floor, with 20% removed 
within the first hour. Small scavenging species were thought to be the most important in 
consuming discards and recycling the discarded organic material, and benefitted through an 
increase in biomass. These species then provided an increased food source themselves for the 
target species of the fishery and were found in the stomachs of deep-water rose shrimp 
(Parapenaeus longirostris) and Nephrops (Castro et al., 2005).  
Some seabird species are also able to utilize discards and have experienced population increases 
through access to previously inaccessible food resources (Garthe and Scherp, 2003, Furness et al., 
2007, Gislason, 2003). Garthe and Scherp (2003) estimated that 6500t of discarded fish, mainly 
cod, were consumed by seabirds each year in the Baltic Sea. However, changes in relative species 
abundance may also trigger changes in predator-prey relationships and alter intra-specific 
competition (Gislason, 2003). Feeding on discards has also altered how some species behave; 
Bartumeus et al (2010) found that seabird movement patterns may be altered by the distribution 
of discarding fishing vessels (Bartumeus et al., 2010). Some species have also become reliant upon 
discards as a food source; the instigation of an annual moratorium on trawling in the Ebro delta of 
the western Mediterranean resulted in the complete prevention of discards, and was linked to a 
significant reduction in clutch and egg size of a local population of Audouin’s gull (Larus audounii) 
(Tasker et al., 2000). In addition it is also possible that consuming discards may increase parasite 
transmission to seabirds (Groenewold et al., 1996).  
The practice of discarding may also indirectly affect megafana. Reports from fishing vessels 
suggest that cetaceans may come in close proximity with fishing gear, risking entanglement, in 
order to take advantage of discarded fish (Couperus, 1994). Populations of these and other 
megafauna may be more at risk from the additional mortality, due to their life history 
characteristics (Morizur et al., 2004). 
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1.4. Why is discarding so difficult to manage? 
Catchpole et al (2005b) argue that the current high levels of global discards are due, at least in 
part, to the inability of past regulations to restrict fishing effort to available fishing opportunities, 
such as TACs. Managing the resulting discards is complicated by considerable variation in 
discarding levels, the causes of discarding, and the corresponding impacts, within and between 
fisheries (Kelleher, 2005). This variability is dependent upon the fishing ground, season, 
regulations, market forces and gear choice, and the behaviour, characteristics and demographics 
of target and non-target species, (Catchpole et al., 2005b, Kumar and Deepthi, 2006, Tasker et al., 
2000, Alverson et al., 1994, Bozzano and Sarda, 2002, Guénette et al., 2001). Discarding activities 
may even vary during a single trip, dependent on available hold space and day to day variability in 
markets (Bellido et al., 2011). Moreover, the relative economic and ecological impact of 
discarding will vary between fleets and fisheries, and may not be reflected by estimated discard 
rates. Low discard rates do not necessarily mean that only a few fish are discarded. Discards may 
represent only a small proportion of the total catch, however discards could still represent a large 
number of fish (Graham et al., 2007, Alverson and Hughes, 1996, Morizur et al., 2004). Conversely 
fisheries with low landings may have high discard rates despite discarding only a few individuals 
(Alverson et al., 1994, STECF, 2006). 100% of herring caught in EU demersal trawlers is discarded, 
however the species is rarely encountered (STECF, 2006). Differences in the mortality rates of 
discarded individuals in each fishery will also influence the impact of the activity and the 
appropriateness of management measures (Clucas, 1997, van Beek et al., 1990). Moreover, there 
has been no comprehensive evaluation of the mortality generated by discards versus the 
mortality generated by other factors (Alverson and Hughes, 1996). So, each fishing fleet will have 
a unique scale and composition of discarding, the impact of which will vary dependent upon the 
species involved (Clucas, 1997, van Beek et al., 1990), potentially requiring fleet specific 
management measures (Borges et al., 2005). Management of discards is made even more 
complex as the social, economic and biological aspects of reducing discarding must be accounted 
for within the wider management regime of commercial fisheries (Kelleher, 2005). In some 
nations management priorities may be to maximise the profits of fisheries or to provide much 
needed employment opportunities, aims that may conflict with efforts to control discarding 
activities (Pope, 2002). In such cases the final discard management measures put in place may be 
structured to satisfy political rather than conservation objectives (Pope, 2002). On top of this, the 
management challenge is often exacerbated by a lack of effective enforcement or willingness of 
fishers to accept and comply with new gear technology or regulations aimed at reducing discards 
(Catchpole and Gray, 2010). 
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Beyond the variability of discards, effective management is also hampered by a lack of data on 
discarding (Cochrane, 2002b). Until recently most data collection was focused on commercial 
landings (Lescrauwaet et al., 2013, Bellman and Heery, 2013), and data on which species were 
discarded was often absent (Guénette et al., 2001). Some countries and fisheries have no 
systematic system for documenting discards; eastern USA data held by the National Marine 
Fisheries Service database does not include information on discards (Ryan et al., 2001). Similarly, 
before 2001 observers in the Canadian Atlantic pelagic longline fishery did not collect data on the 
length composition or the relative condition of discards, preventing accurate assessments of 
discard levels and discard survival rates (Carruthers et al., 2009). In other cases discard data may 
only be available for a few species or sectors of a fleet (European-Commission, 2002), resulting in 
estimates that lack precision (STECF, 2006). However, accurate data on fishing mortality, including 
estimates of discarding, are required for the assessment of commercial fish stocks; exclusion of 
these data may affect the accuracy of stock forecasts and the appropriateness of management 
decisions, as mentioned above (Alverson et al., 1994). 
The paucity of discard data may be due to the nature of discards; data collection must occur at 
sea (Alverson et al., 1994). On board observers are considered to be the most accurate source of 
discards data (Kelleher, 2005). Campana et al (2006) argue that it is only through observer 
presence that an estimate of the scale of blue shark bycatch in the Atlantic EEZ of Canada can be 
made; nominal landings of longline fisheries represent only 5% of the estimated catch for this 
species in this area. However, the costs of observer programmes may be prohibitive (Kelleher, 
2005), the data may not show a high level of precision (Cook, 2003), and observers may be 
refused access to vessels (Catchpole et al., 2011). In addition, the presence of observers may alter 
the behaviour of the skipper and crew, biasing discard data (Murawski, 1992). Moreover, where 
observer coverage is not 100% sampled discard data must be raised to fleet level, requiring the 
use of raising factors which may introduce an additional source of bias (Rochet and Trenkel, 2005). 
CPUE or reported landings are often chosen as raising factors, however the relationship between 
these variables and discarding may not always be linear, particularly where discards events are 
sporadic, resulting in inaccurate estimates of discarding (Borges et al., 2008, STECF, 2006). Rochet 
and Trenkel (2005) found no evidence that discards were proportional to fishing effort or catch 
levels.  
An alternative to observer data is the use of fisher’s logbooks, however the quality of this data is 
often poor and incomplete, resulting in inaccurate profiles of discarding (Clucas, 1997). The 
quality will be dependent upon a number of factors, including the skipper’s estimation of how 
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important compiling logbooks are; the degree of literacy within a fishery, and the structure of the 
management and regulation regime that is in place (Bergh and Davies, 2002). Clucas (1997) notes 
that the bycatch recorded in mandatory logbooks of Falkland fisheries represented only 24% of 
that reported by observers during the same time period.   
Even if discard information is available, differences in collection methodologies and processing of 
data from different sources may render it incompatible (Clucas, 1997, STECF, 2006). For example, 
discard estimates may be based on the number of individuals or weight of discarded catch, 
influencing the interpretation of data (Catchpole et al., 2011). It is hard to compare the 
effectiveness of different measures if results are expressed in different ways, i.e., change in 
numbers of fish opposed to changes in weight (Davies et al., 2009). In the EU different 
classifications of metiers and fleets leads to difficulty in estimating and comparing discarding 
estimates (Uhlmann et al., 2013). Even what is defined as discards may vary between different 
scientists and managing authorities (Alverson et al., 1994, Kelleher, 2005), potentially altering 
estimates of discarding (FAO, 2010) and resulting in misinterpretation of reports and policy aims 
(Clucas, 1997). The European Commission defines discards as catch that is returned to the sea 
after being retained and landed on board vessels (European-Commission, 2002); this definition 
excludes catch that is purposefully released or “slipped” before gear is hauled onto vessels. 
However, the FAO definition includes that fraction (FAO, 2010); a definition that was also used by 
the Workshop on Discarding in Nordic Fisheries (Valdemarsen, 2003). Different management 
authorities may also have different definitions dependent upon the priorities of that group; the 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission only includes commercially important tuna fisheries in 
its definition of discards (Kelleher, 2005). In some instances the term bycatch may also be used 
interchangeable with the term discards (Clucas, 1997). Such differences may make comparing 
estimates and reports from multiple sources inappropriate, preventing quantification of the wider 
scale of discarding (Clucas, 1997).  
 
1.5. What can be done? 
As discards have become a major focus for fisheries managers, the development of more effective 
measures to control the capture of unwanted individuals has become an important target for 
fisheries research (Hall and Mainprize, 2005). An EC Communication of the Community Action 
Plan to reduce discards of fish argues that the first response of member states in trying to reduce 
discards is to improve the condition of commercial stocks; overexploitation has altered the size 
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composition of target populations to one that is dominated by the undersized, immature 
individuals that are most likely to be discarded, whether for economic or regulatory reasons 
(European-Commission, 2002). Similarly, the 2010 International Guidelines on Bycatch 
Management and Reduction of Discards encourages management authorities to include 
objectives for the regulation and utilisation of discards in wider fishery management plans in line 
with the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 2010). The nature of the discard 
management measures is dependent upon the aim of the policy setters; to reduce waste of a 
resource, to address ethical concerns raised by the capture of charismatic species, or to reduce 
the impact of fishing activities on non-target catch (FAO, 2010). The waste of resources can be 
addressed through increased utilisation of catch that would normally be discarded whilst 
ecological impacts may be addressed through preventing capture in the first place or by 
increasing the survival of the discarded component of the catch (Alverson et al., 1994, FAO, 2010). 
In reducing the impact of discarding on non-target species survival rates are important, more 
robust species could benefit from measures designed to improve survival rates, where as those 
more vulnerable to discarding mortality are more likely to benefit from measures that reduce the 
initial chance of capture (Carruthers et al., 2009, FAO, 2010). 
1.5.1. Reduce unwanted catch 
Management measures to reduce discarding include technical measures, input or output controls, 
and fishery use regulations. Technical measures aim to control the selectivity of gear and the 
timing and location of fishing activities (Pope, 2002). Conversely, input and output controls aim to 
limit total fishing mortality. Input controls regulate the intensity of fishing operations, usually 
through restrictions on fishing effort. Output controls are aimed at controlling how much is 
actually caught, primarily through quotas (Pope, 2002). Use regulations control the number of 
vessels or individuals who have a right to access a fishery or use specified gear, for instance a set 
number of pots (Charles, 2002).  
1.5.1.1. Input Control 
Input controls include measures aimed at controlling the total amount of fishing that occurs 
through placing limits on the amount of time that can be spent fishing, the amount of gear that 
can be used, and the size and number of vessels allowed to fish (Pope, 2002). Fishing time can be 
controlled through regulating the number of days that vessels can fish, or be out of port, often in 
the form of days-at-sea quotas (Shepherd, 2003, Pope, 2002). The advantages of days-at-sea 
quotas are that they can be easily enforced (Cotter, 2010, Branch et al., 2006a, Shepherd, 2003) 
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and should result in a reduction in total catches and so the amount of fish that are discarded 
(Catchpole et al., 2005b, Alverson et al., 1994, Cappell, 2001). Discards of commercial species may 
also be reduced as with less time allowed at sea, fishers are less likely to high-grade as there will 
be fewer opportunities to catch more valuable fish (Catchpole et al., 2008a). In addition, days-at-
sea restrictions can be used as an economic incentive for fishers to reduce bycatch; those fishers 
that employ more selective gear can be rewarded by being granted additional days at sea 
(Catchpole et al., 2005b). Replacing TACs with a system of days-at-sea quotas would also prevent 
over-quota discards (Cotter, 2010, Branch et al., 2006a). However, such effort controls are not 
without disadvantages; discarding due to market forces or size regulations can persist (Eliasen et 
al., 2009, Shepherd, 2003) and extreme reductions in fishing effort may encourage fishers to 
operate less selectively in an attempt to fulfil their quota (Cappell, 2001) and or maximise 
landings (Catchpole et al., 2005b, Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Fishers may also spend less time 
steaming offshore to historic fishing grounds, remaining further inshore in order to maximise the 
amount of time spent fishing, potentially in areas where bycatch rates may be higher (Catchpole 
et al., 2008a, Paramor et al., 2005). In addition, the positive impacts of such effort controls can be 
counteracted by the continual development of more efficient fishing gear and refinement of a 
fisher’s skills, requiring continual modifications of effort regulations  (Pope, 2002, Shepherd, 
2003). The potential impact of days-at-sea quotas in incentivising more selective fishing practices 
is investigated further in Chapter 3. 
The number of vessels engaged in a fishery can be reduced through introduction of a limited 
number of fishing licenses, or through government decommissioning schemes (Pope, 2002). In 
2003 US$46 million was spent in decommissioning part of the US West Coast groundfish fishery, 
reducing the number of vessels from 263 to 171 in an effort to reduce the fishing mortality of 
overexploited rockfish (Branch et al., 2006b). Such reductions in the number of vessels in a fishery 
may reduce the “race for fish,” allowing fishing to occur at a lower rate and freeing time for 
fishers to operate more selectively (Alverson et al., 1994). However, the success of these schemes 
is limited as fishers who remain in the fleet are likely to be the most successful and more able to 
invest in increasing the catching efficiency of vessels, resulting in a smaller decrease in fishing 
mortality than would be expected (Pope, 2002). The level of fishing can also be regulated through 
controlling the type and amount of gear that is carried by individual vessels  (Pope, 2002). Gear 
controls may be particularly important in preventing fishers deploying additional gear or more 
efficient gear when restricted by days-at-sea regulations (Pope, 2002, Shepherd, 2003), but can 
reduce the economic efficiency of the fishery (Ulrich et al., 2002).   
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1.5.1.2. Output controls 
Output controls can include restrictions on the weight or the number of individuals that can be 
caught, usually in the form of TACs (Pope, 2002). However, the regulation of fisheries through 
output measures alone is likely to result in high discard rates (Graham et al., 2007). Over-quota 
fish is often illegal to land, requiring that portion of the catch to be discarded at sea (Hall et al., 
2000). However, how quotas are released or allocated to fishers may reduce the level of discards. 
For example, only a small amount of quota could be made available during spawning seasons, 
reducing the level of effort applied during this period and consequently discards of undersized or 
poor quality fish (Cappell, 2001). Quotas could also be set for particular grades of fish to reduce 
the incentive to high grade (Cappell, 2001). Alternatively, a share of a TAC could be allocated to 
each vessel in a fishery in the form of Individual Quotas (IQs) (Casey et al., 1995). Such quota 
programs are widespread and can be found in, amongst other places, Iceland, Canada, the USA 
and New Zealand who set up the first system in 1986 (Casey et al., 1995, Buck, 1995). With an IQ 
the incentive to “race for fish” reduces as catches are assured (Casey et al., 1995, Branch et al., 
2006b). Fishers have more time to choose areas with low bycatch rates, to deploy more selective 
gears (Alverson et al., 1994, Branch et al., 2006b, Buck, 1995, Sigler and Lunsford, 2001), or to 
operate in seasons when the quality or market value of fish is higher (Gauvin et al., 1994, Casey et 
al., 1995), potentially influencing the proportion of catch that is landed (Batista et al., 2009). The 
use of IQs since 1993 in the British Columbian halibut fishery resulted in a shift from intense short 
seasons to a slower pace fishery and a survey of skippers suggested that IQs had resulted in a 
reduction in discarding of catch (Casey et al., 1995). In some systems any over or under use of 
quotas within defined limits may be “rolled over” to the following fishing season, reducing the 
likelihood of over-quota discards; the amount that is allowed to be rolled over can be controlled 
in line with conservation needs of the regulated species (Sanchirico et al., 2006). Alternatively 
fishers may be allowed to surrender over-quota catch to management authorities rather than be 
forced to discard, reducing the unaccountable mortality of discarded catch (Sanchirico et al., 
2006). In the Nova Scotia mobile gear groundfish fishery fulfilment of the fleet quota, which is 
divided into IQs, results in area closures reducing the likelihood of discarding of over-quota fish 
(Sanchirico et al., 2006). Since the implementation of an IQ system in the Alaskan sablefish 
(Anoplopoma fimbria) fishery, discard rates have fallen from 24% to under 10% (Buck, 1995). Even 
if discarding persists, Buck (1995) argues that the slower pace of fishing, allowing improved 
handling practices, is likely to result in higher discard survival rates reducing the ecological impact 
of the process. 
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The effectiveness of IQs in reducing discards is increased when transfer of quotas between vessels 
is allowed, becoming Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) (Branch et al., 2006b, Eliasen et al., 
2009). Fishers can buy, sell or lease extra quota allowing skippers to match the composition of 
their catch (Branch et al., 2006b, Sanchirico et al., 2006). The leasing or transfer or quotas may be 
controlled to ensure that the distribution of effort remains appropriate for the fishing grounds 
(Sanchirico et al., 2006). Under this system the cost of additional quota or the alternative of 
discarding over-quota marketable fish represent an economic loss for fishers, and may encourage 
the use or development of more selective fishing practices (Branch et al., 2006b). Fisheries 
models also suggest that ITQs will incentivise rational fishers to shift targeting to species with less 
constraining quotas (Poos et al., 2010, Toft et al., 2011).  
However, Charles (2002) and Buck (1995) argue that IQs and ITQs based on landings rather than 
total catch may increase the incentive to discard. Fishers may try to maximise the value or their 
quota and recoup the price of any additional quota through high grading (Cappell, 2001). 
Moreover, fishers may choose to discard over-quota fish if the price of additional quotas is too 
high in comparison to the value of the catch (Eythórsson, 1996, Branch et al., 2006b). Sanchirico 
et al (2006) also suggest that high levels of quota transfer, rollover or leasing complicate 
estimating total fishing mortality, resulting in less precise stock assessments. However, Buck 
(1995) argues that the development of an observer programme and the inclusion of total catch 
rather than just landings in the quota would help eliminate high-grading in ITQ systems, 
alternatively quotas could be set to account for the additional mortality that results from 
discarding. When unwanted catch is accounted for there is an economic cost to discarding; a 
proportion of the quota will be fulfilled by individuals that have no market value (Catchpole et al., 
2008a). Fishers will have to operate in a more selective manner in order to maximise the profit 
from quotas (Catchpole et al., 2008a). Accounting for discard mortality against quotas has 
reduced the incentive to discard cod in Canada’s Northern cod and shrimp fisheries  (Kulka, 1997). 
Similarly, counting the estimated discard mortality of marketable fish against ITQs has removed 
the incentive to discard catch and encouraged the adoption of more selective fishing practices in 
the British Columbian groundfish fishery (Grafton et al., 2005, Branch et al., 2006b, Sanchirico et 
al., 2006). Grafton et al (2005) argue that near complete observer coverage has been essential in 
generating these changes.  
1.5.1.3. Use Rights  
Fishery use rights place restrictions on which fishers have the right to operate in or “use” the 
fishery (Charles, 2002). The allocation of use rights imparts a sense of ownership of the resource 
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onto fishers, which may in theory encourage more sustainable use of the fishery to protect future 
income (Eythórsson, 1996). Use rights can be divided into two categories, access rights or harvest 
rights (Charles, 2002). Access rights control which individual or vessels are allowed to operate in a 
fishery, and the locations where these vessels may operate, effectively regulating fishing effort 
(Charles, 2002). Access rights can be effective in controlling discarding activities through economic 
incentives or disincentives; those fishers who employ more selective fishing gear or practices may 
be granted access to restricted fishing grounds, promoting conservative practices (Catchpole et al., 
2008a). Use of Square Mesh Panels (SMP), a gear modification designed to increase escape of 
incidental catch from trawls, is used as a prerequisite for granting access to a restricted area in 
the French Nephrops trawl fishery operating in the Bay of Biscay (Catchpole and Gray, 2010). Hall 
et al (2000) promote this form of discard management suggesting that those fishers operating in a 
more selective manner could be rewarded through access to more profitable fishing areas or 
species, or be granted the rights to fish for longer periods. Harvest rights regulate which fishers 
have the right to harvest a resource and how much of that resource they have a right to extract 
and include IQs and ITQs (Charles, 2002). Harvest rights could be granted based on the discarding 
activities of vessels (Buck, 1995). For example, the FAO Guidelines for Reducing the Incidental 
Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries (1999) encourages the use of mandatory seabird bycatch 
mitigation devices as a condition for licensing (FAO, 1999). Moreover, Hall et al (2000) argue that 
when bycatch is controllable through the skill of fishers, discarding could be reduced through a 
requirement that a set of performance standards are met by all skippers and crews wanting 
access to a fishery. Compliance with this code of conduct could be encouraged through ensuring 
that products originating from low discarding fisheries receive a premium market price (Hall, 
2000).  
1.5.1.4. Technical measures 
Technical measures may include input and output controls, but are usually subdivided into 
restrictions on gear type, gear modifications, or temporal and spatial controls on fishing activities 
(Cochrane, 2002a). A number of technical measures are aimed at improving the selectivity of 
fishing gear and consequently levels of incidental catch and discarding. The selectivity of  fishing 
gear is not only related to its characteristics (i.e. mesh size), but also the way in which a fisher may 
use that gear (Bjordal, 2002). Selectivity may be improved through altering the properties of the 
gear, such as the addition of selectivity devices (Bjordal, 2002), or through avoiding periods or 
areas where incidental capture of non-target species is more likely (Hall, 2002). Particularly 
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efficient unselective gear could be banned to reduce bycatch levels, alternatively the gear could 
be modified to improve its ecological performance (Alverson et al., 1994).   
Gear-based technical modifications - Gear-based technical measures can involve modifications to 
the gear itself or alterations to the configuration of the gear. These measures are often favoured 
more by the fishing industry as they do not reduce fishing opportunities (Catchpole et al., 2005b). 
More selective fishing results in catches that require less effort to sort and may be of higher 
quality due to a reduction in damage caused by the interaction of target and non-target catch 
(Catchpole et al., 2005b). Gear modifications also tend to be more visible, and therefore more 
easily enforced (Catchpole et al., 2005b), but efforts must be made to ensure that fishers do not 
disable selectivity modifications at sea to increase the likelihood of catching the maximum 
amount of marketable fish (Alverson et al., 1994). Gear modifications may be the most 
appropriate management measure where levels of discarding are unpredictable and not related 
to season or fishing areas (Graham et al., 2007). Modifications can be made to a wide range of 
fishing gears. For example, in pot fisheries adding size restrictive escape gaps allows the release of 
undersized target species, or small non-target species before the gear is hauled (Bjordal, 2002). In 
longline fisheries the type and size of hooks may be restricted to improve selectivity (Kelleher, 
2005). However, the vast majority of the literature on improving the selectivity of fishing gear to 
reduce discards has focused on modifications to trawls. 
Larger mesh sizes - The most traditional technical measure for reducing the capture of undersized 
fish in trawl fisheries is the regulation of the mesh size of codends (Catchpole et al., 2005b, 
Alverson et al., 1994). Increases in the mesh size of English Nephrops beam trawlers to above 
90mm has resulted in a significant reduction in discarding rates since 1999 from 83% to 60% by 
number (Enever et al., 2009b). Similarly, increasing the size of mesh from the commercial 
standard of 80mm to 100mm in the Bristol Channel skate (Rajidae) fishery resulted in a decline in 
discards of 72% with only a 3% fall in the value of landings (Enever et al., 2010). Kronbak et al 
(2009) analysed the long term theoretical biological and economic implications for Nephrops, cod, 
plaice and sole of increasing mesh sizes in the Danish Nephrops trawl fishery; the use of 100mm 
and 120mm mesh sizes over the standard 90mm resulted in an increase in the stock biomass of all 
four species, and resulted in a rise in the overall cash flow of the fleet (Kronbak et al., 2009). 
Increase in mesh size in other parts of a trawl can also improve selectivity; increasing the mesh 
size in the upper panel of a Nephrops trawls can reduce retention of undersized haddock and 
whiting, and potentially increase the retention of marketable individuals (Ingólfsson, 2011). Use of 
the “Orkney trawl” which is characterised by very large mesh in the upper sections of the trawl 
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has shown promise in reducing catches of smaller cod whilst maintaining and even increasing 
catches of haddock in roundfish fisheries (Campbell et al., 2010, Kynoch et al., 2010). Similarly, the 
large mesh “Eliminator trawl” has had positive results in trials, cod catches were reduced by 89% 
compared to a standard trawl whilst maintaining catches of haddock and whiting (Holst and Revill, 
2009, Revill and Doran, 2008).  
Escape panels - The capture of unwanted individuals can be reduced through the inclusion of 
panels made from larger mesh sizes (Bjordal, 2002, van Marlen et al., 2005, Madsen et al., 1999, 
Madsen and Stæhr, 2005). van Marlen et al (2005) found that such escape panels behind the 
ground rope of beam trawls resulted in a 13% reduction in the bycatch of benthic species. A 
number of trawl fisheries have introduced a square mesh panel (SMP), into the diamond mesh of 
codends (Catchpole and Gray, 2010, Catchpole et al., 2006a). Under load diamond mesh becomes 
distorted, reducing the intended mesh size and therefore the size selectivity of the gear (Bjordal, 
2002). Square mesh does not become distorted allowing undersized catch to pass through (Cook, 
2003, Graham et al., 2003). The use of a 100mm SMP was found to be the most effective gear 
modification at reducing hake discards in the French Bay of Biscay Nephrops fishery (Catchpole 
and Gray, 2010). Likewise, the addition of a SMP to mesh sizes of below 120mm in English 
Nephrops otter trawlers resulted in a significant reduction in discarding rates from 63% to 45% by 
number, comparable to the effect of using a mesh size above 120mm (Enever et al., 2009b). 
Bullough et al (2007) showed that SMPs could reduce catches of <MLS whiting by 34% in a 
commercial demersal trawl. Reducing catches of cod has also been achieved in flatfish otter trawl 
fisheries through the combined effect of large square mesh in the top section of the trawl and 
SMPs in the codend (Madsen et al., 2006). Using knotless netting can further improve the 
performance of escape panels by increasing the escape area (Arkley and Dunlin, 2002). Twine 
diameter and colour can also influence efficacy (Revill et al., 2007). However, escape panels can 
become masked by weed, mud and debris (Broadhurst et al., 1996), and performance is reliant 
upon correct positioning within a trawl (Krag et al., 2008, Briggs, 2010, Graham et al., 2003).  
Square mesh codends - The use of codends constructed solely of square mesh has also been 
investigated. 100mm square mesh codends in the Bristol Channel skate fishery resulted in a 68% 
decline in discards and a 1% increase in the value of landings compared to the standard 80mm 
diamond mesh codend (Enever et al., 2010). The use of a square mesh codend on an Italian vessel 
in the Mediterranean allowed the escape of undersized illegal hake, whilst maintaining a similar 
catch level of target individuals (Catchpole and Gray, 2010). Wade et al (2009) showed that the 
performance of a square mesh codend in a modified beam trawl could be increased by inclusion 
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of two 200mm SMPs, reducing unwanted catches of finfish by 54-63% by number and benthic 
invertebrates by 39-45%. The weight of landings was reduced, however this was mitigated by an 
increase in the value per kilogram of the catch when compared to the standard trawl (Wade et al., 
2009).  
Selection grids - Selection grids can be added to fishing gear to guide unwanted fish out of the 
codend of trawls, through excluding particular size ranges or exploiting the behavioural 
characteristics of different species (Cook, 2003, Campos and Fonseca, 2004, Fonseca et al., 2005, 
Valentinsson and Ulmestrand, 2008). Alternatively, different species can be diverted by selection 
grids into separate trawl codends (Ferro et al., 2007) with different mesh sizes, allowing 
undersized catch of different target species to escape from the trawl (Cook, 2003, Graham and 
Fryer, 2006). Reductions in unwanted catch have been seen in Canadian, Norwegian and 
Australian shrimp fisheries as a result of selection grids (Clucas, 1997). Swedish grids, a type of 
selection grid, are designed to prevent large finfish from entering the codend of trawls targeting 
Nephrops, instead individuals are guided to an escape hole in the upper section of the trawl 
(Catchpole et al., 2006b). Retention of small fish and undersized Nephrops is then reduced 
through the application of a square mesh codend  (Catchpole et al., 2006b). Similarly, the 
Nordmøre grate, designed to reduce the capture of roundfish, has been compulsory in shrimp 
fisheries and demersal trawls operating in the Barents Sea since 1997 (Graham et al., 2007). It has 
also been compulsory in all Swedish vessels targeting Nephrops in Swedish waters since 2004 
(Catchpole and Gray, 2010). Selection grids are also mandatory in many Canadian, Icelandic and 
North American shrimp fisheries (Clucas, 1997). New shrimp fisheries have been developed in 
Canadian waters with the use of the Nordmøre grate allowing fishers to exploit areas that were 
formerly avoided due to the high proportion of non-target species in the catch (Clucas, 1997). 
However, selection grids do have disadvantages; Kronbak et al (2009) analysed the long term 
theoretical biological and economic implications of implementing various technical measures in 
the Danish trawl fishery targeting Nephrops in the Kattegat and Skagerrak; these fishers also 
retain adult sole, cod and plaice but discard juveniles. The implementation of a selection grid in a 
trawl with a 90mm codend was predicted to result in an increase in cod, plaice and sole stock 
biomass over a ten year period (Kronbak et al., 2009). However, this technical measure resulted in 
a decline in the potential net cash flow of the fleet over the following ten years due to a loss of 
marketable catch (Kronbak et al., 2009). Catchpole et al (2006b) also found that the use of a 
Swedish grid and a standard diamond mesh codend in a Nephrops trawl, resulted in a dramatic 
reduction in retention of finfish above MLS,  but also resulted in an increase in the retention of 
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small cod; a result that has also been seen in other Nephrops fisheries (Frandsen et al., 2009, 
Drewery et al., 2010).  
Reducing the capture of unwanted fish is not the whole picture; the success of more selective 
fishing gears relies on the survival of individuals passing through and escaping from a codend 
being greater than if the fish were just discarded (Ryer, 2002, van Beek et al., 1990). Individuals 
that are escaping fishing gear may become stressed or sustain injury through contact with the 
gear or other fish, influencing long-term survival rates (Ryer, 2002, van Beek et al., 1990). 
Undersized sole escaping from large mesh sizes in beam and otter trawls showed lower survival 
rates than expected; only 60% of individuals who escaped immediately survived the interaction 
with the fishing gear (van Beek et al., 1990). The behaviour of juvenile walleye pollock and 
sablefish was impaired after simulated escape from a trawl codend, particularly when the 
individuals had experienced crowding before escape; individuals suffered predation linked to a 
reduction in schooling ability and apparent awareness of predators (Ryer et al., 2004, Ryer, 2002). 
Such behavioural impairments or injuries may reduce the success of gear modifications, 
particularly where predators are readily available to take advantage of vulnerable individuals 
(Ryer, 2002). As a result the success of technical measures in reducing the impact of fishing 
operations on non-target catch may not be as high as expected (van Beek et al., 1990). 
Non-gear-based modifications - The selectivity of fishing gear can also be improved through 
alterations to fishing practices. In pot fisheries the use of different bait, or bait in varying states of 
deterioration can be used to attract particular species, improving selectivity (Bjordal, 2002). 
Changes in the deployment or retrieval of gears may also be sufficient to increase its selectivity 
without further modifications (Hall et al., 2000). The Kerala Marine Fishing Regulation Act which 
controls fisheries within the Kerala state of India, prohibits trawling at night in order to reduce the 
higher levels of bycatch associated with this operation period  (Kumar and Deepthi 2006). 
Likewise, the duration of soak times of static gear are regulated in both the Mediterranean and 
Baltic European fisheries in an effort to reduce discarding as a result of deteriorated or predator-
damaged catch (European-Commission, 2002). Alternatively the capture of unwanted catch can 
be reduced through technical measures that control or alter fishing activities. 
Spatial and Temporal Closures - Temporal and spatial closures can be used to control fishing 
operations, and can vary in severity from the prohibition of all fishing activities within an area or 
time period, to the restricted access of particular vessels or gear types (Hall, 2002). Closures can 
be used to exclude fishing operations from areas or during periods where bycatch levels may be 
high (Pope, 2002, Grech et al., 2008, Murawski, 1996, Melvin et al., 1999). For example, real-time 
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area closures have been used in Australian fisheries to limit bycatch of southern bluefin tuna 
(Thunnus maccoyii) by vessels lacking quota (Hobday and Hartmann, 2006). In Alaska levels of 
bycatch above a defined limit will trigger fishery or area closures (Graham et al., 2007, Kelleher, 
2005, Clucas, 1997). Areas or periods when there are a higher proportion of juvenile, or 
undersized individuals that would be discarded may also be protected through a closed area or 
season (Hall, 2002). Seasonal closures have seen success in the shrimp fisheries of the Gulf of 
Mexico; closure of the fishery during May to July allows juvenile shrimp to mature in inshore 
waters before they migrate offshore into areas where they may be caught, preventing the capture 
and subsequent discarding of undersized individuals (Hall, 2002). Similarly, real-time area closures 
are enforced in Norway if levels of small fish exceed a threshold, and are maintained until levels 
decline (Graham et al., 2007). Closures can also be employed to protect breeding (Grech et al., 
2008) or spawning grounds when adult fish may be particularly vulnerable to the mortality caused 
by discarding or are of poor quality (Catchpole et al., 2005b, Hilborn, 2007b). Spawning requires 
energy, as a result plaice are often of reduced weight and therefore less valuable which could 
encourage high-grading (Catchpole et al., 2008a). Similarly, temporal closures of a fishery may be 
used to reduce discarding or high grading by ensuring that fishing only takes place when the 
target of the fishery is more likely to be of good quality and marketable size, and is in demand and 
commanding a good market price (Hall, 2002, Kelleher, 2005). For example, the opening of the 
Bering Sea pollock fishery is timed to coincide with the highest market prices (Hall, 2002). 
Moreover, openings could be planned to coincided with peaks in the abundance of target species 
reducing the fishing period required to fulfil a quota and consequently the period in which non-
target species may be taken as bycatch (Melvin et al., 1999). Spatial and temporal closures may be 
particularly important in regulating gears that are already fairly selective such as purse seines and 
pelagic trawls in which discarding is sporadic (European-Commission, 2002). However, the use of 
area or temporal closures must be viewed with caution, these restrictions may result in the shift 
of fishing effort to other areas or seasons (Bastardie et al., 2010, Branch et al., 2006a, Goodyear, 
1999), and result in an increase of bycatch of other species (Baum et al., 2003). Moreover, if area 
closures aimed at reducing bycatch of non-target species do not cover the vast majority of the 
species’ distribution, fishing effort may just be shifted to other regions where the species will be 
equally affected by discarding (Catchpole et al., 2006a). However, large area closures may be 
difficult and costly to enforce (Hall, 2002).  
Bycatch quotas - Bycatch quotas or limits are another technical measure that can be employed to 
reduce discarding (FAO, 2010); they may act to restrict the total catch of non-target species, or 
the proportion of total catch that is of non-target species (Pope, 2002). Once a bycatch quota has 
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been reached a fishery may be closed to ensure that no further individuals are taken, and fishing 
mortality remains sustainable for the species in question (Pope, 2002). Such quotas give non-
target species an economic value as catching them creates a cost for the fisher, incentivising their 
avoidance (Grafton et al., 2005). For example, if the number of crabs in a haul exceeds a defined 
threshold of 3 individuals per metric ton of fish, vessels of the US North Pacific and Alaska trawl 
fishery targeting winter rock sole (Lepidopsetta bilineata) will voluntarily move to below the 56 
degrees North latitude (Gilman et al., 2006). Moreover, if bycatch catch quotas are set for 
individual vessels an incentive is created for fishers to improve their selectivity, not only reducing 
the likelihood that fishing will be constrained, but also creating surplus bycatch quota that could 
be sold or leased, increasing income (Hutton et al., 2010). However, bycatch quotas require 
observer programs to ensure compliance, due to the need for continuous monitoring (Pope, 
2002).  
Communication programmes - Communication between vessels in a fleet allows skippers to avoid 
areas where catches result in high discarding rates, reducing the impact of fishing on non-target 
individuals over time; and where regulations are in place, the forced closure of fisheries (Gilman 
et al., 2006). A voluntary communication programme is in place for members of the Blue Water 
Fishermen’s Association in the US North Atlantic longline swordfish (Xiphias gladius) fishery, 
aimed at reducing the capture of sea turtles by indicating areas where bycatch is low (Gilman et 
al., 2006). A 50% reduction in the incidental capture of turtles has been linked to the success of 
this communication programme (Gilman et al., 2006). The North Pacific longline fishery has a fleet 
wide communication programme coordinated by a private contractor, designed to reduce the 
incidental capture of halibut and seabirds (Gilman et al., 2006). The contractor uses observer data 
and information from vessel owners to evaluate bycatch levels, those vessels with high bycatch 
rates are contacted by managers and warned. Vessel owners can contact managers or contractors 
for advice on how to improve their performance.  Reports on bycatch data are produced after the 
close of the fishing season and maps showing bycatch hotspots are posted to skippers each 
month of the following season (Gilman et al., 2006). Gilman et al (2006) argue that the influence 
of this measure amongst others is hard to quantify, however non-participating vessels had 
bycatch rates which were as much as 30% higher than vessels in the programme. Moreover, 
fishing effort redistributed away from areas of increased bycatch (Gilman et al., 2006). Overall 
bycatch rates of halibut have declined by one third since the programme was initiated, and 
declines in seabird bycatch have also occurred (Gilman et al., 2006). In 1994 the US North Pacific 
and Alaskan trawl fisheries instigated a contractor coordinated communication programme to 
reduce the bycatch of several species within each of the fisheries. The contractor uses observer 
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and skipper data to produce daily information on bycatch rates and hotspots, vessel-to-vessel 
communication also occurs, industry approved responses to this information can then take place 
to avoid high bycatch levels and fishery closure. Gilman et al (2006) argue that fleet 
communication programmes in the North Pacific may prove to be very important to the economic 
turnover of a fishery; communication allows vessels to avoid high bycatch potentially avoiding 
area closures that may increase steaming costs or trigger the premature closure of the fishery. 
The above examples highlight the reductions in bycatch and therefore discarding that can be 
achieved through effective fishery wide communication programmes; however such programmes 
are less likely to be successful where bycatch is unpredictable and non-target species occur across 
the range of the fishery (Gilman et al., 2006). 
Sustainability certification - Those fisheries that perform well, with low levels of incidental catch, 
may be rewarded through certification as a sustainable fishery (Hall et al., 2000). The use of 
ecolabels to identify products originating from fisheries with low bycatch levels may provide an 
economic advantage for better performing fisheries (Hall et al., 2000) and provide the public an 
opportunity to influence fishing activities (Lewison et al., 2004, Catchpole et al., 2008a).  
Discard education programmes - The FAO encourages member states to develop education 
programmes for fishers and managers, not only highlighting the importance of reducing bycatch 
but also in the effective implementation of mitigation measures (FAO, 1999, FAO, 2010). 
Catchpole et al (2006a) found that Nephrops fishers out of the English port of North Shields were 
unaware or did not accept that a reduction in discards would result in conservation benefits, 
contrary to the opinion of scientists. The authors argue that educating fishers on the positive 
ramifications of discard reduction could help reconcile the industry and scientists and encourage 
acceptance of management measures (Catchpole et al., 2006a). Moreover, educating fishers on 
the scale of discarding within a fishery may itself help to reduce discarding; Gilman et al (2006) 
state that many fishers in the US Alaskan demersal longline fishery were oblivious to the high 
rates of seabird bycatch of some individual vessels; once apprised of the situation fishers were 
able to take measures to reduce incidental rates.  
1.5.2. Prohibiting the act of discarding 
Another option for reducing discards is to impose a ban on the activity for the total catch or 
defined species (Alverson et al., 1994). A discard ban on its own will not reduce the fishing 
mortality imposed on bycatch, but will allow this additional source of mortality to be accounted 
for, improving the information on which management decisions are based (Diamond and Beukers-
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Stewart, 2011, European Commission, 2002). For example, a ban on the discarding of commercial 
species in Norwegian waters has been in place since 1990 including an ever increasing number of 
species (Graham et al., 2007, Crean and Symes, 1994). The aim of this ban was to improve the 
accuracy of total fishing mortality estimates, with managers believing that accountability was 
favourable to the discarding of species with low discard survival rates (Clucas, 1997). In addition, 
Kelleher (2005) states that discard bans are widely favoured by the industry as long as the 
measure is implemented in an equitable manner. However, a discard ban will simply shift waste 
from at sea to on-shore unless it is incorporated with other measures to encourage a reduction or 
increased utilisation of the unwanted catch, resulting in only  limited ecological and moral 
benefits (Bellido et al., 2011). However, a supporting discard ban can improve the performance of 
ITQ programmes in mixed fisheries, preventing high grading (Branch et al., 2006b) and 
encouraging fishers to fish more selectively or cover their bycatch with sufficient quota 
(Sanchirico et al., 2006). Similarly discard bans can facilitate the documentation of total catches, 
including discards, against quotas, encouraging fishers to operate more selectively in order to 
ensure that the quota is fulfilled by more valuable larger fish (Catchpole et al., 2008a). All 
marketable bycatch in Canadian groundfish fisheries is counted against quotas (Clucas, 1997). In 
Icelandic fisheries, where discards are banned, the capture of undersized fish is discouraged as 50% 
of the weight of commercial species will be counted against quotas (Clucas, 1997). However, high 
levels of enforcement are required to ensure that discarding does not continue away from the 
eyes of observers (European-Commission, 2002). In addition, economic incentives may be 
required to compensate fishers for the cost of landing unwanted catch and encourage compliance 
(Sanchirico et al., 2006), however the incentive must not be at such a level to encourage fishers to 
target those species in order to achieve additional income (Clark and Kahn, 2009, Clucas, 1997, 
Gezelius, 2008, Hutton et al., 2010, Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011). In New Zealand 
fisheries a tax, called a “deemed value”, is applied for landing over-quota fish or non-vulnerable 
bycatch species. The tax is set at a level that tries to strike a balance between encouraging the 
landing of all catch, thereby reducing regulatory and economic discards, and discouraging fishers 
from pursuing species with insufficient quota (Sanchirico et al., 2006, Batstone and Sharp, 1999, 
Peacey, 2002). The 2010 International Guidelines on Bycatch Management and Reduction of 
Discards promotes the use of discard bans, or full retention legislation, but only when bycatch 
species cannot be released alive with high rates of survival (FAO, 2010). Likewise, only those 
species with high survival rates or those that cannot be utilized are permitted to be discarded in 
New Zealand and Canadian groundfish fisheries (Clucas, 1997, Sanchirico et al., 2006). 
 
31 
 
1.5.3. Increase discard survival rates  
If the capture of non-target individuals is unavoidable it is vital that the survival rates of discarded 
catch are maximised, reducing the impact of discarding on these species and the wider ecosystem 
(Campana et al., 2009, Carruthers et al., 2009, Mesnil, 1996). Bellido et al (2011) suggest that 
increasing the survival rates of catch may be as effective as improving the selectivity of fishing. 
1.5.3.1. Discard survival rates  
The ability to tolerate the capture and release events of discarding varies among species (Cook, 
2003). For example, short-term mortality rates of crustaceans discarded in the Clyde Sea 
Nephrops fishery varied between species and individuals from 7-25% for swimming crabs 
(Liocarcinus depurator) to 2-23% in squat lobsters (Mundis rugosa) (Bergmann and Moore, 2001b). 
Moreover, juvenile walleye pollock were found to be much more sensitive to the stress of 
trawling in comparison to juvenile sablefish, displaying higher levels of mortality and a more 
impaired ability to feed (Olla et al., 1997). 
Short-term and long-term survival rates are also influenced by the degree of damage sustained 
during the capture and discarding process (Bjordal, 2002). Enever et al (2009a) showed the initial 
condition of skate (Rajidae) after capture was indicative of discard survival rates. Similarly, 
delayed mortality of hermit crabs (Pagurus bernhardus) in the Clyde Sea Nephrops fishery was 
greater in damaged individuals (Bergmann and Moore, 2001b). The level of damage sustained 
may vary between and within the same species; Bergmann et al (2001) found that the number of 
damaged individuals of different invertebrate species in the Clyde Sea Nephrops fishery ranged 
widely from 2% for queen scallops (Aequipecten opercularis) to 100% of the more vulnerable 
brittlestars (Ophiura ophuria). Damage rates were influenced by sex, with berried female 
swimming crabs sustaining less damage (Bergmann et al., 2001). Similarly, the condition of 
discarded skate in the Bristol Channel skate fishery was related to sex, size and species, as well as 
codend weight (Enever et al., 2010). Larger fish appeared more resilient to trawling, and female 
skates captured in a square mesh codend were in better condition than males of the same species 
(Enever et al., 2010). The negative impact of damage may be compounded if wounds become 
infected resulting in delayed mortality (Bjordal, 2002). Davis (2005) found injured sablefish were 
more likely to develop skin infections, leading to delayed mortality for up to 35 days after 
simulated capture in a trawl. Moreover,  the damage sustained during discarding may reduce an 
individual’s ability to avoid predators (Bergmann et al., 2001). Moreover,  behavioural and reflex 
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impairments as a result of discarding may also make fish more vulnerable to predators, or less 
able to feed resulting in delayed mortality (Olla et al., 1997, Davis, 2002). 
Survival rates are also related to the nature of fishing operations. The level of damage incurred by 
an individual may vary with gear type; Bergmann et al (2001) found that damage rates in benthic 
invertebrates caught in the Clyde Sea Nephrops fishery were influenced by the type of fishing gear 
and the size of the catch. Likewise, van Beek et al (1990) found that the condition and survival of 
discarded plaice was higher in otter trawls compared to beam trawls. In trawl fisheries, survival is 
also related to duration, speed and depth of a tow (Davis, 2002, Bergmann et al., 2001). Asterias 
Rubens showed short-term mortality rates of up to 18% with more deaths occurring at greater 
tow depths and durations (Bergmann and Moore, 2001a). van Beek et al (1990) found the 
condition of plaice deteriorated with longer haul durations reducing the rate of discard survival. 
Olla et al (1997) showed that juvenile walleye pollock became entangled in the mesh of a 
simulated trawl when speeds became too high, damaging individuals and impairing their ability to 
feed and avoid predators, elevating delayed mortality rates to 100% after 2 weeks. The size of the 
catch was influential on mortality rates of brittlestars captured by Nephrops trawl in the Clyde Sea 
which varied from 8-31% (Bergmann and Moore, 2001a). Likewise, higher codend weights 
reduced skate condition in the Bristol Channel skate fishery (Enever et al., 2009a). Extended 
exposure to air whilst fishers sort the catch or redeploy fishing gear also affects survival rates; 
Davis (2005) found that immediate mortality of sablefish increased with the duration of exposure, 
an effect that was more extreme in young fish. 
Environmental factors will also influence survival rates; the survival of discarded plaice decreased 
as water temperatures increased (van Beek et al., 1990). Air temperature was also shown to 
affect the survival of discarded catch (Giomi et al., 2008). Exposure to winter air temperatures of 
9-12˚C for 20 minutes resulted in the mortality of less than 2% of harbour crabs (Liocarcinus 
depurator) captured in trawls in the Northern Adriatic Sea, opposed to mortalities rates of 96% 
after exposure to summer temperatures of 26-28˚C (Giomi et al., 2008). The light level may also 
influence the survival of individuals; Olla et al (1997) found that sablefish and juvenile walleye 
pollock failed to swim during a simulated trawl event in the absence of light, independent of the 
speed applied. Fish became entangled in the net resulting in impaired behaviour, scale loss and 
lesions; mortality was 100% within 6 days of the experiment. Under daylight conditions and 
comparable towing speeds, no change in behaviour or mortality was observed (Olla et al., 1997).    
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1.5.3.2. Improving survival rates 
Increased discard survival rates can be achieved through changes in fishing operations. More 
efficient handling of catches by fishers, including a rapid return of unwanted catch to the sea will 
improve discard survival rates. Returning unwanted sablefish to the sea in 15 minutes opposed to 
30 reduced the rise in core body temperature by 3˚C, which may prove critical to the immediate 
or delayed discard mortality of an individual (Olla et al., 1998). Sole and plaice discards that are 
kept wet and sorted rapidly display lower mortality rates (van Beek et al., 1990). Keeping catches 
shaded as well as wet may also help to reduce the higher discard mortality associated with fishing 
in warmer months (Davis, 2002). However, improving handling techniques and times will only 
benefit those species that are resilient to the stress incurred through capture in fishing gear (Olla 
et al., 1997). This stress associated with capture could be reduced if fishers were restricted to 
operating in cooler months (Davis, 2002, Giomi et al., 2008). Reducing towing speeds of trawls 
may also improve discard survival rates through limiting gear inflicted damage; at lower speeds 
fish are more able to swim in the centre of the trawl away from the mesh where injury is incurred 
(Broadhurst et al., 2006). Use of more selective gear can also improve survival rates; increasing 
the size of mesh from the commercial standard of 80mm to 100mm in the Bristol Channel skate 
fishery resulted in slight improvements in the discard survival rates of skate, 59% compared to 57% 
survive (Enever et al., 2010). Skate survival was also higher in a square mesh codend, 67% 
compared to 55% in the standard codend (Enever et al., 2010). Broadhurst et al (2006) argue that 
the application of acoustic pingers or tori lines deployed to reduce the bycatch of megafauna may 
also act to increase the survival of discarded fish as they are sheltered from predation 
immediately around the vessel or fishing gear.  
1.5.4. Increase utilisation of unwanted catch 
When the aim of management authorities is to prevent waste, discarding can be reduced through 
increasing the utilization of incidental catch (Clucas, 1997). However, increased utilisation should 
only be encouraged if the discarded species are being exploited at sustainable levels, and the 
current level of removals can be supported by the stocks (Bellido et al., 2011, Davies et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, increased utilisation could be used as a supporting measure; Clucas (1997) states 
that it is unlikely that successful discard management measures will result in completely “clean” 
fisheries, capture of non-target species will still occur albeit at a sustainable level. Faced with this 
situation, Clucas advocates discard utilisation if individuals cannot be returned to the sea alive. 
Utilisation of discards relies upon fishers choosing, or being required to land normally discarded 
catch, a process that may require incentives (Clark and Kahn, 2009, Clucas, 1997). One option is to 
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reduce the landing charges of discarded catch, as is the case for European tuna purse seiners 
(European-Commission, 2002). Another is to generate or increase access to markets for unwanted 
catches (Clucas, 1997). For example, development of a market for small tailed Nephrops has 
reduced discarding levels in the English Farns Deeps Nephrops fishery (Catchpole et al., 2005a). 
Declining catches and accompanying price increases of traditional species are encouraging 
consumers to try formerly discard species (Kelleher, 2005). New markets for dab, flounder 
(Platichthys flesus), Norway pout (Trisopterus esmarkii) and grey gurnard have resulted in a fall in 
discarding rates of these species in the Dutch beam trawl fishery (Catchpole et al., 2008a). In 
Iceland marketing of underutilsed species is facilitated through a “bycatch bank” which 
encourages fishers and consumers alike to embrace non-traditional fish species (Clucas, 1997). 
Similarly, those species which lack a local market could be exported to countries where they are 
more valued (European-Commission, 2002). Poor quality or damaged fish could be sold as a raw 
product for fish meal production (Coelho and Stobberup, 2001) or for use in agriculture and 
aquaculture (Kelleher, 2005). For example, discard utilisation has increased across Southeast Asia 
as the demand for animal feed rises (Kelleher, 2005) and some unwanted catch from local Spanish 
fisheries is sold as feed for farmed octopus (European-Commission, 2002). Using unappealing and 
undesirable catch to create value-added products could create new markets for these species 
(Kumar and Deepthi 2006); traditional products could be made for local markets and more widely 
accepted products such as surimi for export (Clucas, 1997, Kelleher, 2005). However, Clucas (1997) 
highlights the lack of success that has been achieved in piloting such products in the past, citing 
the lack of markets and sufficient profit to cover production as the main factors for these failures. 
In addition, discard utilisation programmes must be implemented with caution; it is important 
that a market for undersized fish or vulnerable bycatch species is not developed such that there is 
an incentive for fishers to actively target these species (Hall and Mainprize, 2005). In Icelandic 
fisheries where discards are banned, there is a limit placed on the amount of undersized fish that 
can be landed discouraging the direct targeting of smaller fish (Clucas, 1997).  
1.5.5. What influences success of discard management measures? 
Appropriate management measures - It is important that the correct management measures are 
chosen for individual fisheries. Not all management measures will be appropriate for the 
protection of all species; closed areas would be ineffective for a highly migratory species unless 
they were of considerable size (Hall, 2002). In mixed fisheries the implementation of effective 
technical measures may be complex; measures may be appropriate for one species but not for 
another (Pope, 2002). Kronbak et al (2009) modelled the impact of a 90mm codend and 120mm 
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mesh panel in the Danish Nephrops trawl fishery compared to a standard commercial 90mm 
codend. The model suggested that this selective gear would result in an increase in the cod stock 
but a decline in the Nephrops stock over the following 10 years due to increased retention and 
subsequent discards of this species (Kronbak et al., 2009). Deciding on the most suitable 
combination of management measures is important. Implementation of single management 
measures in fisheries, particularly those targeting multiple species, is unlikely to be sufficient 
(European-Commission, 2002). In order to preserve the fisheries whilst reducing discards, limited 
technical measures in combination with controls on fishing effort may be most appropriate 
(European-Commission, 2002). Hall (2002) argues that it was the failure to combine technical 
measures to improve selectivity with any effort controls that resulted in the inability of managers 
to control the decline of Georges Bank demersal stocks. Similarly, the implementation of new 
discard regulations must take into account other legislations that are already in force within a 
fishery, including those of other countries (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). Non-
compliance in Danish vessels has resulted from the interaction of the Norwegian discard ban, 
requiring commercial fish to be processed and stored whilst in Norwegian waters, and the Danish 
requirement that over-quota fish be discarded (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). Moreover, 
appropriate measures must be chosen with the ecosystem in mind, not just one species, or the 
discard problem may just be shifted between species (Lewison et al., 2009). Banning of some gear 
types may result in a shift to a different gear type that may have its own bycatch problems, as has 
been seen with the expansion of longline fisheries after the prohibition of high sea drift nets in 
1992 (Hall and Mainprize, 2005). Closures may also result in a shift in the discarding problem; 
Dietrich et al (2009) found that temporal closures in the Alaskan longline cod fishery led to a 54% 
reduction in the bycatch of all seabird species overall but led to a 23% increase in the bycatch of 
albatross species. Baum et al (2003) found that an area closure in Northwest Atlantic aimed at 
reducing sea turtle bycatch, resulted in an increase in the capture of 11 shark species and 6 
species of finfish of conservation concern, due to the displacement of fishing effort to an area of 
higher biodiversity. 
The economic impact on a fishery will also be important in determining if the management 
measure is the most appropriate. New gears must be affordable and cost effective (Arkley and 
Dunlin, 2002), those that result in a decline in profits are unlikely to be accepted or may trigger 
non-compliance or a compensatory increase in fishing effort (Suuronen and Sardà, 2007, 
Catchpole and Revill, 2008, Hall and Mainprize, 2005, van Marlen et al., 2005). Catchpole et al 
(2006b) evaluated the theoretical use of Swedish grids and square mesh codends in the English 
Farns Deep Nephrops trawl fishery. The use of the Swedish grid alone resulted in a loss of 
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marketable fish resulting in half the landings by weight of a standard trawl, representing an 
economic loss of 40% (Catchpole et al., 2006b). The combined use of a square mesh codend and 
grid resulted in a significant reduction in discards, due to the escape of finfish across all size 
classes, but also resulted in a 75% reduction in the total value of the landings compared to a 
standard trawl (Catchpole et al., 2006b). Similarly, van Marlen et al (2005) found that the addition 
of drop out panels in beam trawlers resulted in a significant reduction in bycatch but at a cost, a 
loss of 6-26% of valuable flatfish catch. Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) argue that an 
economic loss is the most likely cause of non-compliance with regulations in Danish fisheries. 
Stakeholder collaboration - Many authors (Revill et al., 2007, Melvin et al., 1999, Eliasen et al., 
2009, Pinkerton, 2002) emphasise the need for collaboration between the fishing industry and 
managers in the development of any successful management program, including those tackling 
discarding. Many fishers believe that controlling politicians who set management measures are 
ignorant of the nature of fishing, particularly due to their central location removed from the 
regional nature of fisheries (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). Estrangement from policy 
setters is a common feeling in the English Nephrops fishery, with over 75% of skippers expressing 
this view (Catchpole et al., 2006a), a view reflected by the wider UK fishing industry (Hatcher and 
Gordon, 2005). By consulting at all stages, including throughout the period of restriction 
(Catchpole and Gray, 2010), fishers will gain a greater understanding of the detrimental effects of 
discarding, and the aims and mechanics of the management measures being imposed on a fishery 
(Catchpole et al., 2008a). This will encourage mutual respect between the fishing industry and 
managers (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). Fishers can gain a sense of ownership over 
management measures, encouraging compliance, monitoring and enforcement from within the 
fishery (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003, Gilman et al., 2006, Pinkerton, 2002). In return 
managers can gain from the experience and advice of the industry helping to develop practical 
measures with the greatest chance of success (Pinkerton, 2002, Melvin et al., 1999, FAO, 2010). A 
number of successful technical measures have originated from the fishing industry, including the 
“backdown” procedure and the Medina panel designed to aid the escape and reduce the 
entanglement of dolphins in the Eastern Pacific tuna purse seine fishery (Hall, 1998). Moreover, 
many authors (Broadhurst et al., 1996, Eliasen et al., 2013, Kennelly and Broadhurst, 2002, Melvin 
et al., 1999) argue that measures, including gear modifications, introduced with industry 
collaboration are more likely to be accepted by fishing fleets, particularly if the industry has been 
involved in the initial collection of discard data (Catchpole and Gray, 2010). The FAO encourages 
states to implement frameworks to cement the collaborative working of all interested parties 
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over the life of the fishery, and highlights the need for dissemination of successful management 
measures between fisheries as well as the wider global fisheries community (FAO, 2010). 
Compliance with management measures - The level of compliance will impact heavily on the 
success or failure of any management programme, so how compliance can be encouraged and 
what the impact of non-compliance is likely to be must be evaluated (Bergh and Davies, 2002). 
Higher levels of compliance can be encouraged through flexible regulations, allowing generic 
management measures to be adapted into more practical forms for individual fisheries (Raakjær 
Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). Equity amongst fishers will also influence compliance; compliance 
is likely to be higher when fishers feel that all sectors targeting a stock are equally affected by 
regulations (Catchpole et al., 2006a, Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003, Hatcher and Gordon, 
2005). Catchpole et al (2005b) suggest that fleet-wide deployment of gear changes ensures equity 
amongst fishers improving voluntary uptake of modifications and compliance with those that are 
legislated.  The economic impacts of management measures will also affect compliance levels 
(FAO, 2010, Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003, van Marlen et al., 2005). Low compliance in 
the face of economic loss as a result of discard reduction measures can be combated through 
economic incentives or disincentives, either as direct compensation or use rights (Catchpole et al., 
2006a, Catchpole and Gray, 2010). Fishers using more selective gear can be rewarded by being 
granted additional days-at-sea (Catchpole et al., 2005b) or be granted access to more profitable 
fishing areas (Hall, 2002). In addition the granting of fishing licenses can be used to ensure 
compliance; the uptake of a minimum of one gear modification is compulsory if a fishing license is 
to be granted in the French Nephrops fishery (Catchpole and Gray, 2010). However, any incentives 
or disincentives that are implemented must be strong enough to outweigh any potential benefit 
of non-compliance (Branch et al., 2006a). Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) found that 
fishers were likely to continue to fish despite having exceeded a quota if there was a low chance 
that they would be caught. However, non-compliant behaviour is reduced if the cost of detection 
and prosecution exceeds expected benefits (Beddington et al., 2007). Any infringement of 
management restrictions must be penalised immediately and in such a way as to make non-
compliance costly to the guilty fisher (Bergh and Davies, 2002). This will deter others from similar 
behaviour, preventing the development of a general positive attitude towards non-compliance in 
a fishery (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). A set number of infringements during a ten year 
period will result in expulsion from the profitable Western Australia rock lobster fishery, providing 
a strong incentive for compliance  (Bergh and Davies, 2002). Consequently, enforcement is vital in 
ensuring compliance to new regulations, particularly seasonal or area closures (Bergh and Davies, 
2002). 
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1.6. What has been done in EU and UK fisheries? 
A number of technical measures have been implemented under the CFP in an effort to reduce the 
capture of unwanted fish and control total fishing mortality (Gezelius, 2008). Effort restrictions 
have been implemented in many EU fisheries with the aim of reducing fishing to levels that are 
more in line with constraining single-species TACs, and in so doing reduce over-quota discards 
(van Oostenbrugge et al., 2008). A high grading ban is in place; it is illegal to discard catch of quota 
species that is of a legal size if sufficient quota is available to allow its landings (Eliasen et al., 
2013). Mandatory use of selective gears and incentives to adopt more selective fishing practices 
have also been introduced (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011, Madsen and Valentinsson, 2010). For 
example, the use of sievenets and selection grids has been mandated in the North Sea brown 
shrimp fishery (Crangon crangon) to reduce catches and discards of <MLS plaice that occur in high 
abundance on the same fishing grounds (Catchpole et al., 2008b). SMPs were introduced in the 
UK North Sea Nephrops fishery in 1991, in response to a call from both managers and the 
whitefish fishery (Graham et al., 2007). These fishers were concerned about the decline in the 
status of their target species, haddock, whiting and cod, which were commonly discarded as 
juveniles in the Nephrops fishery (Graham et al., 2007). SMPs were made compulsory in UK 
Nephrops fisheries in 1992 and in all EU fisheries targeting North Sea demersal fish in 2000 
(Catchpole et al., 2006a). In 2002 the mesh size of panels was increased and codend 
circumferences were restricted (Graham et al., 2007). Enever at al. (2009b) suggest that these 
technical measures are responsible for the reduction in the proportion of the total catch of 
English North Sea Nephrops trawlers contributed by juvenile whiting, from 22% to 3%. The 
authors also suggest that addition of a SMP to mesh sizes of below 120mm in English otter 
trawlers resulted in a significant reduction in discarding rates from 63% by number to 45%, similar 
to the effect of using a mesh size above 120mm (Enever et al., 2009b). Moreover, increases in the 
mesh size of English beam trawlers to above 90mm since 1999 resulted in a significant reduction 
in discarding rates from 83% by number to 60% (Enever et al., 2009b). Closed areas, including the 
“plaice box” in the North Sea have also been introduced (Pastoors et al., 2000). Nevertheless, 
discarding still remains an issue in EU fisheries (Suuronen and Sardà, 2007) and has been linked to 
the overfishing of European stocks (European Commission, 2011b). TACs, catch composition and 
MLS regulations defined in the CFP continue to generate legal discards (Österblom et al., 2011, 
European Commission, 2002). In addition, some regulations, such as the Cod Recovery Regulation, 
have created perverse incentives for fishers to adopt less selective gear (Graham et al., 2007). 
Under this regulation Nephrops fishers operating with small mesh escaped reductions in allowable 
fishing effort, in addition 20% of their catch could be incidentally caught cod. Larger vessels, some 
39 
 
of which were voluntarily using mesh of >100mm, were granted less than half the days at sea of 
these other vessels and only 5% of their catch could be cod. The intention was to restrict the 
fishing activities of the larger vessels who contributed the majority of cod fishing mortality. 
However, fishers were instead incentivised to adopt smaller mesh sizes and avoid the tougher 
restrictions (Graham et al., 2007).  
1.6.1. The reform of the CFP 
The majority of fishers see discarding as morally wrong (Paramor et al., 2005); 100% of Danish 
fishers in the North Sea believe discarding dead fish is unconscionable (Raakjær Nielsen and 
Mathiesen, 2003). Similarly, for fishers in the English Nephrops trawlers having to discard 
commercial species due to regulations is senseless, as they represent a waste of current or future 
valuable catch (Eliasen et al., 2013). Fishers are not alone; the public and managers also believe 
that discarding of dead catch is unacceptable (Bellido et al., 2011). In 2009 the European 
Commission released a Green Paper proposing a complete reform of the CFP to address the poor 
management of EU fisheries, including not only discards but also overexploitation of stocks, 
declining catches, over-capacity fleets, high subsidies, and economically fragile fisheries 
(European Commission, 2009). The Commission set out its vision for future European fisheries, 
where exploitation levels are in line with the maximum sustainable yield of stocks, and 
economically viable fleets are of a size that is proportionate to the resource, using 
environmentally friendly fishing practices. In addition, the Green Paper stated that the reformed 
CFP should prevent discards (European Commission, 2009). A view reiterated in the UK’s response 
(United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the European Union, 2009). In March 2011, Maria 
Damanaki, the European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, gave a speech in 
Brussels announcing that in her opinion discards were unethical and a waste of both resources 
and effort (European Commission, 2011a). She proposed a discard ban supported by a system of 
effort controls, controlling days-at-sea, or catch quotas accounting for the total catch of vessels 
(European Commission, 2011a). The objective of eliminating discards and reducing unwanted 
catches is now at the heart of the 2012 reform of the CFP (European Commission, 2013a). A 
discard ban covering regulated species has been agreed by Member States and will be phased in 
from 2015. Total removals of important commercial species will be controlled through catch limits 
requiring the full documentation of catches, with the aim of achieving stocks exploited at or 
below their maximum sustainable yield by 2015 where possible, and 2020 at the latest (European 
Commission, 2013a). The reforms of the CFP are in the final stages; negotiations between 
Member States are complete, the Commission has accepted the reformed policy. The final 
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approval of this policy by the European Parliament is expected to occur in December 2013 
(European Commission, 2013b).  
 
1.7. Introduction to research  
 
The European Commission aims to meet the objective of eliminating discards and reducing 
unwanted catches through the introduction of a discard ban for regulated species (European 
Commission, 2013a). A discard ban may reduce discards and improve data collection if 
compliance is high. However, unless incentives are created for the adoption of more selective 
fishing practices, a discard ban is unlikely to reduce unwanted catches (Bellido et al., 2011). A 
discard ban may just result in unwanted catch being landed rather than discarded.  
In Chapter 2 we examine experience from a number of fisheries around the world where a discard 
ban has been introduced. Using primary literature, government reports and the findings of stock 
assessments we evaluate whether a discard ban can incentivise change. We also analyse the role 
of supporting measures such as bycatch quotas and real-time closures.   
Under the reforms of the CFP the discard ban will be supported by effort controls and or catch 
quotas for important commercial species. In Chapter 3 we analyse whether the combination of a 
discard ban with such measures will generate incentives for fishers to adopt more selective fishing 
practices. We use observer and logbook data, combined with economic data from the fishing 
industry, to assess how the income of a case study fleet, the English North Sea otter trawler fleet, 
might change on an average trip under a discard ban combined with effort controls or catch 
quotas. The analysis is based on two alternate behavioural scenarios; the continuation of existing 
fishing behaviour and catch compositions, or the avoidance of all <MLS catch. Comparing these 
two scenarios allows us to discern if fishers would benefit from avoiding <MLS catch, and 
therefore if an incentive for the adoption of more selective fishing could be generated. 
The model presented in Chapter 4 builds upon the finding of Chapter 3. Using the logbook, 
observer and economic data we construct a model which includes data from all trips undertaken 
by the English North Sea otter trawler fleet in 2010. We assess how the operating profit of the 
fleet would have changed in 2010 if a discard ban and a single or multiple catch quotas had been 
implemented for four demersal finfish species. We examine how operating profits might have 
changed under a range of behavioural scenarios including the adoption of more selective gear. 
This allows us to identify not only what behaviour changes might take place when the CFP reforms 
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are introduced, but also which vessels will have the strongest incentives to change fishing 
practices. 
In Chapter 5 we use the Fcube (Fleet and Fisheries Forecast) model (Ulrich et al., 2011) to explore 
how introducing catch quotas and a discard ban may impact on the multiple stocks and fleets of 
the North Sea demersal finfish fishery. We go further in evaluating how different methods of 
setting catch quotas may affect fleets and the generation of an incentive for more selective fishing 
practices. We identify how this incentive may be distributed amongst fleets, and what factors 
determine its strength. This allows us to explore who is likely to be a winner or a loser over a 
much larger scale than our previous models, giving us an idea of how the level and nature of 
fishing may change in the North Sea once the CFP reforms come into force.  
The text of the research chapters reflects the version of the CFP reforms that was current at the 
time that they were written, and that published papers haven’t been revised to account for 
subsequent changes. 
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Chapter 2.  
Incentivising selective fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from 
European and global fisheries. 
 
Condie, H. M., Grant, A., and Catchpole, T. L. 2014. Incentivising selective 
fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from European and global 
fisheries. Marine Policy, 45: 287-292. 
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Abstract 
The reduction of discards in European fisheries has been identified as a specific objective of the 
reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. To reduce the uncertainty in catch data and the 
socially unacceptable waste of resources that results from the disposal of catch at sea, a policy to 
ban discards has been proposed. Discard bans are currently implemented in Alaska, British 
Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland. Experience from these countries 
highlights that a policy of mandatory landings can result in a reduction in discards, but relies upon 
a high level of surveillance or economic incentives to encourage fishers to land more of their 
catch. Discard bans will also not result in long term benefits to stocks unless total removals are 
reduced, through the avoidance of undersized, non-commercial or over quota catch. Experience 
shows that additional management measures are required to incentivise such a move towards 
more selective fishing. Success has resulted from the use of area closures and bycatch limits, with 
potential applications in EU fisheries. However, selective fishing will not be a panacea for the 
current state of European fisheries; discard bans and accompanying measures must be embedded 
in a wider management system that constrains fishing mortality to reasonable levels before 
sustainable exploitation can occur.  
Keywords: Discard ban; Selective fishing; Catch quotas; Bycatch  
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1. Introduction  
Discarding, where a portion of a vessel’s catch is returned to the sea dead or alive (FAO, 2010), is 
a widespread problem in EU fisheries. 40-60% of catch is discarded by North Sea beam trawlers, 
whilst discard rates of 30% are estimated for bottom trawlers in the Northeast Atlantic (STECF, 
2006). The incentives for discarding are numerous, but result from multiple species and size of 
fish occurring in the same area and being captured by fishing gear of limited selectivity (MRAG, 
2007). In EU fisheries, regulations define the catch that can be legally landed. Fish that exceed 
quota, are below minimum landing size (MLS) or do not meet catch composition regulations 
cannot be retained and must be discarded (European Commission, 2002). Catch will also be 
discarded if it is of poor quality, small size, or of a non-commercial species resulting in a low 
market value (Catchpole et al., 2005). Disposal at sea results in much of this catch being 
undocumented, introducing additional uncertainty into the stock assessments of commercial 
species and making it more difficult to determine appropriate fishing mortality levels (MRAG, 
2007).  Consequently, the reduction of discards in European fisheries has been identified as a 
specific objective of the proposed reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (European 
Commission, 2011b). To facilitate this aim, the implementation of a discard ban in combination 
with catch quotas has been proposed (European Commission, 2011a). Dependent upon the level 
of compliance a discard ban should result in a reduction in discards. However this will only benefit 
stocks in the long term if a reduction in total removals and therefore fishing mortality is achieved 
(MRAG, 2007). In the case of commercial species, reducing the fishing mortality of juvenile fish 
would allow a greater number of individuals to survive and reproduce (Sigler and Lunsford, 2001), 
with a subsequent growth in the size of stocks and exploitable catch (Valdemarsen, 2003). 
However, experience shows that in the absence of incentives to fish more selectively and avoid 
the capture of formerly discarded catch, a discard ban will not result in more sustainable fisheries 
(Bellido et al., 2011). Discard bans have been implemented in a number of fisheries around the 
world, including the US Alaskan and British Columbian groundfish trawl fisheries, and in New 
Zealand, Icelandic, Norwegian and the Faroese fisheries. This paper briefly assesses the effect of 
these discard bans and the surrounding management system, identifying whether any benefits of 
the policy have been observed, primarily through the reduction of discards and incentivising of 
more selective fishing through the avoidance of undersized, over quota and non-target species. 
The experience from UK fisheries projects and pilot schemes in incentivising a behaviour change 
in fishers is also evaluated. Finally, conclusions are drawn from both sets of observations to 
provide a number of lessons that can be used by UK fisheries managers when implementing the 
new discards policy under a reformed CFP.  
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2. Incentives for selective fishing under a discard ban – lessons from abroad 
2.1  US Alaskan groundfish fisheries 
The US Alaskan groundfish fisheries have operated a discard ban for Pacific cod (Gadus 
macrocephalus) and pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) since 1998 (Graham et al., 2007), 
supported by one of the most comprehensive observer programs in the world (Hall et al., 2000). 
Commercial species are managed through Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQs) or fishing cooperatives, 
placing constraints on the capacity of the fishery (Sigler and Lunsford, 2001). Non-target species 
are protected through fishery specific bycatch levels (Graham et al., 2007). Those that are 
vulnerable or commercially important, including herring (Clupea pallasii), halibut (Hippoglossus 
stenolepis), salmonids (Oncorhynchus spp) and commercial species of crab (Paralithodes 
camtschaticus, Chionoecetes opilio, Chionoecetes bairdi) (NPFMC, 2012) are defined as Prohibited 
Species. Exceeding the proscribed bycatch levels will trigger area or fishery closures (Graham et 
al., 2007, Alverson et al., 1994, Gilman et al., 2006). 
Since the discard ban was implemented, the discard rates of the Alaskan walleye pollock pelagic 
trawl fishery have fallen. Pacific cod discard rates fell from 6.8% to 0.4% by 2003, and pollock 
discard rates are less than 1% (Graham et al., 2007). It is not clear from the literature whether the 
existing low level of discarding is due to non-compliance or is deemed as acceptable by the 
managing authorities. Changes in the selectivity of fishing have also been observed in response to 
bycatch limits. A voluntary change to more selective pelagic trawls from semi-demersal trawls 
occurred in the walleye pollock fishery in response to high catch rates of prohibited crab and 
halibut. Pelagic trawls are now mandatory and levels of bycatch are less than 2% (Graham et al., 
2007). The selectivity of fishing has also been improved in the demersal longline fishery after a 
voluntary fleet wide communication programme designed to reduce the incidental capture of 
halibut was implemented (Gilman et al., 2006). Observer catch and bycatch data are collated by 
the Fisheries Information Services and the locations of bycatch hotspots, along with advice on 
bycatch reduction techniques, are reported to vessels within the program. As a result fishing 
effort has redistributed away from areas associated with increased bycatch and the bycatch rates 
of participating vessels are 30% lower than the rest of the fleet. Gilman et al. (Gilman et al., 2006) 
argued that the programme has contributed to a 33% reduction in the levels of halibut bycatch. 
The introduction of IVQs has reduced the capacity of the sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria) and 
halibut longline fishery. With fewer vessels operating, fishing grounds are less crowded allowing 
the remaining effort to concentrate in more productive areas where the abundance of juvenile 
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fish is lower. Improved choice of fishing grounds resulted in a 9% increase in proportion of mature 
female sablefish in the catch, leading to a 9% increase in the spawning biomass per recruit by 
2001 (Sigler and Lunsford, 2001). 
The use of a discard ban in the Alaskan groundfish fishery has reduced discard levels of the 
designated species (Graham et al., 2007). Placing limits on bycatch that will constrain fishing have 
incentivised more selective fishing, with a shift in fishing grounds and gear choice, and increased 
fleet communication (Gilman et al., 2006, Sigler and Lunsford, 2001, Graham et al., 2007). This has 
been aided through a high level of observer coverage and allocation of individual quotas. Under 
this management system, in which the discard ban is embedded, no groundfish stocks are 
considered to be overfished with only 3 stocks falling below target biomass levels (Aydin et al., 
2010). 
2.2 British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery  
The discarding of rockfish (Sebastes) species is prohibited in the British Columbia groundfish trawl 
fishery. Only those species designated as Prohibited Species, which cannot be legally retained, are 
excluded from the ban and mitigation measures are required to maximise their survival rates 
(Rice, 2003). The fishery is managed under an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system 
supported by 100% observer coverage. When a species quota is exhausted, fishers must stop 
operating in that area, or purchase additional quota within defined limits (Grafton et al., 2005, 
Branch and Hilborn, 2008). Overages of up to 37.5% for halibut and 15% for hake (Merluccius 
productus) can be legally landed without the purchase of additional quota, reducing the incentive 
to discard. This overrun is subtracted from the following year’s quota and the value of the catch is 
forfeited. This removes any incentive to target over quota catch that can be legally landed, whilst 
encouraging fishers to match catches to available quota (Rice, 2003, Sanchirico et al., 2006). 
Marketable discarded catch is counted against quotas, after allowing for estimated discard 
survival rates, discouraging highgrading where fishers try to maximise profits by landing only the 
larger more valuable individuals (Grafton et al., 2005, Branch and Hilborn, 2008). Non-target and 
non-quota species are managed through bycatch limits (Sanchirico et al., 2006, Grafton et al., 
2005). 
The direct effect of the discard ban in promoting more selective fishing has not been evaluated in 
the literature. Reductions in the discards of Pacific ocean perch (Sebastes alutus), yellowmouth 
(Sebastes reedi), redstripe rockfish (Sebastes proriger), and shortspine thornyheads (Sebastolobus 
alascanus) have been observed, but are linked to constraining quotas and the accounting of 
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discard mortality by onboard observers (Grafton et al., 2005). Targeting of species with less 
constraining quotas has been observed, with fishers avoiding areas where fish with limited quota 
are more abundant; in the case of rougheye (Sebastes aleutianus), yelloweye (Sebastes 
ruberrimus) and shortraker rockfish (Sebastes borealis) this has resulted in a 50% reduction in 
catches (Branch and Hilborn, 2008). Bycatch limits have also triggered more selective fishing. 
Discard rates of spiny dogfish dropped by 5% between 1997 and 2004, and the annual bycatch 
mortality of halibut has been reduced by 15% (Grafton et al., 2005).  
More selective fishing has been incentivised, but the role of the discard ban in this change is 
unclear. Constraining bycatch limits and a reduction in the benefits of discarding, facilitated 
through a full observer programme, have encouraged fishers to match catches to available quota 
and avoid excessive bycatch (Grafton et al., 2005, Branch and Hilborn, 2008). Under this system of 
management the majority of groundfish stocks are considered to be in a healthy condition, 
however not all stocks are being adequately protected (Fargo et al., 2007). 
2.3 Faroe Island fisheries  
The Faroese Islands have operated under a full discard ban since 1994 (Gezelius, 2008). 90% of 
the Faroese fishing fleets are managed under effort controls (Løkkegard et al., 2007), whilst larger 
vessels operating in deeper waters are managed under quotas and bycatch limits for cod and 
haddock (Reinert, 2001b, Reinert, 2001a). Trawling is prohibited inside the 12 nautical mile limit 
(Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011, í Jákupsstovu et al., 2007), except for a limited number of small 
trawlers targeting plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and lemon sole (Microstomus kitt) during 
summer months (Reinert, 2001b, Løkkegard et al., 2007). Fishers operating in this area are obliged 
to report high catches of undersized fish (Eliasen et al., 2009, Løkkegard et al., 2007); if juveniles 
of cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) or saithe (Pollachius virens) 
contribute more than 30% of the catch, an area closure will be implemented (í Jákupsstovu et al., 
2007, Reinert, 2001b, Løkkegard et al., 2007). Fishers must also vacate fishing grounds if 4% or 
more of the total trip catch of cod is below 40cm (Gezelius, 2008). Outside the 12 nautical mile 
limit, the mandatory use of large minimum mesh sizes and sorting grids in trawls is thought to 
reduce the capture of undersized fish (Løkkegard et al., 2007). 
Discarding in the demersal fisheries targeting Faroe Plateau cod, saithe and haddock is thought to 
be low (ICES, 2011). These fisheries are managed through effort controls which do not generate 
incentives for discarding as fish are not counted against quotas (Eliasen et al., 2009, Løkkegard et 
al., 2007). Highgrading may be incentivised in the fisheries managed under TACs, but has not been 
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quantified (Sanchirico et al., 2006). No discard data are currently available to evaluate the efficacy 
of the discard ban (Løkkegard et al., 2007). However it is known that the ban is not always 
enforced and some discarding does occur (Reinert, 2001a). Information on changes in fishing 
behaviour to avoid bycatch and juvenile fish is also sparse. However, Løkkegard et al. (Løkkegard 
et al., 2007) argue that juvenile haddock have not been effectively protected through technical 
measures in the longline fisheries.  
Without discard data it is difficult to assess whether selective fishing has been incentivised. It is 
clear that the current management system and any changes in selectivity have not prevented the 
status of cod, haddock and saithe stocks falling below optimum as a result of unsustainable effort 
levels (ICES, 2011). Haddock stocks are currently depleted and cannot sustain directed fisheries, 
whilst dramatic reductions in effort of over 30% have been advised by ICES for the Faroe Plateau 
cod and saithe stocks (ICES, 2011). Clearly avoiding the capture of juveniles, bycatch and over 
quota fish will not result in sustainable fisheries unless fishing effort is first set at an appropriate 
level.  
2.4 Iceland fisheries  
The landing of catch has been mandatory in Icelandic fisheries since 1989, as part of an ITQ 
management system (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011, Sanchirico et al., 2006, Clucas, 1997). Legal 
landing of over quota and non-target catch is allowed. ITQ overages of 5% can be covered by 
quota from the following year (Sanchirico et al., 2006, Hutton et al., 2010), alternatively fishers 
can forfeit the catch value which will then be used for fisheries research (MFA, 2011). Fishers will 
receive 20% of this value to cover landings costs (Hutton et al., 2010, Sanchirico et al., 2006). 
Larger overruns and non-target catch can be covered through the purchase of additional quota 
(Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Failure to cover non-mandated catch with allowed overages or 
purchased quota can result in the revoking of fishing licences (Sanchirico et al., 2006). The capture 
of juvenile fish is discouraged through the closure of fishing areas for two weeks if catch levels 
exceed proscribed limits (MFA, 2011). Non-compliance can lead to revoking of fishing licenses, 
fines or even gaol sentences (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Catches are monitored onshore by the 
Directorate of Fisheries, supporting at sea observers and coast guard inspections (MFA, 2011).  
Despite a policy of mandatory landings, discarding still occurs but has declined since the early 
1990s (Valdemarsen, 2003). Haddock discard rates have fallen from an already low level of 2.8% 
to under 1%, whilst cod discard rates have not exceeded 2% since 2001 (Pálsson et al., 2010). 
Total discards of saithe are currently between 1-2% (ICES, 2011). Anecdotal evidence also 
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suggests that fishers have attempted to avoid catching cod as a result of a constraining TAC, 
shifting targeting to haddock. However the Icelandic haddock stock is currently harvested 
unsustainably (ICES, 2011). The effect of the area closures has not been evaluated. ICES suggests 
that juvenile fish are unlikely to be protected by small temporary closures but highlight that 
multiple successive closures in a single fishing ground may have an effect which has not been 
quantified (ICES, 2011). However, approximately 2000 closures have been initiated since 1986 
with over 60% triggered by high abundance of juvenile cod (MFA, 2011). Moreover, direct 
targeting of small saithe has increased over recent years and the issue of bycatch also remains. 
The sustainability of high levels of juvenile anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius) captured in trawl 
fisheries and bycatch of lumpsuckers (Cyclopterus lumpus) has raised concerns and should be 
closely monitored (Hafrannsónastofnunin, 2010).  
Although the discard levels are low it is unclear if the discard ban itself has incentivised more 
selective fishing. Information on the landing weights of undersized individuals and bycatch species 
is sparse. In its absence it is difficult to assess whether fishers avoid the capture of this unwanted 
catch or simply land more of it. However, around 10 000t of over quota or undersized catch is still 
landed annually under the allowed 5% quota overages (MRAG, 2007), suggesting that selectivity 
remains a problem. Discarding is low under a policy of mandatory landings, but still persists 
(Pálsson et al., 2010) and little evidence of more selective fishing is available in the literature. The 
shifting of targeting to haddock by cod fishers (ICES, 2011) highlights the importance of ensuring 
that fishing mortality of all target species within a mixed fishery is constrained to appropriate 
levels, and that any changes in fishing behaviour are monitored and accounted for.  
2.5 Norwegian fisheries  
A discard ban has been in force in Norwegian fisheries since 1983 and has undergone a continual 
extension of the species to which it applies (Dingsør, 2001, Graham et al., 2007, MRAG, 2007). 
Under this policy discarding of all significant commercial species is prohibited onboard all 
Norwegian registered vessels and vessels inside the Norwegian EEZ (Diamond and Beukers-
Stewart, 2011, Gezelius, 2006). These commercial species are managed under TACs subdivided 
into ITQs or group quotas (Dingsør, 2001, Eliasen et al., 2009). Catch is counted against quotas 
and all fishing activity that runs the risk of catching that species must stop when the quota is 
fulfilled (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Small overruns of quota or non-target catch can be legally 
landed and retained by fishers (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Larger catches that incidentally 
exceed quotas or catches of sub-legal length can be landed without prosecution or penalties but 
the catch is confiscated by the sales organisations or Directorate of Fisheries respectively. The 
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catch value is forfeited, but vessels in the demersal fishery receive 20% to cover landing costs, 
incentivising compliance with the ban (Gezelius, 2006, Gezelius, 2008). This system of legal 
landings and forfeiture of sales values is designed to discourage discarding and the targeting of 
over quota catch (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011). Observation of discarding, direct or 
negligent targeting of non-mandated catch or falsifying sales notes and logbooks will result in 
fines and the confiscation of the catch, or revoking of fishing licences (Gezelius, 2006, Eliasen et 
al., 2009, Gezelius, 2008). 
A system of area closures, similar to the Faroese and Icelandic systems, is designed to reduce the 
capture of undersized fish in the Barents Sea whitefish fisheries (Rejwan et al., 2001). Fishing 
grounds will be closed if more than 15% of the total catch of target species is undersized cod, 
haddock and saithe and will not be reopened until levels of juvenile fish reach acceptable limits 
(Dingsør, 2001, Rejwan et al., 2001, ICES, 2011). Similar restrictions are in place for bycatch in the 
Pandalus shrimp fishery (Graham et al., 2007, Rejwan et al., 2001). Observers onboard 
commercial fishing vessels (Graham et al., 2007), and survey vessels operating in areas where 
undersized fish are more likely to be abundant facilitate the rapid closing and opening of fishing 
areas (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). Coastguard inspections ensure that catch matches the 
composition regulations. If the level of undersized catch or non-target species is too high, vessels 
are required to move at least 5 nautical miles to different fishing grounds (Graham et al., 2007, 
Rejwan et al., 2001, Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011). 
The lack of effective monitoring has complicated estimates of compliance and consequent 
efficacy of the discard ban (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011, Dingsør, 2001, Graham et al., 
2007). Assessment of any link between changes in selectivity and the presence of this policy has 
not been made in the available literature. Discarding of saithe is known to occur in the cod and 
purse seine fisheries, and highgrading of haddock is also a problem in the Northeast Arctic 
longline and trawl fisheries, although this has not been quantified (ICES, 2011). However, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs argues that the behaviour of fishers has 
changed in response to the policy’s existence, reducing overall discards (MFCA, 2010). A reduction 
in the discarding of cod and haddock below the minimum legal catch size was observed in the 
Barents Sea between 1988-1998, however evidence suggests this occurred in response to the 
supporting system of area closures, rather than the ban (ICES, 2011). Other changes in selectivity 
have also been incentivised by area closures. The Pandalus shrimp fishery developed a type of 
sorting grid, the Nordmøre grid, to reduce the large catches of undersized fish, which had resulted 
in the closure of substantial areas of the Barents Sea (Graham et al., 2007). The grid consisted of 
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an aluminium grid of variable size held at a 48˚ angle in front of the codend. The narrow bar 
spacing (19mm) guided larger fish to an escape whole in the top of the trawl, whilst smaller target 
shrimp passed through the bars into the codend (Isaksen et al., 1992). The voluntary uptake of the 
Nordmøre grid allowed participating vessels to gain access to closed fishing grounds, and it 
became mandated in 1993. Closures may still be implemented despite the success of this gear 
modification, incentivising continued research into improving the selectivity of shrimp fishing. 
Inspired by the success of the Nordmøre grid, the Barents Sea demersal trawl fleet developed fish 
grids, allowing access to closed fishing grounds (Graham et al., 2007). The grids were mandated in 
1997 (Dingsør, 2001). 
The effect of the Norwegian discard ban in incentivising more selective fishing is difficult to 
quantify due to a lack of data. However, ICES state that the Norwegian management system has 
been successful at reducing the capture of juvenile haddock, and the adult stock is currently 
exploited at sustainable levels (ICES, 2011). The system of area closures reducing fishing 
opportunities has also generated an economic incentive to avoid undersized fish of other species 
(Graham et al., 2007). However, the management system as a whole has failed to maintain all 
stocks at target levels. The Coastal Cod stock is currently exploited unsustainably, despite large 
reductions in bycatch limits and restrictions on allowable gear types (ICES, 2011). Golden redfish 
(Sebastes marinus) and beaked redfish (Sebastes mentella) stocks are also depleted and cannot 
support directed fisheries or the bycatch levels currently observed (ICES, 2011). Although some 
success has been seen in Norwegian fisheries, particularly in regard to the system of real time 
area closures, maintaining the catches of all species at sustainable levels remains a challenge that 
has not been met. 
2.6 New Zealand fisheries 
New Zealand fisheries have been managed under a discard ban incorporated within an ITQ system 
since 1986 (Hutton et al., 2010). Discarding of catch is only allowed for species with high survival 
rates (Sanchirico et al., 2006) or those below the legal MLS (MRAG, 2007). The landing of over 
quota, non-target or bycatch species is allowed, incentivising compliance (Hutton et al., 2010). To 
avoid the curtailment of fishing and loss of fishing permits, this catch must be covered through 
the purchase of additional quota or the payment of a tax, the “deemed value” (Peacey, 2002, 
Hutton et al., 2010). The deemed value is a penalty based on the market value and weight of 
catch, and is subtracted from catch profits. To discourage excessive overruns of quota, the 
deemed value will increase with the scale of the overage. A 20-40% overrun of an individual’s 
quota will incur 20% larger deemed values dependent upon the species in question (Sanchirico et 
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al., 2006, MRAG, 2007). Subsequent purchase of quota to cover this catch will result in a refund of 
the deemed value (Peacey, 2002). This sliding scale is aimed at incentivising fishers to operate 
more selectively, avoiding the harvest of fish for which they have insufficient rights (Peacey, 
2002). If set correctly this incentivises the landing of non-mandated catch, particularly if the quota 
for that species is constraining, but not its direct targeting (Hutton et al., 2010).  
Despite the discard ban and deemed value system, discarding is seen as an increasing problem by 
the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries (Peacey, 2002, MRAG, 2007). The current effect of the ban 
is difficult to evaluate as data on discarding are sparse (Davies et al., 2009). However, a lack of 
sufficient incentives for selective fishing or increased catch utilisation has been linked to an 
increase in illegal discarding of non-target or over quota catch (MRAG, 2007). Large quota 
overages resulting in high deemed values may incentivise fishers to discard catch before arriving 
into port. High deemed values may also encourage highgrading (Hutton et al., 2010). However, 
there is no direct evidence of increased discarding as a direct result of the deemed value system 
(Peacey, 2002). 
The system as a whole is unlikely to incentivise the avoidance of juvenile fish; discarding of sub-
legally sized individuals of certain commercially important species is required and is not 
documented or counted against quotas, providing little or no incentive for selective fishing 
(MRAG, 2007). Moreover, deemed values cannot be applied to non-commercial or catch below 
marketable size which have no market value, providing little incentive to avoid these individuals 
(Hutton et al., 2010, Sanchirico et al., 2006). 
A lack of data has also reduced the effectiveness of the management system as a whole. In 2000-
2001 fleet quotas were exceeded in 27% of quota stocks linked to many TACs being based on 
insufficient stock data (Sanchirico et al., 2006). However, in 2009, there was sufficient information 
to evaluate the status of 119 out of the 633 stocks now included under the quota system. 82 
(69%) are at or above target stock sizes, whilst 14 (13%) are depleted or collapsed. New Zealand’s 
Ministry of Fisheries considers these rates to compare favourably with other management 
systems employed globally (Ministry of Fisheries, 2010). 
Evaluation of these fisheries shows that discard bans are not implemented in isolation, but as part 
of a much larger management system. A discard ban by itself will not reduce fishing mortality, 
although may allow improved data collection and closer observance of TACs (Clucas, 1997). It is 
the accompanying management measures that will incentivise fishers to operate more selectively 
in order to avoid undersized, over quota and non-target catch. Experience from North America 
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and the Nordic countries show that effects will be greatest where high levels of non-mandated 
catch trigger a reduction in fishing opportunities (Gilman et al., 2006, Sigler and Lunsford, 2001, 
Graham et al., 2007, Grafton et al., 2005, Branch and Hilborn, 2008). Area closures can result in a 
shift in gear choice and the development of bycatch reduction tools, whilst bycatch limits can be 
effective at incentivising fishers to act collaboratively, as shown by the Alaskan and Norwegian 
case studies (Graham et al., 2007, Gilman et al., 2006). Experience from the New Zealand, 
Norwegian and Faroese fisheries show that a lack of accurate data complicates evaluation of the 
efficacy of any management measure in incentivising more selective fishing. Above all experience 
from these fisheries shows that selective fishing on its own will have little benefit unless fishing 
mortality is also set at a sustainable level (Fargo et al., 2007, ICES, 2011). 
3. Incentivising selective fishing – lessons from UK fisheries 
A number of schemes and pilot studies have concluded that more selective fishing can be 
incentivised in UK fisheries. Project 50%, a collaborative project between English Channel beam 
trawlers and scientists, gave fishers the freedom to design their own gear based on their 
knowledge and experiences (Armstrong and Revill, 2010). Changes in structure and mesh size 
resulted in an average reduction in discards of 52%. This project concluded that there is “no one 
size fits all” gear modification, any attempt to improve selectivity must be appropriate for the 
season, the area of fishing, and the individual vessel (Armstrong and Revill, 2010). 
Eliminating discards through catch quotas has been proposed under the reformed CFP (European 
Commission, 2011a). Pilot schemes have been initiated for North Sea cod and English Channel 
sole (Solea solea). All catch of the managed species is deducted from a vessel’s catch quota 
independent of marketability, including those that were formerly discarded. Exhaustion of quota 
will require fishing activities that risk the capture of that species to stop. The total catch is 
monitored via Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) including CCTV cameras and sensors (Course 
et al., 2011). Selective fishing is incentivised in order to maximise the value of quota and prevent 
the curtailment of fishing (Marine Scotland, 2011). Fishers have the freedom to choose how they 
operate allowing the adaption of fishing methods to suit particular vessels (Course et al., 2011). In 
the Scottish North Sea cod pilot, changes in fishing behaviour in order to reduce the capture of 
the constraining cod were observed. Fishers switched to more selective gear, and relocated to 
different fishing grounds where they could target other species and avoid high concentrations of 
cod (Marine Scotland, 2011). Similar behaviour was observed in the English North Sea cod pilot, 
where the average length of cod in the catch increased above that observed before the trial 
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(Course et al., 2011). During the schemes REM showed promise as a monitoring tool, potentially 
supplementing observer coverage. 
REM could also be used as a catch data collection tool to facilitate a system of real time closures 
designed to protect vulnerable species, juvenile and spawning fish (Marine Scotland, 2010). 
Stakeholder consultation identified that many UK fishers would support such a system, on the 
proviso that effective systems were put in place to ensure both the rapid closure and reopening of 
areas (Paramor et al., 2005). Defining areas where different gear types could be used was also 
favoured, with gears that are less selective being designated to areas where bycatch rates are 
lower (Paramor et al., 2005). 
4. Discussion - Advice for European fisheries  
A number of lessons can be drawn from the fisheries discussed in this paper which could influence 
the design of any incentives schemes that are implemented under the reformed CFP.  
4.1 Reducing Discards  
4.1.1 Discard Bans  
As shown by the North American and Icelandic case studies, if compliance is high discard bans can 
result in a reduction in discards and more accurate catch data (MRAG, 2007). Compliance is more 
likely if the level of surveillance is high, as total fishing mortality can be accounted for, removing 
the incentive to highgrade (Grafton et al., 2005, Branch and Hilborn, 2008). However 
implementing an observer programme similar to that of British Columbia in EU fisheries may be 
impractical. 100% observer coverage is expensive (Vestergaard, 1996), and is unlikely to be cost-
effective in EU fisheries which are dominated by vessels of 10m and under (Graham et al., 2007). 
Experience from the UK catch quota pilots suggests that this problem may be addressed at least in 
part by REM (Marine Scotland, 2010, Course et al., 2011). 
4.1.2 Accompanying Measures  
In the absence of high levels of monitoring discarding under a discard ban will continue unless the 
accompanying management measures create strong enough incentives to encourage landing of 
catch or selective fishing (MRAG, 2007). Implementing gear restrictions or area closures may 
reduce the need to discard, through a reduction in the capture of unwanted catch (MRAG, 2007). 
In addition increased flexibility in management systems that allow the transfer, purchase or 
leasing of quota to match the catch composition of vessels will reduce the incentive to discard 
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non-mandated catch (MRAG, 2007). Allowable quota overages and economic landing incentives 
will reduce the cost of landing formerly discarded catch (Hutton et al., 2010, Sanchirico et al., 
2006). However, EU fisheries managers will have to implement sufficient restrictions to ensure 
that selective fishing results in a greater economic benefit to fishers than landing unwanted catch, 
thereby preventing continued capture of over quota catch or the direct targeting of formerly low 
value sizes or species of fish (MRAG, 2007). 
4.2 Incentivising Selective Fishing 
4.2.1 Discard Bans  
Anecdotal evidence from Norway and Iceland suggests that discard bans and accompanying 
measures can generate social or economic incentives for more selective fishing. However, very 
little data are available from the case studies to suggest that a discard ban in itself directly results 
in the avoidance of non-mandated, non-commercial or undersized catch. Moreover, encouraging 
compliance with a discard ban through landing incentives may reduce the benefit of avoiding this 
unwanted catch (Hutton et al., 2010, Sanchirico et al., 2006, MRAG, 2007).  
4.2.2 Accompanying Measures  
The case studies highlight the need for additional management measures to encourage a change 
in fishing behaviour. The strongest incentives are generated by measures that place a constraint 
on fishing in response to quota overages and incidental catch, such as the UK catch quota 
schemes (Course et al., 2011, Marine Scotland, 2011), the Norwegian area closure system or the 
restrictive bycatch limits implemented in the Alaskan walleye pollock fishery (Graham et al., 
2007). These result in a shift in gear choice, target species or fishing area (Gilman et al., 2006, 
Branch and Hilborn, 2008). These measures rely on the detailed monitoring of catches or catch 
compositions (Graham et al., 2007, Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011, Course et al., 2011). As noted 
above, an extensive observer programme may be unfeasible in EU fisheries, but the catch quota 
pilot schemes have highlighted the potential use of REM as an enforcement tool (Marine 
Scotland, 2010, Course et al., 2011). Any management measure implemented in EU fisheries will 
be particularly powerful if they can utilise the experience and knowledge of fishers, highlighted by 
the success of Project 50% and the catch quota pilot schemes (Armstrong and Revill, 2010, Course 
et al., 2011, Marine Scotland, 2011). However, Iceland’s experience with the unsustainable 
harvest of haddock highlights the need for EU fisheries managers to ensure that any change in 
fishing behaviour will not shift effort onto species or a size range of fish that are unable to support 
the increase in exploitation (ICES, 2011). 
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4.3 Sustainable fisheries  
Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from these experiences is that selective fishing will 
not be a panacea for the state of EU fisheries. Despite a reduction in discards and evidence of 
more selective fishing, unsustainable exploitation of fish stocks is still occurring in a number of 
stocks managed under a discard ban (Fargo et al., 2007, ICES, 2011, Ministry of Fisheries, 2010). A 
policy of mandatory landings can be a useful tool in the management of fisheries, reducing waste 
and improving data collection, especially when combined with management measures that 
incentivise selective fishing. But it must be embedded in a wider management system that 
constrains catches to a long term sustainable level (ICES, 2011). 
5. Conclusions 
The reformed CFP seeks to eliminate discards through a discard ban and/or catch quotas 
(European Commission, 2011a). Additional management measures are likely to be needed under 
any discard ban to incentivise more selective fishing. Experiences from fisheries in the UK and 
around the world show that choosing the right measures is not a simple process. Different 
regulations will be required for different fisheries, dependent upon distribution of activities, the 
gear in use, the scale of enforcement that is available, and the species that are targeted and 
incidentally caught (Hutton et al., 2010). These measures will mean little unless fishing mortality is 
constrained to a sustainable level, whether that is through quotas or effort controls. These 
challenges will be faced by fisheries managers throughout Europe if the proposed changes to the 
Common Fisheries Policy are implemented. 
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Abstract 
Reforms of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) will implement an EU wide ban on 
discarding phased in from 2015, requiring the landing of unwanted small and unmarketable fish. 
The Commission argues that this will create strong incentives for more selective fishing practices; 
however, there is little information to allow us to predict likely changes in fishing behaviour. Using 
detailed historic observer and logbook data from English North Sea otter trawlers and information 
on fish prices and landing costs, we examine the potential impact of a discard ban combined with 
either effort controls or catch quotas on the landings of an average trip. We calculate fishing 
incomes based on the assumption that existing fishing behaviour and catch compositions are 
maintained and compare this with incomes calculated on the assumption that all unwanted catch 
can be avoided. The difference provides an estimate of the maximum possible financial incentive 
for fishers to adopt more selective fishing practices. The calculations suggest that a discard ban in 
isolation will generate little economic incentive to operate more selectively. When combined with 
effort controls, a reduction in fishing effort may result in a proportional reduction in unwanted 
catches, but an incentive to actively avoid this catch is unlikely to be generated. Catch quotas 
would generate much stronger economic incentives, but only for the avoidance of the five quota 
species. So, contrary to the aims of the reformed CFP, a discard ban may not result in a dramatic 
reduction in unmarketable catches of all species. 
 
Keywords: Discards, discard ban, Common Fisheries Policy reform, catch quotas, selective fishing 
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1. Introduction 
Discarding, the act of throwing catch back into the sea (Kelleher, 2005), wastes food and 
economic resources. It represents a major source of undocumented mortality, contributing to the 
overfishing of European fish stocks (European Commission, 2011d, European Commission, 2007a). 
However, the focus of management under the existing European Union Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) is on landings rather than catches. It is illegal to land catch that does not match prescribed 
catch compositions, legal Minimum Landing Sizes (MLS) or TACs (European Commission, 2002). 
Discarding represents a legitimate means for fishers to comply with these regulations by disposing 
of catch which cannot be legally landed, as well as fish with a low economic value (Gezelius, 2008). 
So there is little incentive for fishers to operate more selectively and avoid this “unwanted catch” 
in the first place. However, discarding is perceived as unethical and a waste of resources 
(European Commission, 2011b). Moreover, permitting discarding can result in total catches far 
exceeding the recommended level of removals from stocks, threatening the sustainability of 
fisheries (Kindt‐Larsen et al., 2011). If fishers were to operate more selectively, avoiding capturing 
unwanted fish, whether through the adoption of more selective gear, a change of target species, 
or a change in temporal or geographical distribution of fishing, fishing mortality could fall if 
marketable catches were unchanged. This would allow a greater number of individuals to survive 
and reproduce (Sigler and Lunsford, 2001), with a subsequent growth in the size of stocks and 
exploitable catch (Valdemarsen, 2003, European Commission, 2007b). The European Commission 
(CEC) has proposed reforms of the CFP that seek to reduce these unwanted catches and eliminate 
discards by 2019 (European Commission, 2012). Central to the reforms is a discard ban, supported 
by fishing effort controls or catch quotas (European Commission, 2011a, European Commission, 
2011d, European Commission, 2011c). Fishing effort controls aim to constrain exploitation of 
stocks through restricting the time vessels may spend fishing (Cotter, 2010), whilst catch quotas 
place a direct cap on fishing mortality, requiring all catches to be deducted from quota (Kindt‐
Larsen et al., 2011). Once the quota is exhausted fishers must halt any activities that risk the 
capture of the regulated species within the designated fishing grounds (Course et al., 2011). The 
Commission argues that these measures will create strong incentives for the avoidance of 
unwanted catch through the adoption or development of more selective fishing gears and or 
other changes to fishing practices (European Commission, 2007a).  
If effort controls or catch quotas are combined with a discard ban, having to retain and land 
unwanted catches may result in additional costs that lead to a fall in income, generating economic 
incentives to avoid unwanted catches. If hold capacity is limited, the obligation to retain and store 
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unwanted catches may result in full holds (MRAG, 2007), with fish that would previously have 
been discarded displacing additional valuable landings. When operating under catch quotas, 
additional trips might have to be undertaken in order to maintain existing marketable landings, 
with an associated increase in costs. Under effort controls, where additional trips are not possible, 
fishers may be able to improve the efficiency of operations through gear modifications, 
investment in technology, or fisher knowledge and skill. This would increase the catches of 
valuable species per trip and reduce the loss in income generated by a reduction in fishing time 
(van Oostenbrugge et al., 2008, Kraak et al., 2013, Catchpole et al., 2006). However, an increase in 
target catches per trip may not be possible if hold space is exhausted by the retention of 
unwanted catch. As well as occupying hold space, retaining unwanted catch will require additional 
storage boxes and ice, and will incur additional landings charges (European Commission, 2007a, 
MRAG, 2007). Sales need to cover both landing charges and the cost of additional boxes and ice, 
or fishers will see a fall in income. Therefore, a rational fisher should act to avoid these costs and 
maximise revenue through more selective fishing, reducing the unwanted catch in the first 
instance (Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011, Vestergaard, 1996, Valdemarsen, 2003, European 
Commission, 2007a).  
Two additional incentives may be generated by a discard ban combined with catch quotas. 
Unsalable or low value catch of the regulated species will be deducted from a vessel’s quota, 
reducing the amount of quota available for fishers to catch more marketable individuals, and 
reducing the value of a catch quota. In addition, catching unwanted fish will result in catch quotas 
being fulfilled more rapidly. This will reduce the duration of the fishing season and prevent 
continued fishing for other valuable species, reducing fishing income. Operating more selectively 
to avoid unwanted catch should increase profits (Kindt‐Larsen et al., 2011).  
These arguments that a discard ban will incentivise more selective fishing seem plausible. 
However, there is little information to allow us to predict the likely magnitude of changes in 
fishing behaviour that will result from a discard ban combined with either catch quotas or effort 
controls. Here, we use extensive observer, logbook and economic data from the English North Sea 
otter trawler fleet to predict the economic incentives for selective fishing that will be created. This 
is an important EU fleet where discarding is currently high (Enever et al., 2009). We also 
determine how the economic consequences of a discard ban are likely to be distributed across 
different fleet segments. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Mean landings per trip under a discard ban  
2.1.1 Landings weight and value  
The reformed CFP (European Commission, 2012) includes a discard ban applied to all regulated 
fish species and Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus, hereafter referred to as Nephrops). Mean 
landings per trip were estimated, assuming 100% compliance with this ban. Trip data on the 
weight, size and species composition of discards from English North Sea otter trawlers under 24m 
in length between 2008‐2010, were extracted from the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Science’s (Cefas) Observer Programme (COP). These vessels include otter trawlers of 
varying size primarily targeting Nephrops or whitefish (mainly cod, Gadus morhua; haddock, 
Melanogrammus aeglefinus; and whiting, Merlangius merlangus). The discard data comprised of 
78 trips in which 424 hauls (approximately 90% of the total number of hauls) were sampled by on 
board fisheries observers. Discard rates, and therefore the impact of any discards policies, are 
known to vary between different sections of a fleet (STECF, 2008). So data were grouped into 6 
vessel segments based on gear type, vessel length and engine power (Table 1), in line with the 
segment designations used by Seafish, the UK fishing industry authority. Landings data for vessels 
matching these segment designations were extracted from statistics for 2008‐2010, held by the 
UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) Fishing Activities Database (FAD). 
We assume that the behaviour of fishers was not altered by the presence of an observer, and that 
data from the COP is representative of similar unobserved vessels. In particular, for each segment 
of the fleet, we assume that the mean weight and size composition of the discarded catch of each 
species is the same as that in the observer programme. This may not be the case in reality (Benoît 
and Allard, 2009), however, as the focus of this analysis is the generation of economic incentives 
and the likely spread of economic impacts between vessel segments, rather than an attempt to 
forecast the actual economic consequences of implementing a discard ban combined with other 
measures, valid conclusions can still be drawn from the model. We assume that fish that are 
currently below marketable size, i.e. are below the minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) 
as referenced in CFP reform documentation, (European Commission, 2012) or are below the 
minimum size that is currently landed (minimum marketable size, MMS), cannot be sold, except 
for fishmeal and that the MCRS is set at existing MLS.  
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Table 1 Characteristics of English North Sea otter trawler vessel segments in the Cefas Observer 
Programme from 2008‐2010. Standard errors are shown in parenthesises.    
Vessel segment 
Mean 
vessel 
length 
(m) 
Mean 
engine 
power 
(KW) 
Mean 
mesh 
size  
(mm) 
Mean hold 
capacity  
(50kg 
boxes) 
Trips  
(2008‐
2010) 
Observed 
trips 
(2008‐
2010) 
<10m trawlers  9.6  140  86  100  16984  18 
Nephrops 
trawlers  
<300KW 
11.4  167  83  225 (29)    5042  12 
Nephrops 
trawlers >300KW  16.5  353  85  710 (182)   474  9 
Whitefish 
trawlers <300KW 
<15m 
12.2  169  90  162 (23)    3256  15 
Whitefish 
trawlers <300KW 
>15m 
16.2  245  98  275 (42)    1898  9 
Whitefish 
trawlers >300KW  18.5  381  106  710 (182)   1268  15 
 
The mean weight in tonnes of marketable catch per trip for each segment and species,ܥ௩௦, is 
given by: 
ܥ௩௦ ൌ
∑ ܮ௩௦௦
݊ ி஺஽ೡ
൅ ∑ ܯ௩௦௦݊஼ை௉ೡ
 
ܮ௩௦ is the weight in tonnes of landings per species and segment; ܯ௩௦ is the weight in tonnes of 
discards per species and segment that are of marketable size; ݊ ி஺஽ೡ  is the number of trips per 
segment documented in the FAD and ݊஼ை௉ೡ is the number of trips per segment extracted from the 
COP. The subscripts ݒ  and ݏ  refer to vessel segment and species, respectively. In both 
management scenarios it is assumed that existing landings quota are removed and any catch of a 
quota species and marketable size could be sold for human consumption. The value of the mean 
marketable landings per trip for each segment,  ௩ܸ, was calculated as: 
௩ܸ ൌ ෍ሺܥ௩௦ ൈ ௦ܸሻ
௦
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where  ௦ܸ is the average first sale value per tonne of each species landed by the English North Sea 
otter trawler fleet in the FAD over the period 2008‐2010. It was assumed that the marketable 
discards component of the marketable catch would attain the same price as individuals of the 
species that had been retained, and that an increase in catch entering markets would not alter 
sales values.  
The mean weight in tonnes of unmarketable landings per trip for each segment, ܷ௩, defined as 
discards that fall below MCRS or MMS, were calculated as: 
ܷ௩ ൌ
∑ ܷ௩௦௦
݊஼ை௉ೡ
  
Where ܷ௩௦ is the weight in tonnes of undersized fish of species s caught by all COP trips on vessel 
segment ݒ. 
A value of £60‐£100 per tonne of whole fish sold for fish meal production was supplied by a 
commercial fish meal plant. Both the minimum and maximum values were applied to the mean 
weight of unwanted landings per trip, as below:    
௩ܹ ൌ ܷ௩ ൈ ܹ 
where  ௩ܹ  is the value that could be attained by the unwanted catch, based on the minimum or 
maximum value of raw products for fish meal production, ܹ, assuming that this is the same for all 
species. 
2.1.2 Landings volume 
The volume of total landings per segment, defined here as the number of fish boxes required to 
land the total catch, was calculated as:  
ܤ௩ ൌ
∑ ܥ௩௦௦
0.05 ൅
ܷ௩
0.05 
Each fish box contains 50kg and it is assumed that marketable catch would be sorted into 
separate boxes based on species, whilst unwanted catch would be stored in multi‐species boxes. 
ܤ௩, the total number of boxes per trip, was then compared with estimates of vessel hold capacity, 
or the maximum number of boxes that could be stored, supplied by skippers in the fleet, in order 
to gauge available hold space.  
2.1.3 Landing costs 
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Landing costs will vary dependent upon the port, but a mean estimate was calculated and applied 
to the landings per trip of each vessel segment. The cost of hiring boxes (65p/box) and ice (mean 
value of £48.75/tonne), and an estimate on the mean use of ice of 0.2 tonnes to every 1 tonne of 
fish were based on information from the industry. It was assumed that fishers would hire all fish 
boxes. Sales commission charges of 4% of the sales value were supplied by Seafish, and were 
applied only to the marketable fraction of the catch. Landing charges were supplied on the 
websites of 16 major UK ports, giving a mean cost of 2.5% of the sales value. Landing charges 
were applied to the mean marketable catch value per trip, and the mean unwanted landings per 
trip. Accordingly, total landing costs for each segment, ܣ௩, were calculated as: 
ܣ௩ ൌ ܤ௩ ൈ 0.65 ൅
∑ ܥ௩௦ ൅ ܷ௩௦
5 ൈ 48.75 ൅ ሺ ௩ܸ ൅ ௩ܹ ሻ ൈ 0.025 ൅ ௩ܸ ൈ 0.04 
The influence of an increase in each individual cost on overall landings costs of unmarketable 
catch is shown in Figure S1 (supplementary information, Appendix 8.1). 
To calculate the economic incentive to avoid unwanted landings, the above estimates of mean 
landings volume, costs and value per trip were also calculated based on a scenario where knife‐
edged selectivity was implemented and 100% of unwanted catch was avoided, i.e. unwanted 
landings were set to zero. In addition, the uncertainty (standard error) around mean catch and 
hold capacity estimates was included and propagated through the model.  
2.2 Management scenario 1‐ a discard ban with effort controls 
If fisher behaviour remains unchanged, a reduction in effort will lead to a pro‐rata reduction in 
catches and therefore fishing mortality. To examine the potential impact of a discard ban 
combined with effort controls, the annual landings volume, costs and income of each segment 
were estimated based on the mean segment effort levels of 2008‐2010, and on a 30% reduction 
from this level. A 30% reduction in effort was chosen to reflect an extreme change in effort. Mean 
landings volume, costs and value per trip were estimated using the methods outlined in section 
2.1 and multiplied by the mean annual number of trips undertaken by each segment, as 
documented in the FAD for 2008‐2010. This was repeated with the annual number of trips 
undertaken reduced by 30%, giving an estimate of the impact of a 30% reduction in allowable 
effort. For the purpose of this scenario, it was assumed that a 30% reduction in the number of 
trips would produce a 30% reduction in days‐at‐sea; that fishers did not alter their behaviour and 
that catchability of all species was unchanged, i.e. those trips no longer undertaken due to the 
reduction in allowable effort would be chosen at random by fishers. Additionally it was assumed 
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that effort reductions were uniform across segments. The annual costs of each segment, under 
each effort level, were then subtracted from the annual value of landings, providing an estimate 
of annual fishing income for each segment. The mean hold capacity of vessels in each segment 
was multiplied by the existing and reduced effort levels, giving an estimate of the maximum 
volume of landings that could be landed in a year under each effort level, and compared to the 
above estimate of annual landings volume indicating the degree of hold utilisation under each 
effort scenario. As mentioned above, under a system of restricted effort fishers may alter their 
behaviour to increase catch rates per trip. To investigate whether hold capacity would restrict this 
behaviour in the case study fleet, the annual hold capacity under a 30% reduction in effort was 
compared to the annual volume of catches achieved under the existing effort levels. This indicates 
whether fishers would have sufficient storage space to maintain annual marketable landings by 
increasing catch rates per trip of target species. The above analysis was performed based on the 
per trip estimates of landings including unwanted catch or excluding 100% of unwanted catch, 
indicating the economic benefit that might be generated by implementing more selective fishing 
practices.  
2.3 Management scenario 2 ‐ a discard ban with a catch quota 
Single species catch quotas were calculated for each segment, for 5 species: cod, haddock, plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa), sole (Solea solea) and whiting. Under catch quotas, the full 
documentation of catches allows a part of the TAC that is usually set aside to account for discards 
to be added to existing landings quotas (Eliasen et al., 2009). Under the current UK Marine 
Management Organisation’s catch quota scheme protocols, the percentage of this extra quota 
should not exceed 75% of the stock percentage discard rate. The catch quotas in this analysis 
were set accordingly using the 2009 stock discard rates estimated by the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) (32% for cod, 24% for haddock, 45% for plaice and 26.6% for 
whiting). Annual statistics from the MMO show that UK North Sea landings quota for the 5 chosen 
species were almost completely utilised in 2008‐2010 (97‐100% of cod quota, 86%‐99% of 
haddock quota, 95‐99% of plaice quota, 78‐97% of sole quota and 98‐100% of whiting quota); 
consequently it was assumed that mean annual landings documented in the FAD represented the 
mean landings quota available to each segment in 2008‐2010. The extra quota, calculated using 
the ICES stock discard rates, was then added to the existing landings quota to give estimated 
catch quotas for each of the chosen species. For sole, no ICES stock discard rate exists, so catch 
quotas were instead set in line with the 2011 MMO protocols which cap the uplift in existing 
landings quota at 30%.   
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Assuming no change in the existing fishing behaviour, the number of trips that could be 
undertaken by each vessel segment before the catch quota was fulfilled was calculated based on 
the above estimates of the mean landings weight per trip of the 5 catch quota species.  
ܧ௤௩ ൌ  ܳ௩൫ܥ௤௩ ൅ ܷ௤௩൯ 
ܧ௤௩ is the number of trips that can be taken under each catch quota, ܳ௩, by each segment, and 
ܥ௤௩ and ܷ௤௩ are the weight of marketable and unwanted landings of the catch quota species. The 
number of trips that can be undertaken provides a proxy for fishing season duration under each 
of the catch quotas and a discard ban, based on the existing catch composition or avoidance of all 
unmarketable catch, and assuming no restriction on allowable effort; the fewer trips that can be 
undertaken, the shorter the fishing season. It was assumed that a catch quota for one species 
only would be implemented for each segment at any one time.  
The per trip estimates were raised by ܧ௤௩ to give annual landings volume and weight in tonnes, 
landings costs and income, based on existing catch compositions or avoidance of unmarketable 
catch. These estimates were based on all 50 species caught by the case study in 2008‐2010, 
including the 5 regulated species, providing an insight into the impact of catch quotas in a mixed 
fishery. The annual landings volume was compared to mean vessel hold capacity to examine if 
there would be sufficient hold space to land all catches under a discard ban and a catch quota.  
The value of each catch quota for each segment,  ௤ܻ௩, based on existing catch compositions or 
avoidance of unwanted catch was calculated as: 
  ௤ܻ௩ ൌ  ܧ௤௩൫ ௤ܸ௩ ൅ ௤ܹ௩ െ ܣ௤௩൯  
where  ௤ܸ௩ and  ௤ܹ௩ are the value of marketable and unwanted landings of the catch quota species, 
whilst ܣ௤௩  are the costs associated with the catch quota species landings. 
For the purposes of this analysis it was assumed that quotas were not transferable.  
2.4 Summary of Assumptions 
The model is built upon a number of assumptions as stated above. As the intention of the model 
is to evaluate whether an economic incentive is created for more selective fishing practices, the 
avoidance of unmarketable catch is the only behaviour change investigated here. Consequently it 
is assumed that the catch volume and composition of marketable fish per unit effort will remain 
unchanged despite the introduction of either management scenario. The avoidance of 
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unmarketable catch will also not affect the volume and composition of marketable fish per unit 
effort. Under management scenario 1 it is assumed that existing landings quotas are removed, 
but that effort is constrained to its current level. By contrast, under management scenario 2, all 
effort restrictions are lifted. This allows us to evaluate the potential impact of a discard ban 
combined with effort controls or catch quotas in the absence of any other management tools. 
Under both management scenarios 100% compliance is assumed, and it is also assumed that hold 
capacity will vary proportionately with fishing effort (i.e. that the lengths of trips remain the same 
as at present).   
3. Results  
3.1 North Sea otter trawler discards, 2008‐2010  
During 2008‐2010 English North Sea otter trawlers discarded close to 19% of their total catch by 
weight on trips sampled in the COP (Figure 1a). 87% of discards were of quotas species, and 27% 
of all discards were of an unmarketable size or species. The discards were dominated by whiting, 
dab (Limanda limanda, Pleuronectidae), plaice, saithe (Pollachius virens, Gadidae), cod and 
haddock (Figure 1b). Dab does not have a specified MLS and quota uptake was low, suggesting 
that this species may have been discarded due to its low market value (MMO, 2010). Only 3% (by 
number) of discarded saithe were below the legal MLS, however the discard rate for this species 
was close to 7%, indicating that quota restrictions may have been a primary driver in the decision 
to discard fish of a marketable size (Figure 1f).  
The five species managed under catch quotas in this model represented 32% of discards by weight 
(Figure 1b). The high percentage by number of individuals below the MLS suggest that landing size 
restrictions were a primary driver in the discarding of cod (Figure 1c, 68%), haddock (Figure 1d, 
60%), plaice (Figure 1e, 73%), and sole (Figure 1f, 99%). The discarding of some marketable 
individuals also occurred, possibly in response to quota limitations or quality (Figure 1c and e). 51% 
of whiting discards were over the MLS, suggesting that the influence of landing size restrictions on 
discarding is weaker for this species. Much of the whiting catch may have been returned to the 
sea in response to quota restrictions, or fluctuations in catch composition and price (Figure 1g).  
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Figure 1 Discards of the English North Sea otter trawler fleet documented in the Cefas observer 
programme between 2008 and 2010. (a) The scale of discards by weight (tonnes, t). (b) Discards 
of the 5 catch quota species, and 2 high discarding species, dab and saithe. The length‐frequency 
distributions of retained (solid line) and discarded catch (dotted line) of catch quota species (c‐g) 
and saithe (h), a major component of discards, in comparison to legal MLS (vertical line).   
 
3.2 Management Scenario 1 ‐ a discard ban combined with effort controls  
Removing existing landings quota and introducing a discard ban under existing effort levels would 
have resulted in a 13‐68% increase in marketable landings (Figure 2a) and an 8‐30% increase in 
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fishing income (Figure 2b) compared to mean annual landings and income of 2008 to 2010. The 
<10m segment would have seen the greatest increase in landings, however Nephrops trawlers 
over 300kW in engine power would have seen the greatest increase in fishing income. Whitefish 
trawlers with engine power over 300kW would have observed the smallest change in both income 
and landings. Implementing knife‐edged selectivity would have resulted in a very small decrease 
in fishing income of up to 1% (Figure 2b). The total landings under a discard ban and existing 
effort levels would have utilised between 12 and 49% of available hold space, dependent upon 
the vessel segment (Figure 3a). This estimate of used hold space is based on a mean value of the 
total landings per trip under a discards ban. However, in reality the volume of landings varies 
between trips (Figures S2 and S3, supplementary information, Appendix 8.1), and a vessel may 
undertake a trip where a much higher percentage of the hold space is utilised than on average. 
Consequently, having to retain catch that would previously have been discarded may result in 
hold space being exceeded on a small number of individual trips.    
A 30% reduction in effort levels, assuming no change in fishing behaviour, would have had varying 
impacts on different segments; <10m vessels would have seen an 18% increase in marketable 
landings compared to mean annual landings in 2008‐2010, whilst whitefish trawlers over 300kW 
in engine power would have incurred a 21% reduction in marketable landings (Figure 2c). All 
segments would have seen a reduction in the income generated by landings, from 9% to 24% 
compared to mean annual incomes in 2008‐2010 (Figure 2d). Avoidance of unwanted catch would 
once again have resulted in a maximum 1% reduction in income (Figure 2d). Under the 
assumptions of the model annual hold capacity would have been reduced by 30%, in line with 
effort reductions, however, as total landings would also have been reduced proportionately hold 
capacity would not have been exhausted; only 12‐49% of hold space would have been utilised 
(Figure 3b). The surplus hold capacity would have allowed fishers to alter their behaviour, and 
maintain the level of marketable landings achieved under a discard ban and existing effort levels, 
despite the retention of associated unwanted catches (Figure 3c).     
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Figure 2 Percentage change in the a) annual marketable landings and b) fishing income of <10m, Nephrops (N<300kW, N>300kW) and whitefish 
(W<300kw<15m, W<300kW>15m, W>300kW) otter trawlers under a discard ban and effort controls restricted to the mean annual fishing effort of 2008‐
2010, compared to the mean marketable landings and income achieved in 2008‐2010, if unmarketable catch is retained (dark grey) or avoided (light grey). 
Change in c) annual marketable landings and d) fishing income under a discard ban and effort controls compared to 2008‐2010 if effort is reduced by 30%. 
Error bars show range of values due to uncertainty in mean catch estimates and variation in the value of unmarketable catch.  
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Figure 3 The percentage of <10m, Nephrops (N<300kW, N>300kW) and whitefish (W<300kw<15m, 
W<300kW>15m, W>300kW) otter trawler hold space that would be used annually by total 
landings if unmarketable catch is retained (dark grey) or avoided (light grey) under a discard ban 
and effort controls set at a) the existing mean annual fishing effort level of 2008‐2010, or b) a 30% 
reduction in effort, assuming no change in fisher behaviour. c) The percentage of hold space used 
if fishers were to alter their behaviour and maintain catches achieved under existing effort levels, 
despite a 30% reduction in fishing effort. Error bars show range of hold utilisation values resulting 
from uncertainty in mean catch estimates and mean hold capacities.  
3.3 Management Scenario 2 ‐ a discard ban combined with a catch quota 
The impact of introducing a catch quota and a discard ban into the otter trawler fleet would have 
varied dependent upon the regulated species and the segment (Table S1, supplementary 
information, Appendix 8.1). For example, under a cod catch quota Nephrops trawlers >300kW in 
engine power would have seen a 52% reduction in the number of trips that could be undertaken 
annually compared to 2008‐2010 (Figure 4a), leading to a 25% reduction in marketable catches of 
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all species  (Figure 4c) and a 38% reduction in income (Figure 4e). Meanwhile, the annual number 
of trips by whitefish trawlers >300kW in engine power, would have increased by 14% (Figure 4a), 
leading to a 28% increase in marketable catches (Figure 4c) and a 23% rise in income (Figure 4e).  
Avoiding unmarketable catches of the regulated species would have allowed more trips to be 
undertaken before the catch quota was fulfilled, allowing an increase in marketable catches and 
income (Table S1, supplementary information, Appendix 8.1). Avoiding the 86% of cod catches 
that were unmarketable would have allowed <10m trawlers to increase their annual number of 
trips by 65% above that achieved under a scenario where fishers continue to catch both 
marketable and unmarketable catch (Figure 4a). This would increase marketable catches by 108% 
(Fig, 4c) and income by 78% (Figure 4e). Avoiding unmarketable cod would also have increased 
the value of this segment’s cod catch quota by 95% above that achieved when both marketable 
and unmarketable cod are caught (Table 2). Avoiding unmarketable catches of all species would 
have resulted in approximately 1% reduction in income compared to a scenario where only 
unmarketable cod are avoided. As mentioned above hold capacity would not be exhausted by the 
retention of the total catch including unmarketable fish of all species; with 51‐88% of hold space 
unutilised on an average trip.   
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Figure 4 Percentage change in a) annual number of trips, b) annual marketable landings of all 
species and c) annual fishing income of <10m, Nephrops (N<300kW, N>300kW) and whitefish 
(W<300kw<15m, W<300kW>15m, W>300kW) otter trawlers when unmarketable cod is retained 
(dark grey)  or avoided (light grey) under a discard ban and a cod catch quota, compared to under 
the management regime of 2008‐2010. Error bars show range of values due to uncertainty in 
mean catch estimates and variation in the value of unmarketable catch.      
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Table 2 Change in the value of a catch quota if unmarketable catch of the regulated species (cod, 
haddock, plaice, sole or whiting) is avoided compared to under existing catch compositions. 
Parentheses show range due to uncertainty in catch estimates and value of unmarketable catch. 
  Change in catch quota value (%) 
Vessel segment  Cod  Haddock  Plaice  Sole  Whiting 
<10m trawlers  95  (41, 142) 18  (10, 26)  202  (120, 285)  13  (7, 19)  34  (25, 42) 
Nephrops trawlers 
<300kW  39  (25, 53)  34  (21, 49)  97  (70, 122)  8  (1, 17)  65  (45, 91) 
Nephrops trawlers  
>300kW  63  (20, 94)  35  (8, 50)  3  (2, 5)  2  (‐1, 9)  20  (14, 25) 
Whitefish trawlers 
<300kW <15m  46  (28, 62)  6  (3, 8)  74  (44, 97)  1  (1, 2)  21  (13, 28) 
Whitefish trawlers 
<300kW >15m  18  (11, 26)  4  (2, 6)  25  (9, 39)  1  (0, 1)  9  (5, 14) 
Whitefish trawlers   
>300kW  5  (4, 7)  4  (2, 5)  5  (1, 9)  0  (‐1, 0)  9  (6, 12) 
 
4. Discussion  
4.1 Management scenario 1 ‐ a discard ban combined with effort controls.  
In the absence of existing landings quotas, implementing a discard ban in the otter trawler fleet 
under existing effort levels would have resulted in a large increase in income, as fishers could 
retain marketable fish that would previously have been discarded. However, the model shows 
that the rise in income is not proportional to the increase in marketable landings, suggesting that 
marketable discards are less valuable than catch that is currently landed and that discarding of 
some species may have been driven, at least in part, by a low market value. For fleets where 
discards are dominated by less valuable species, implementing a discard ban in the absence of 
landings quotas may not result in a large rise in income, despite an increase in marketable 
landings. In addition some marketable fish may have been discarded as they are close to the MMS 
or MLS (as shown by COP data), or of poor quality, and would achieve a lower market value; 
consequently the increase in income may not be as large as estimated by the model. Landing 
marketable discards may compensate for a reduction in marketable landings as a result of effort 
restrictions; however, as this catch is of a proportionally lower value than existing landings, fishing 
income may still be reduced.  
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Any reduction in fishing effort should benefit fish stocks that are currently overexploited 
(Murawski et al., 1999), but implementation of a discard ban offers little benefit in reducing 
unmarketable catches, beyond that which results from the effort controls alone. If there is no 
direct control on catches, the discard ban generated little economic incentive for the modelled 
fleet to avoid unmarketable catches as a result of increased landings costs or exhausted hold 
capacity. Independent of the level of effort and the behaviour of fishers, avoiding unmarketable 
catch would have resulted in a small reduction in fishing income as the value of the unmarketable 
catch sold for fish meal production exceeded the cost of its landing, generating a small profit. The 
cost of landing 1t of unmarketable catch (£13.50) is far exceeded by its value (£60‐£100), and as 
the relationship between the weight and the costs and values of this catch is linear unmarketable 
catch should generate a profit independent of its weight and composition. However, the English 
Discard Ban scoping study highlighted potential impacts on shore based operations that could 
result in an increase in landing costs (Catchpole et al., 2011). More catch would have to be moved 
and a larger area of fish quays utilised, potentially increasing labour costs and leading to increased 
landing charges and harbour dues (Catchpole et al., 2011). If landing costs start to exceed the 
value of the unmarketable catch, increased selectivity may be incentivised (European Commission, 
2007a).  
Retaining unmarketable catches would not have exhausted the mean hold capacity of vessels 
under the existing effort levels. With the majority of hold capacity remaining unutilised there 
would have been little incentive for fishers to avoid unmarketable catches as valuable landings 
would not have been displaced. This finding is based on the volume of landings and discards that 
would have been landed on an average trip. However, the volume of landings and discards varied 
between trips (Figures S2 and S3, supplementary information, Appendix 8.1). In all segments the 
volume of landings was much higher than the mean on a small number of trips. On such trips 
much more of the hold space may be utilised than on average and having to retain previously 
discarded catch may result in a full hold, forcing vessels to stop fishing. The impact of a small 
number of curtailed trips will be dependent upon how important the landings of such trips are to 
the annual income of a vessel. Under a 30% reduction in effort, the model assumes that annual 
hold capacity of vessel segments would have been reduced by 30%, resulting in a proportional 
reduction in the volume of catch that could be landed annually. If fishers did not alter their 
behaviour in response to restrictions in fishing effort, and catch compositions were maintained, 
all else being equal, catches of both marketable and unmarketable fish would also have seen a 
proportional reduction. Consequently, the 30% decrease in total landings would have prevented 
hold capacity being exhausted despite the retention of unmarketable catch. If fishers had altered 
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their behaviour to maximise catches per trip and maintain landings annual hold capacity would 
still not have been exhausted; there is sufficient available hold space for the total catch achieved 
under existing effort levels to be caught and retained despite a reduction in the number of trips 
that could be undertaken. If effort restrictions were more severe, hold capacity may have become 
more restrictive, particularly in the <10m segment and for whitefish trawlers >300kW in engine 
power. However, avoidance of unmarketable catches would offer little benefit due to their small 
volume compared to marketable catches. This finding is based on an assumption that catch 
compositions will remain the same even if effort is reduced, but in reality, in the absence of 
landings quotas, fishers can alter their target species to maximise income (Kraak et al., 2008, 
Kerrigan et al., 2004, Cotter, 2010). However, unless the volume of catch, particularly of 
unmarketable fish, increases dramatically the hold capacity of the modelled fleet is unlikely to be 
exhausted, generating little incentive for more selective fishing practices. Moreover, in reality, a 
30% reduction in fishing effort may not result in a 30% reduction in annual hold capacity; 
dependent upon the duration of fishing trips, a 30% reduction in days‐at‐sea may not translate 
into a 30% reduction in the number of trips that can be undertaken annually, and the reduction in 
hold capacity may be less than estimated here. Consequently, annual hold capacity under effort 
restrictions may be even less restrictive for this fleet.  
At present, some catch of a marketable size may be discarded because it is of poor quality. As a 
result, the amount of catch sold for fishmeal production may be higher, and the volume of 
marketable catch lower than estimated in the model. In addition the findings of the model are 
based on mean catches per trip, however discard compositions and volumes vary spatially and 
seasonally (Moranta et al., 2000, Batista et al., 2009, Feekings et al., 2012). So the discard ban 
may lead to more or less unwanted catch having to be landed than would be predicted from the 
mean totals, depending upon the timing and location of fishing operations. Nevertheless, as 
landing costs are recouped and hold capacity is not exhausted, little economic incentive will be 
generated to avoid unmarketable catches. In fleets where the majority of hold space is currently 
utilised, a discard ban combined with effort controls may have more of an impact. This suggests 
that the assumption of the model of 100% compliance with the discard ban is a valid one. Having 
to land unmarketable catch does not result in a loss in income providing little incentive for illegal 
discarding under this management scenario.   
Other incentives to avoid unmarketable catches could be generated under a discard ban and 
effort controls, including an increase in the time and effort needed for catches to be sorted 
(European Commission, 2007a, MRAG, 2007). Avoiding unmarketable catches would allow fishers 
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to use their time and effort more efficiently, and would reduce the time valuable species spend 
on deck before being processed (Morizur et al., 2004). Johnsen and Eliasen (2011) identify a 
reduction in sorting time as a strong incentive for fishers to aid in the development of more 
selective fishing gears and techniques. However, the strength of the incentive will be vessel‐
specific as the degree to which sorting times are increased will be dependent upon the nature of 
the catch, the efficiency of the crew and the sorting procedure of individual vessels. In reality, the 
use of large mixed‐species boxes is likely to limit the additional time required to sort 
unmarketable catch, and reduce the benefit of its avoidance.  
A discard ban combined with effort controls set at existing effort levels is synonymous with a 
discard ban implemented in isolation, suggesting that a discard ban alone will not incentivise 
more selective fishing by otter trawlers. This agrees with experience from other fisheries where 
there is little evidence that a partial or full discard ban in itself has resulted in the active 
avoidance of unwanted catch (Condie et al., 2014). In Faroese fisheries, where a discard ban and 
effort controls are in place there is little evidence that a change in the selectivity has occurred 
(Condie et al., 2014). It has been necessary to supplement the management system with 
additional output controls and technical measures, to limit the capture of juvenile fish (Eliasen et 
al., 2009).  
Despite a lack of economic incentives generated by increased landings costs or exhausted hold 
capacity, unmarketable catches may still be reduced under effort controls and a discard ban. 
Restricting days at sea can reduce the fishing mortality imposed on both target and non‐target 
species, through a reduction in catches (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006, Murawski et al., 1999). The 
relationship between fishing effort and catch is not linear and varies with changes in the 
behaviour of both fishers and fish (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006, Rochet and Trenkel, 2005, Kraak et al., 
2013). Restricting fishing time creates an incentive for fishers to improve targeting of species that 
contribute the most to the value of landings, through fisher knowledge of the best places and 
time to fish, investment in technology and or gear modifications (Kraak et al., 2013, van 
Oostenbrugge et al., 2008, Rijnsdorp et al., 2006). Consequently reductions in catches of these 
valuable species may be less than reductions in fishing time (Rochet and Trenkel, 2005, Rijnsdorp 
et al., 2006). Changes in unmarketable catches could be more or less than the reductions in 
fishing effort, dependent upon the co‐occurrence of these species and sizes of fish with targeted 
individuals, and any changes in their catchability due to the alterations in fishing practices (van 
Oostenbrugge et al., 2008, Kraak et al., 2013). Greater reductions in unmarketable catches could 
be encouraged by issuing enhanced fishing opportunities, such as additional days at sea, to those 
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vessels using more selective gear or avoiding areas where a high proportion of the catch is 
contributed by juvenile fish (Catchpole et al., 2005). 
4.2 Management scenario 2 ‐ a discard ban combined with a catch quota 
A catch quota, but no effort controls, would create stronger incentives to avoid unmarketable 
catches, but only of the catch quota regulated species. Once again implementation of a discard 
ban offers little benefit in incentivising avoidance of unmarketable catches, beyond that which 
results from the catch quotas alone. The current cost of landing unmarketable catch is less than 
its value as fishmeal, so avoiding unmarketable catch of all species would result in a very small 
decline in income under a catch quota. Hold capacity is not exhausted by the retention of total 
catches, providing no incentive to avoid unmarketable catch. However, by avoiding unmarketable 
individuals of the catch quota regulated species fishers can increase the number of trips that can 
be undertaken before the catch quota is exhausted, increasing marketable catches of all species 
and fishing income.  
The impact of implementing catch quotas on the modelled fleet is determined by the magnitudes 
of the current actual discard rates of a vessel segment relative to the ICES estimated stock discard 
rate used to set the catch quota. If the discard rate of a vessel segment is high and exceeds the 
ICES estimate then the catch quota will be insufficient to cover the usual total catches of the 
vessels. Under a cod catch quota, Nephrops trawlers >300kW in engine power saw a large drop in 
the number of trips that could be undertaken, with a subsequent decline in income, as these 
vessels discard 76% of cod catches, substantially higher than the ICES estimate of 32% (Figure 5). 
Loss of income is particularly severe for these vessels as cod catches contribute only a small 
proportion of total landings by value (Figure 5); having to stop fishing as a result of a fulfilled cod 
catch quota results in a large decline in catches of other marketable species. This could be 
alleviated to some degree by acquiring additional quota through swaps, leases or pools. Where 
discard rates are substantially less than the ICES estimate, catch quotas will exceed usual catches, 
allowing vessels to increase the number of trips they undertake. Marketable catches and income 
will increase, but so might the fishing mortality generated by these vessels. Under a sole catch 
quota fishers receive a 30% increase in existing quota in line with MMO catch quota protocol as 
an ICES stock discard rate is not available for this species. However, existing discards of the fleet 
are substantially less than the 30% additional sole quota given to vessels. Fishers are able to 
increase the number of trips they undertake, and their catches of both quota species and other 
marketable fish, provided there are no catch restrictions for other species (Table S1 
supplementary information, Appendix 8.1; Figure 5). The greater the discrepancy between actual 
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and ICES estimated discard rates, the larger the mismatch between catch quotas and actual 
catches, and the greater the impact on income. By avoiding unmarketable individuals of the 
regulated species fishers can lower their total catch per trip, allowing more trips to be undertaken 
before the catch quota is fulfilled. The strength of the incentive for such a behaviour change will 
depend upon the proportion and scale of catches that are unmarketable, and is strongest when 
discard rates are high and the majority of discards are unmarketable. This also applies to catch 
quota value. By avoiding unmarketable catches fishers can allow the catch quota to be fulfilled by 
marketable fish, increasing the quota’s value. The more fish that are unmarketable, the greater 
the economic benefit of avoiding them and the stronger the incentive to do so. This agrees with 
experience from the Labrador and northeast Newfoundland Shelves Cod fishery, and the British 
Columbia groundfish fishery. If all catch is counted against a vessel’s quota, catching 
unmarketable or over‐quota fish results in a loss of revenue incurred directly by fishers (Kraak et 
al., 2013), and an incentive is created to avoid these individuals (Kulka, 1997), particularly if the 
cost of leasing additional quota is high (Branch et al., 2006b). This incentive for more selective 
fishing is reliant upon all fish being documented; a high level of monitoring will be required to 
ensure that all catches are documented and that fishers will not reduce the economic cost of 
catching unwanted fish through illegal discarding, as has been observed in other fisheries where 
individual transferable quotas have been implemented (Harrington et al., 2005, Branch et al., 
2006a, Branch et al., 2006b).  
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Figure 5 The percentage of mean landings per trip between 2008 and 2010 of <10m, Nephrops and whitefish otter trawlers contributed cod (circle), haddock 
(square), plaice (diamond), sole (triangle) and whiting (inverted triangle), by weight and value. The percentage of the mean total catch per trip discarded by 
weight and the percentage of discards that are unmarketable. Error bars show ± variation in estimates due to uncertainty in catch estimates.    
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The relative gain in fishing income associated with avoiding unmarketable catch of quota species 
will be lower than estimated by the model, as avoiding all unmarketable individuals is unlikely to 
occur. However, a large reduction in their capture is achievable (Graham et al., 2007, Gezelius, 
2008, Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011), and the incentive to do so will still be strong. Changes in fishing 
practices have already been observed in a number of catch quota pilot schemes. Facilitated by the 
elimination of micromanagement, participating vessels have adopted more selective gear, or 
changed fishing grounds, and the average size of the regulated species in the catch has increased 
(Course et al., 2011, Marine Scotland, 2011).  
Despite the strong incentives generated by this system, catch quotas must be implemented with 
caution. A large discrepancy between actual discard rates and the ICES stock discard rate used to 
limit the additional quota will result in catch quotas that do not reflect existing catches, and 
fishing may become either unprofitable due to a decline in the length of the fishing season or 
unsustainable in the long term due to an increase in fishing mortality. In addition, under a 
scenario of multiple catch quotas, fishing will be driven by the most constraining quota, 
potentially underutilising some stocks. Consequently, it will be important to ensure that catch 
quotas match catch compositions. This could be achieved through setting catch quotas in line 
with the actual discard rates of vessel segments, rather than the ICES estimate, or through 
ensuring high levels of catch quota flexibility and transferability. In addition, the CFP proposals 
include the provision for a de minimis exemption that can be applied to up to 9% of the total 
allowable catch under certain conditions (European Commission, 2012). However, providing 
fishers with more flexibility to match their quota allocations with their catch composition will 
reduce the incentive to avoid unmarketable catches. 
5. Conclusion 
Contrary to the aims of the reformed CFP, a discard ban in the absence of limits on catch may not 
incentivise a dramatic reduction in unmarketable catch. A discard ban can reduce discards, cutting 
waste and improving data collection (MRAG, 2007, European Commission, 2002). However, a 
discard ban in isolation generates little or no economic incentive for more selective fishing 
(Condie et al., 2014). Limiting fishing effort could result in a reduction in unwanted catches, but is 
unlikely to actively incentivise fishers to change their behaviour to avoid unwanted fish. A discard 
ban combined with catch quotas has the greatest potential to incentivise more selective fishing, 
but only for the regulated species, and unless quotas are set appropriately and with flexibility, 
could increase the fishing mortality imposed by some vessel segments while rendering fishing 
unprofitable in others. No one discard management measure will be appropriate for all EU 
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fisheries, or all vessel segments within a single fishery. Additional technical measures or incentive 
programmes tailored to different fleets or fleet segments may be needed to encourage fishers to 
adopt more selective fishing practices and avoid unwanted catches of all species. Understanding 
the economic consequences of management policies and the most likely behavioural response of 
a rational fisher will allow the most appropriate management tools to be implemented, in order 
for the CFP objective of eliminating discards and reducing unwanted catches to be achieved.  
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Abstract 
A key objective of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy reforms is the elimination of 
discards and a reduction in unwanted catches. Combining a discard ban with catch quotas, where 
all fish, independent of size, count towards quotas could create economic incentives for more 
selective fishing, reducing unwanted catches. We use fishing activities data from English North 
Sea otter trawlers to examine the impact of these measures on this fleet. Initial impacts depend 
on the scale of increase and distribution of quotas and are unevenly distributed, depending on the 
catch and discard characteristics of vessels. Selective fishing will be rewarded as vessels that 
currently have low discards could increase catches and profits. Fishing by less selective vessels will 
be curtailed, reducing profits by 1-14%. This could be partially mitigated through reducing 
regulated catches but will require changes to fishing patterns as using currently available selective 
fishing gears may impact on profitability. So, catch quotas and a discard ban create strong 
incentives for more selective fishing practices, but also for non-compliance with full 
documentation of catches. A high level of monitoring and enforcement will be required to ensure 
that fishers improve profitability through more selective fishing practices rather than illegal 
discarding. 
Keywords: Catch quotas, economic impact, fishing mortality, North Sea otter trawlers  
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1. Introduction 
Non-governmental organisations, such as the Fish Fight campaign (Fish Fight, 2011), have drawn 
public attention to the scale of discarding in marine fisheries. Non-target species, undersized fish 
and over quota catch are returned to the sea in large quantities, often dead (Alverson et al., 
1994). Such discards not only represent a waste of food and economic resources but also limit the 
accuracy of stock assessments. Much of the discarded catch will go undocumented, representing 
unaccounted mortality and making it difficult to set appropriate limits on fishing activities 
(European Commission, 2011a). This has contributed to the overfishing of European fish stocks 
(European Commission, 2011c). Currently, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) it is illegal to land catch that does not match prescribed catch compositions, legal Minimum 
Landing Sizes (MLS) or TACs (European Commission, 2002). Instead this catch may be legally 
discarded. Fishers can also choose to discard any catch with a low market value. The European 
Commission is implementing a discard ban as part of the latest reform of the CFP, seeking to 
reduce these unwanted catches and eliminate this wasteful practice (European Commission, 
2011c, European Commission, 2011a, European Commission, 2011b). 
However, a discard ban itself creates little economic incentive to reduce unwanted catches. 
Supporting measures are required (Condie et al., 2014). A more promising approach is to manage 
fisheries through a combination of catch quotas and a discard ban (European Commission, 
2011b). As outlined in the CFP proposals, this seeks to encourage more selective fishing practices 
by creating economic incentives to avoid catches that would formerly have been discarded 
(European Commission, 2012). Under catch quotas the total catch of a regulated species, 
independent of quality or size, will be documented, and counted against a vessel’s quota by 
weight (Marine Scotland, 2011). Full documentation of catches allows a part of the TAC currently 
set aside to account for discards to be added to current landing quotas (Eliasen et al., 2009). 
However, all activities that risk the capture of the regulated species within the designated fishing 
ground must stop once the catch quota is fulfilled (Course et al., 2011). Lowering the total catch 
of regulated species per trip will delay the fulfilment of the quota and allow fishing for other 
species to continue for longer, whilst avoiding juvenile fish will allow the quota to be fulfilled by 
more valuable individuals of marketable size (Course et al., 2011). Vessels involved in catch quota 
pilot schemes have adopted more selective gear, or changed fishing grounds, and the average size 
of the regulated species in the catch has increased (Course et al., 2011, Marine Scotland, 2011).   
So, catch quota management has shown promise in reducing catches of previously discarded 
individuals and capping fishing mortality, but the impact of changing to such a management 
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measure for an entire fleet is unknown. If we have good data on the fishing activities of individual 
vessels, it is possible to construct a model that estimates the initial impact of catch quotas and the 
resulting strength of any economic incentives for more selective fishing. Here we do this using 
observer and logbook data for a European case study fleet, English North Sea otter trawlers. 
Potential changes in fishing effort, landings and profits are calculated under the assumptions that 
fishers make no attempt to alter the selectivity of fishing or, alternatively that fishers change their 
behaviour to maximise profits. Data on changes in catch composition achieved in published gear 
trials can be used to calculate the potential economic benefit of adopting more selective gear, 
giving an indication of whether such a shift in fishing behaviour is likely to be seen under catch 
quotas. By identifying the trips that maximise profits when operating under catch quotas, it is also 
possible to examine the likelihood of other changes in fishing behaviour occurring, such as 
changes in target species or seasonality of fishing.  
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Data  
The model uses logbook data detailing landings, income and fishing effort by trip extracted from 
the UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs' (Defra) Fisheries Activities Database 
(FAD), and data on discards from the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Sciences 
(Cefas) observer programme (COP) database (described in (Enever et al., 2007). Data were 
extracted for a single year 2010, a year in which landings by English vessels are similar to those of 
preceding years, allowing the outputs of the analysis to be generally applicable to future years 
(MMO, 2011).  
2.2 Trip catches and profits  
Logbook data on the weight and value of landings on all 9031 trips undertaken in 2010 by English 
North Sea otter trawlers less than 24 meters in length were extracted from the FAD. Trips were 
separated into six vessel segments (Table 1), in line with the segment designations used by 
Seafish, the UK fishing industry authority. Trips by vessels less than 10m in length were grouped 
together. Trips undertaken by larger vessels were subdivided by gear type (trawls mainly targeting 
Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus, hereafter referred to as Nephrops) or whitefish (mainly cod 
(Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) and whiting (Merlangius merlangus)), 
and subdivided again by engine power (under 300kW, over 300kW). Trips undertaken by whitefish 
trawlers were finally subdivided by length of vessel (10m-15m, 15-24m). 
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Table 1 Landings weight and value, percentage of the total catch discarded by weight, and 
percentage of discards <MLS for vessel segments within the English North Sea otter trawler fleet 
in 2010. Discard proportions and percentage of discards <MLS are estimated from observer data, 
landings data are extracted from logbook data. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the lower and 
upper 95% confidence values.  
Segment Species Landings (t) Landings value (£) 
Discard 
proportion (%) 
Discards <MLS (%) 
Mixed trawlers <10m length overall (LOA) and  <300kW engine power 
 Cod 162 221 970 58 (25, 82) 38 (9, 94) 
 Haddock 128 92 944 10 (6, 20) 72 (42, 93) 
 Plaice 49 35 796 66 (51, 80) 82 (77, 89) 
 Whiting 339 260 198 27 (21, 38) 57 (38, 72) 
 Other 777 2 250 660   
      Nephrops  trawlers <300kW engine power 
 Cod 38 52 318 46 (20, 69) 39 (12,87) 
 Haddock 50 42 355 13 (8, 23) 59 (35, 82) 
 Plaice 35 25 382 65 (53, 77) 82(78, 87) 
 Whiting 94 69 932 38 (28, 52) 47 (29, 66) 
 Other 458 933 060   
      Nephrops  trawlers >300kW engine power 
 Cod 9 14 996 50 (27, 69) 33 (14, 67) 
 Haddock 11 8 586 16 (9, 28) 51 (34, 73) 
 Plaice 5 5 492 64 (52, 76) 82 (78, 87) 
 Whiting 35 29 772 38 (50, 45) 45 (29, 62) 
 Other 111 213 216   
      Whitefish trawlers <15m LOA and <300kW engine power 
 Cod 126 206 122 36 (19, 55) 38 (20, 66) 
 Haddock 204 206 108 11 (6, 18) 51 (37, 69) 
 Plaice 31 22 850 60 (48, 71) 81 (78, 85) 
 Whiting 122 90 957 38 (49, 45) 45 (30, 60) 
 Other 205 577 907   
 Whitefish trawlers >15m LOA and <300kW engine power 
 Cod 115 199 188 31 (17, 46) 41 (23, 68) 
 Haddock 134 135 933 11 (7, 17) 54 (39, 70) 
 Plaice 397 428 141 56 (47, 65) 83 (79, 87) 
 Whiting 140 106 992 40 (32, 49) 38 (27, 49) 
 Other 351 670 863   
      Whitefish trawlers >300kW engine power 
 Cod 265 531 185 16 (8, 26) 43 (25, 67) 
 Haddock 145 142 279 10 (7, 15) 51 (40, 64)) 
 Plaice 2 620 3 030 563 40 (31, 52) 73 (60, 84) 
 Whiting 103 77 618 39 (32, 47) 37 (27, 47) 
 Other 2 617 3 700 777   
      Fleet      
 Cod 715 1 225 779 38 (7, 74) 39 (16, 85) 
 Haddock 672 628 205 11 (4, 23) 56 (39, 75) 
 Plaice 3 137 3 548 224 44 (30, 60) 76 (65, 85) 
 Whiting 833 635 469 34 (21, 52) 46 (31, 61) 
 Other 4 519 8 346 483   
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Catch quotas regulate total catches of a species, rather than landings. This required the total 
catch of the regulated species produced on each trip to be calculated, using mean segment 
specific discard proportions, estimated from COP data (Table 1). Mean discard proportions, the 
percentage of the total catch discarded by weight, and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were 
estimated for each segment using bootstrap analysis (Table 1), as were the percentage of discards 
by weight over or under the MLS. The variable nature of discarding means that the 95% CIs are 
wide, suggesting that the discards of the fleet could be higher or lower than estimated from the 
small number of observed trips. The impact of this uncertainty was estimated by recalculating the 
total catches generated on each trip using the upper or lower limits of the 95% CIs of discards and 
<MLS catch proportions, and applying the data to the model.  
The value of the >MLS, or marketable catch, of both regulated and non-regulated species was 
calculated based on values from the FAD. Data from the COP shows that most >MLS fish discarded 
in 2010 were smaller than individuals in the retained catch, (Condie et al., 2013), and 
consequently may have been of a lower market grade, achieving a lower market value than the 
catch landed in 2010. To account for this discrepancy a reduced value was applied to this fraction 
of the catch, based on the difference in value between fish grades, using COP data and 
information from UK fish markets. The profits of each trip, the cost of operating subtracted from 
fishing income, were then calculated, using segment specific percentage operating profits taken 
from the 2009 Economic Survey of the UK Fishing Fleet (Curtis and Brodie, 2011).  
The CFP reforms propose that all species regulated by catch quotas will be subject to a discard 
ban and the total catch including <MLS fish must be landed (European Commission, 2012). <MLS 
catch cannot be sold for human consumption, but may be directed to other processes such as fish 
meal production (European Commission, 2012). So the value of <MLS fish of the regulated species 
as a raw material for fish meal production was calculated based on an estimate from the UK fish 
meal industry of £100 per tonne. The costs of landing this catch, C t, including increased landings 
charges, and use of additional ice and fish boxes was calculated as: 
   
  
    
      
  
 
                
Landing charges were supplied on the websites of 16 major UK ports giving a mean cost of 2.5% of 
the value of the catch, U t. Based on information supplied by the industry, it was assumed that 
fishers would hire additional fish boxes, each storing 50kg of catch, at a cost of £0.65 per box; and 
use ice at a rate of 0.2 tonnes of ice to every 1 tonne of fish, at an average cost of £48.75/tonne. 
The weight of <MLS catch in tonnes from each trip, t, is represented by W t. Mean landing costs do 
100 
 
not include additional costs that may be incurred at particular ports, such as transportation costs 
if ports are not in close proximity to fish markets, or the use of chill rooms or other areas for the 
storage of catch before sale. These costs were subtracted from the value of the <MLS catch and 
the net profit was added to the operating profit of each trip as: 
   (∑   
 
    )   (     ) 
Pt is the operating profit generated on each trip; Vs t is the value of marketable catch of each 
species, s, generated on the trip; pv is the percentage operating profit for each vessel segment, v.    
2.3 Calculating catch quotas  
Fleet catch quotas were set for 4 species for which extensive landings and discard data were 
available, cod, haddock, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and whiting. Under the reforms of the CFP, 
catch quotas, in the form of TACs, may replace existing total allowable landings (European 
Commission, 2012). As mentioned above, full documentation of catches allows part of the TAC set 
aside to account for discards to be allocated as additional quota (Eliasen et al., 2009). To account 
for any uncertainty in discard estimates, this uplift in quota could be limited to 75% of the 
estimated stock discards; a protocol that has been followed in UK catch quota pilot schemes 
(Course et al., 2011). The catch quota TAC will then be distributed to member states based on the 
principle of relative stability (European Commission, 2012), and further divided between national 
fleets and metiers. It was assumed in this analysis that the catch quota would be equally divided 
amongst fleets based on their existing landings quota share. Consequently, in this analysis, the 
fleet catch quotas were set by increasing estimated landings quotas by a portion of the fleet’s 
discards, in line with 75% of the 2009 stock discard rate estimated by the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) (32% for cod, 24% for haddock, 45% for plaice and 26.6% for 
whiting). The UK utilised 98-100% of the quota available for cod, haddock, plaice and whiting in 
the North Sea in 2010 (MMO, 2011). So the single species landing quotas available to the fleet for 
these species were assumed to be equal to the landings of the case study fleet in 2010, as 
documented in the FAD. Accordingly fleet catch quotas were set at 992 tonnes of cod, 807 tonnes 
of haddock, 5 026 tonnes of plaice and 1 087 tonnes of whiting. It was assumed that effort would 
be restricted to the days at sea set in 2010.  
Eight catch quota combinations were examined in the model: catch quotas for cod, haddock, 
plaice or whiting alone, and 4 combinations in which 3 or 4 of the single species catch quotas 
were applied to the fleet simultaneously (cod, haddock and plaice; cod, haddock, plaice and 
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whiting; cod, haddock and whiting; and cod, plaice and whiting). Fulfilment of any one of the 
catch quotas would stop fishing.   
2.4 The model  
Individual trips were inputted into the model using the R programming environment (R 
Development Core Team, 2008) based on 4 different fishing behaviour scenarios, as described in 
Table 2 and below. When the cumulative catch weight of each regulated species from the trips 
inputted into the model matched the catch quota for that species no more trips were inputted, 
simulating the closure of a fishery when a catch quota is exhausted. Fleet and segment fishing 
effort, operating profits and marketable landings of all species generated under each behaviour 
scenario and catch quota combination were then calculated and compared. 
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Table 2 Selectivity changes implemented in the model, and their impact on catches of regulated species and other commercial catch. 
Selectivity change – 
Affected Vessels 
Examples of changes to  
Gear 
References Mean % change in catch weight 
Cod Haddock Plaice Whiting Other spp. 
<MLS >MLS <MLS >MLS <MLS >MLS <MLS >MLS  
Nephrops trawlers – 
Change 1  
Cutaway trawl 
Increase mesh size to 120mm 
Inclined Seperator Panel 
(Revill et al., 2006) 
(Krag et al., 2008) 
(Rihan and 
McDonnell, 2003) 
-8% -8% -11% -11% -21%  -17% -39% -11% 
Nephrops 
Nephrops trawlers – 
Change 2  
Modified square mesh panel 
Swedish grid and 
Swedish grid combined with 
square mesh codend 
Swedish grid 
(Madsen et al., 1999) 
(Valentinsson and 
Ulmestrand, 2008) 
 
(Ulmestrand and 
Valentinsson, 2003) 
-53% -73% -62% -68% -23% -39% -54% -78% -6% Nephrops 
Whitefish trawlers – 
Change 3  
 
Orkney trawl 
 
Eliminator trawl 
(Campbell et al., 
2010) 
(Kynoch et al., 2010) 
(Revill and Doran, 
2008) 
-58% -58% +20% +20%   -8% -8% -47% 
Commercial 
Species 
Nephrops and 
Whitefish trawlers – 
Change 4  
Above changes of Senarios 1 and 3 applied simultaneously  
Nephrops and 
Whitefish trawlers – 
Change 5 
Above changes of Senarios 2 and 3 applied simultaneously  
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2.5 Fishing behaviour scenarios 
The first behaviour scenario, "no behaviour change," examined the potential impact if the fleet 
had transitioned to catch quotas in 2010 and fishers did not change their behaviour to try and 
optimise profits. Under this assumption, any reduction in fishing effort caused by exhaustion of a 
catch quota could be spread evenly across the year, or trips could be forgone in a particular 
month; fishers make no active effort to avoid trips that may be less profitable when operating 
under a catch quota(s). This was reflected by randomly inputting trips into the model without 
replacement until the catch quota(s) was exhausted. The second behaviour scenario, "adopting 
selective gear," examined the benefit of adopting more selective fishing gear to avoid low value 
small fish or constraining species, an action that can be encouraged under catch quotas (Course et 
al., 2011). Using the mean results of 3 groups of recent gear trials, the catch weight of 
unregulated species (species not managed under a catch quota) and regulated species of each trip 
was adjusted to reflect the use of more selective gear by different segments under 5 selectivity 
changes (Table 3). Where possible, changes in the catch weight above and below MLS were 
applied. Where such estimates were absent it was assumed that there was a uniform change in 
the catch weight of fish across the whole size range. The modified trip data was then applied to 
the model, as described in Table 2. Comparing the outputs to those of the no behaviour change 
scenario indicated the strength of any incentive to adopt the selective gears examined. The gear 
trials examined are not an exhaustive list of available selective gears; other options are available 
which may have different results. In addition the selective gears included may have differing 
effects on the catches of the different vessel segments, but this information was not available in 
the reports. However, the estimated changes in gear selectivity shown in Table 3 are indicative of 
the improvements that can currently be made in otter trawls. The third behaviour scenario, 
"optimal trips," examined the impact of catch quotas if fishers were to undertake only trips that 
would maximise the operating profit of the fleet. Rijnsdorp et al. argue that, when faced with a 
reduction in fishing effort, fishers should be able to use their experience to pick which trips to 
undertake in order to maximise revenue, and the same principle was operated here (Rijnsdorp et 
al., 2006). A number of factors will affect the operating profit achieved by the fleet under catch 
quotas; the number of trips that can be undertaken, and so the catch of other valuable species, 
will be determined by the catches per trip of the regulated species; whilst the value of landings 
will be determined by the weight, species and sizes present. So each trip was assigned a rank from 
1-9031 based on the operating profit of the trip, the total weight of regulated species caught, the 
weight of regulated species catch below the MLS, and or the value of unregulated species catch, 
relative to all other trips. Each trip was then inputted into the model in order of rank until a catch 
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quota was exhausted. The ranking that produced the maximum fleet operating profit was 
identified and the characteristics of included trips were examined, providing insight into fishing 
behaviour that could be incentivised in order to optimise fleet operating profits within the 
constraints of the allowable fishing effort and existing catch patterns. The fourth behaviour 
scenario, “least optimal trips,” examined the impact of catch quotas if fishers were to undertake 
only trips that would minimise the operating profit of the fleet, giving a worst case scenario of the 
short term impacts of transitioning to catch quotas. The rankings of the third scenario above were 
reversed and the ranking that resulted in the minimum fleet operating profit was identified.  
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Table 3 The steps involved in each of the four fishing behaviour scenarios examining the potential 
impact of a transition to catch quotas by the English North Sea otter trawler fleet. 
Scenario  Step 
No behaviour change 
 Fishers continue to operate as they did in 2010 with no attempt to optimise profits – any 
foregone effort could occur during any month.  
 1 Trips are randomly drawn from the pool of all trips undertaken by the fleet in 2010 
without replacement. 
 2 Each trip selected in step 1 is inputted into the model and the cumulative catch weight of 
each of the regulated species is calculated. 
 3 Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until the cumulative catch weight of any of the regulated 
species is equal to the catch quota for that species.  
 4 The cumulative catch weight and cumulative operating profits of the fleet and fleet 
segments are calculated based on the trips included in the model. 
 5 Steps 1 to 4 are repeated for each catch quota and catch quota combination. 
 6 50 replicates of the model are completed and mean operating profits and catches of the 
fleet and each fleet segment are calculated. This number of replicates was chosen as the 
maximum coefficient of variation was only 1.8% of mean catches and operating profits. 
 Adopting selective gear 
 Fishers alter catch compositions through adoption of more selective gear. No other change in 
behaviour occurs – any foregone effort could occur during any month. 
 1 Catch composition of each trip is altered based on one of 5 selectivity scenarios (Table 2).  
 2 Trips are randomly drawn from the pool of altered trips without replacement and steps 2 
to 6 of the above process are completed. 
 3 Steps 1 to 2 are repeated for each selectivity scenarios. 
   Optimal trips 
 Fishers undertake trips that will maximise the operating profit of the fleet– catches are not 
altered.  
 1 Each trip in the pool of all trips undertaken by the fleet in 2010 is assigned a rank (1-
9031) based on: 
maximum trip operating profit and or, 
maximum value of non-CQ catches on each trip and or, 
minimum catch weight of each regulated species on each trip relative to the species 
catch quota and or, 
minimum weight of <MLS catch of catch quota species on each trip. 
  2 Each trip is inputted into the model in order of rank, and the cumulative catch weight of 
each of the catch quota species is calculated. 
 3 Step 2 is repeated until the cumulative catch weight of any of the regulated species is 
equal to the catch quota for that species 
 4 The cumulative catch weight and cumulative operating profits of the fleet and fleet 
segments are calculated based on the trips included in the model. 
 5 The model is run for all of the rankings described above, under each catch quota or catch 
quota combination. 
  6 The ranking that produces the highest total fleet operating profit is identified and 
segment operating profits, marketable landings and effort are calculated. 
   Least optimal trips  
 Fishers undertake trips that will minimise the operating profit of the fleet – catches are not 
altered. 
 1 The trip rankings of the above scenario are reversed. 
 2 Steps 2 to 5 of the above model. 
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2.6 Fishing mortality changes  
We can make an approximate estimate of how fishing mortality may change under a system of 
catch quotas by assuming that quotas will be fully utilised and comparing them with the weight of 
fish actually caught in 2010. Equating this to changes in (numbers based) fishing mortality 
assumes that there is no change in the size selectivity of the fleet and that selectivity of other 
fleets remained unchanged. The change in fishing mortality that might have occurred if all fleets 
exploiting the stocks had operated under a catch quota was also estimated. The fishing mortality 
associated with fully utilising a catch quota was compared to the fishing mortality generated by 
total removals from the stock in 2010.  
3. Results 
3.1 Behaviour Scenario 1: no behaviour change 
If fishers had not altered their behaviour, the short term impacts of catch quotas and a discard 
ban would have varied dependent upon the regulated species and the existing catch and discard 
characteristics of vessels. When discard proportions exceeded 75% of the ICES estimate, the 
existing total catch of the regulated species would not have been covered by the catch quota. 
Without any change in behaviour, the catch quota would have been utilised before all trips could 
be undertaken, leading to a fall in fishing effort relative to that which occurred under landings 
quotas. The greatest discrepancies between fleet and ICES discard proportions occurred for cod 
and whiting. Fleet discard proportions of cod and whiting were 19% and 28% higher than the ICES 
estimate, resulting in 2010 total catches of cod (1 153t), and whiting (1 272t) exceeding catch 
quotas by 16% and 17% respectively. Consequently the largest reductions in fishing effort, of up 
to 16%, occurred under catch quotas for cod and whiting (Figure 1, Table S1 supplementary 
material, Appendix 8.2). These catch quotas were also exhausted before those for haddock and 
plaice, so were the main factor restricting catches of both unregulated and other regulated 
species when multiple catch quotas were implemented. A reduction in fishing effort would have 
had knock on effects on marketable landings and operating profits. Total marketable landings of 
all species would have been reduced for the majority of segments, despite the additional >MLS 
catch of regulated species available under catch quotas. Reductions were greatest for most 
segments under a whiting catch quota, and would have resulted in a fall in operating profits of up 
to 15% (Figure 1, Table S1 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2). 
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Figure 1 Fishing effort, marketable(>MLS) landings and operating profits of 2 English North Sea 
otter trawler segments and the fleet as a whole under a cod (COD), haddock (HAD), plaice (PLE), 
or whiting (WHG) catch quota, or a combination of all four (CHPW), compared to under the 
existing landings quotas of 2010, assuming no change in fishing behaviour. Segments are 
whitefish trawlers under 300kW and above 15m LOA (open circle), <10m vessels (grey square), 
and the fleet as a whole (filled triangle). Error bars show estimates derived using the lower (upper 
limit of error bars) and upper (lower limit of error bars) limits of the 95% confidence intervals of 
the mean discard and <MLS catch proportions. 
 
Discards of haddock by the fleet were less than 75% of the ICES estimate, resulting in the catch 
quota exceeding the 2010 total catch of this species. Vessels would have benefited through 
landing >MLS haddock that would previously have been discarded, whilst maintaining other 
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landings (Figure 1, Table S1 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2). Increases in operating profit 
would have been higher if effort had not been restricted to 2010 levels and fishers had been able 
to fully exploit the haddock catch quota. 
Variations in the impact of catch quotas on the different vessel segments were apparent. For 
example, in 2010 <10m vessels discarded a higher percentage of plaice than whitefish vessels 
under 300kW in engine power and over 15m in length (Table 1). Under a plaice catch quota, 
landing the >MLS plaice that would previously have been discarded would have allowed <10m 
vessels to increase their marketable landings by 22%, compared with a 9% increase by these 
larger whitefish trawlers (Figure 1). However, <10m vessels saw a larger reduction in total 
marketable landings; plaice catches contributed only 3% of 2010 landings by weight (Table 1) and 
additional >MLS plaice catches would not have compensated for the reduction in other 
unregulated species, resulting in a 9% reduction in operating profits (Figure 1). Plaice was a more 
valuable species to the above whitefish trawlers, contributing 30% by weight of 2010 landings 
(Table 1). Although the percentage increases in marketable plaice would have been smaller than 
for <10m vessels, the additional catches would have partially compensated for the loss of other 
unregulated species, resulting in only a minimal reduction in total marketable landings. The large 
scale of plaice catches by this segment would have resulted in a high volume of <MLS plaice, 
relative to other segments; selling this catch for fishmeal would have compensated for the small 
reduction in total marketable landings, resulting in a 14% increase in operating profits (Figure 1).  
The impact of discard and <MLS catch levels that differ from the mean values used here is 
examined by using the upper and lower limits of the 95% CI of estimated discard and <MLS 
proportions to calculate the total catches of each trip, as mentioned above. The lower limit of the 
error bars shows the impact of catch quotas if discard and <MLS catch proportions were higher 
than estimated. More discards results in a higher total catch per trip, reducing the level of effort 
that can be exerted before a catch quota is exhausted, with knock on effects on total marketable 
landings and operating profits, whilst a higher proportion of <MLS fish will reduce the value of the 
catch (Figure 1). The opposite occurs if discard and <MLS proportions are lower than estimated, 
and is shown by the upper limit of error bars (Figure 1). So, when discards or <MLS proportions 
are higher the impact of catch quotas are greater. 
3.2 Behaviour scenario 2: adopting selective gear  
Vessels adopting the more selective gear with the characteristics analysed would not have 
increased profits relative to the no behaviour change scenario, as operating with the more 
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selective gear would have resulted in a reduction in the marketable landings of all species (Figure 
2, Table S2 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2). The reduction in regulated catches by fishers 
using more selective gear would have left more of the catch quota(s) available for those vessels 
excluded from the selectivity changes, whitefish trawlers under selectivity changes 1 and 2 and 
Nephrops trawlers under change 3, resulting in an increase in marketable landings, and a 
subsequent rise in operating profits for these vessels (Figure 2, Table S2 supplementary material, 
Appendix 8.2). So the implementation of catch quotas does not create an incentive for vessels to 
adopt any of the selective gears investigated here. However, the lower limit of the error bars 
indicate that if discard proportions were higher than estimated whitefish trawlers would have 
benefitted through the adoption of more selective gear (selectivity change 3) under a catch quota 
for cod, implemented in isolation or in combination with others. Reducing the total catch of cod 
on each trip would have delayed the exhaustion of the cod catch quota, allowing whitefish 
trawlers to continue fishing for other species for longer, increasing total marketable landings and 
operating profits, relative to the no behaviour change scenario (Figure 2, Table S2 supplementary 
material, Appendix 8.2). So, dependent upon the regulated species and the vessels under 
management, catch quotas would incentivise the use of the more selective gear described in 
selectivity change 3 if discard proportions were higher than estimated.  
 
 
Figure 2 Percentage change in operating profits of some English North Sea otter trawler segments 
operating under a catch quota for cod, based on a scenario of no change in fishing behaviour 
(open square) or adoption of more selective gear by whitefish trawlers(closed square) (Selectivity 
change 3, Table 2), compared to under the existing landings quotas of 2010. Segments shown are 
Nephrops trawlers above (N>300kW) and below 300kW engine power (N<300kW), whitefish 
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trawlers under 300kW and above (W<300kW>15m) or below 15m in length (W<300kW<15m), 
and whitefish trawlers over 300kW. Other details as Figure 1. 
3.3 Behaviour scenario 3:optimal combination of trips 
Under single catch quotas the highest fleet operating profits were achieved when trips were 
ranked based on the level of <MLS catches (as described in Table 3). Trips with the highest <MLS 
catches were excluded. These were also trips with the highest total catches of the regulated 
species, so the total catch of the regulated species per trip was reduced, allowing a greater level 
of effort to be exerted before the catch quota was exhausted. This allowed fishing for other 
species to continue for longer resulting in higher total marketable landings by the fleet than under 
the no behaviour change scenario (Figure 3, Table S3 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2). 
Similarly, under a combination of catch quotas the optimum fleet operating profits were achieved 
when trips were ranked based on the scale of catches of the regulated species with the most 
constraining catch quotas and the level of <MLS catch. By excluding trips with the highest catches 
of regulated species more trips could be undertaken before any of the catch quotas were fully 
utilised. This allowed fishing for other species to continue for longer, with a subsequent rise in 
marketable landings and operating profits, compared to the no behaviour change scenario (Figure 
3, Table S3 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2). Under all catch quota scenarios, fleet 
operating profits matched or exceeded the fleet operating profits generated under the 2010 
landings quotas (Table S3 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2). But a reduction in operating 
profits was still incurred by some segments. However, this reduction was generally less than 
under the no behaviour change scenario. If discard proportions had been higher than estimated in 
reality, the benefits of excluding trips with the highest catches of the regulated species would 
have been much greater, as catch quotas would have been more constraining (Figures 3). So, 
catch quotas create a strong incentive for vessels to avoid both marketable and <MLS catches of 
regulated species; the more constraining the quota(s) the greater the incentive for more selective 
fishing.   
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Figure 3 Percentage change in operating profits, fishing effort, regulated catches and marketable 
landings of the English North Sea otter trawler fleet when transitioning to a catch quota for cod, 
or a combination of catch quotas for cod, haddock, plaice and whiting, compared to under the 
existing landings quotas of 2010. Changes are based on the assumption of no change in fishing 
behaviour (open circle), an assumption that fishers will be able to select the trips that will 
maximise fleet operating profit (optimal trips, grey square, see Table 3), or the worst case 
scenario in which only trips that minimise fleet operating profits are selected (least optimal trips, 
closed triangle). Other details as Figure 1.    
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There may be some seasonality to the exclusion of trips. Under a combination of cod, haddock, 
plaice and whiting catch quotas, seasonal peaks in the exclusion of trips match peaks in catches of 
plaice and whiting. For Nephrops trawlers over 300kW in engine power operating under a 
combination of cod, haddock, plaice and whiting catch catches, the majority of excluded trips 
occurred in months where catches per trip of the most constraining species were highest (Figure 
4). 
 
 
Figure 4 Seasonal variation in the percentage of trips undertaken by Nephrops trawlers over 
300kW in engine power excluded from the optimal combination of trips that maximises fleet 
operating profit (Table 3) under a combination of cod, haddock, plaice and whiting catch quotas, 
based on the effort undertaken under 2010 landings quotas. Total catches of cod, plaice and 
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whiting per trip in the same months of 2010. Dashed lines represent propagation of the lower and 
upper limits of the 95% confidence intervals around the percentage of total regulated catch 
discarded and percentage of regulated catch <MLS.  
 
3.4 Behaviour Scenario 4: least optimal trips  
The least optimal trips scenario shows the impact of catch quotas if fishers were to adopt tactics 
that minimised fleet operating profits, providing a worst case scenario. Under all catch quotas the 
lowest fleet operating profit occurred when trips were ranked based on a combination of high 
catches of the regulated species, a high proportion of which was <MLS, and low catches of other 
marketable species (Figure 3), as described in Table 3. Fleet operating profits were reduced by as 
much as 82% compared to those achieved under existing landings quotas, much larger than the 
13% reduction seen under the no behaviour change scenario. This confirms the finding of the 
optimal trips scenario, catch quotas generate strong incentives to minimise catches of the 
regulated species on individual trips. If discard proportions had been higher than estimated, fleet 
operating profits would have been reduced further as the total catch of trips would have been 
higher, reducing the level of effort that could have been exerted before the catch quota(s) was 
exhausted (Table S4 supplementary material, Appendix 8.2).     
3.5 Fishing mortality 
If the case study fleet alone had operated under and fully utilised a haddock catch quota total 
stock removals would have increased, but only by approximately 50t. Fishing mortality for this 
species would not have changed, assuming that the behaviour and catches of other fleets 
remained the same as in 2010 (Table 4). However if all fleets exploiting the North Sea haddock 
stock operated under a catch quota, stock fishing mortality would have been reduced. Under the 
assumptions of the model, the additional quota available will be limited to 75% of the stock 
discards and total removals would be capped at a lower level than 2010 catches. So, in contrast to 
the case study fleet, the catches of haddock by some or all other fleets exploiting the stock would 
have been reduced compared to 2010. The impact of cod, plaice and whiting catch quotas on the 
case study fleet would have been more severe; the 2010 catches of these species exceed the 
catch quotas and catches by the fleet would have been reduced, resulting in a reduction in the 
partial fishing mortality generated by vessels (Table 4). Once again, the reduction in total 
removals if all fleets exploiting these stocks had operated under a catch quota would have 
resulted in a reduction in fishing mortality (Table 4).  
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Table 4 Changes in stock fishing mortality under a catch quota based on catch quota weight and 
catch weight in 2010, assuming full utilisation of catch quota for the English North Sea otter 
trawlers or all fleets exploiting the stock. The total catch of the English North Sea otter trawlers is 
estimated from observer and logbook data. 2010 Fs and catch of all fleets are supplied by ICES 
(ICES, 2010).  
 
4. Discussion 
The results show that the short term economic impact of transitioning to catch quotas on the 
English North Sea otter trawler fleet in 2010 would have been dependent upon the species 
regulated, the level and composition of catches and discards, the scale of additional quota, and 
any change in fishing behaviour. Where discard proportions were lower than 75% of the ICES 
estimate the catch quota would have exceeded the existing catches of the fleet, allowing fishers 
to maintain their existing fishing effort and benefit through the landing of >MLS catch of the 
regulated species. In contrast, declines in operating profit would have occurred where fleet 
discard proportions were larger than 75% of the ICES estimate. Assuming no change in fishing 
behaviour, 2010 catches by the fleet would have exceeded the available catch quota, resulting in 
a decline in fishing effort. The greater the discrepancy between the estimates the greater the fall 
in operating profits. So, if the distribution of quota is uniform and no change in behaviour is 
observed, fleets that currently discard less than average will benefit through an increase in 
allowable catches, whilst high discarding fleets will see a curtailment of fishing and a fall in 
operating profits. If the uplift in quota is less than 75% of stock discards the impact on high 
discarding fleets will be more severe.   
The impact of implementing catch quotas varied between fleet segments. If no change in 
behaviour occurred segments with higher discard proportions would have seen a greater 
percentage increase in marketable landings of the regulated species. However, for an increase in 
operating profits to occur, the larger regulated catches had to be sufficient to compensate for the 
Species 2010 F 
English North Sea otter trawlers  All Fleets 
CQ (t) Catch (t) Projected F CQ TAC (t) Catch (t) Projected F 
Cod 0.67 992 1 153 0.67 63 743 69 286 0.60 
Haddock 0.23 807 753 0.23 37 262 39 640 0.21 
Plaice 0.24 5 026 5 602 0.23 94 519 106 500 0.21 
Whiting 0.27 1 087 1 272 0.27 29 499 31 600 0.25 
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loss of other valuable catches when fishing was curtailed. So, the impact of catch quotas on 
different fleet segments is likely to be determined by the scale and rate at which the regulated 
species are discarded by each segment, and the relative importance of those species to each 
segment.    
By reducing catches of the regulated species vessels would have been able to delay the fulfilment 
of the catch quota(s), increasing fishing effort and operating profits. So a strong economic 
incentive is created for vessels to avoid both marketable and <MLS catches of regulated species. 
The more constraining a quota, the greater the incentive for more selective fishing. The incentive 
to avoid regulated catches also creates an incentive for non-compliance with the discard ban and 
full documentation of catches. Sufficient levels of surveillance and enforcement will be required 
to ensure that fishers do not avoid the economic burden of high regulated catches through illegal 
and unmonitored discarding. Assuming that compliance is high, fishers could reduce catches 
through the adoption of more selective gear. Such changes in fishing gear have been observed in 
vessels involved in catch quota pilot schemes (Course et al., 2011). However, the adoption of 
selective gear with the characteristics analysed here would not have been incentivised. This gear 
reduces catches of not only the regulated species, but also valuable unregulated species. 
Reductions in regulated catches would have delayed the fulfilment of the catch quota(s), allowing 
an increase in fishing effort, but, as marketable landings of all species were lower on each trip, a 
small increase in effort would not have resulted in an increase in operating profits, compared to 
the no behaviour change scenario. However, the incentive to adopt the more selective gear would 
have increased if discard proportions had been higher. If discards had been higher than 
estimated, the percentage reduction in regulated catches resulting from adopting more selective 
gear would have resulted in a greater reduction in the catch weight of regulated species than if 
discards had been at the lower level estimated by the mean. The larger reduction in catches 
would have delayed the exhaustion of the cod catch quota allowing more trips to be undertaken. 
With a much higher level of effort being exerted by vessels, cumulative marketable landings 
would have increased, compared to the no behaviour change scenario. In addition, implementing 
more selective gear may be more beneficial than suggested, the data used were derived from 
gear trials of experimental designs; encouraged by the economic benefit of reduced regulated 
catches, the fishing industry may be able to refine these gears to better match catches to their 
quota allocations. A lower catch per haul could also increase the value of catch (Wade et al., 
2009) and reduce fuel costs  (Campbell et al., 2010). Implementing other selective gear not 
explored in this study may be more beneficial for the fleet, provided that the retention of the 
regulated species is reduced and any fall in landings of other valuable species is minimal. More 
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selective fishing could also be implemented through a change in the timing of fishing trips, as 
suggested by the optimal trips scenario. Avoiding fishing during periods of high abundance of 
regulated species, particularly of species with the most constraining catch quotas, could help 
prolong the fishing season. Fishers have been observed avoiding fishing during periods of high 
abundance of <MLS cod when taking part in a UK cod catch quota trial (Course et al., 2011). 
Fishers have also been observed switching fishing grounds or target species during these periods 
(Course et al., 2011). As the current system provides little incentive for fishers to operate more 
selectively and does not make use of a fisher’s technical ingenuity, it is unknown as to what extent 
in reality the selectivity of fishing could be improved to maximise revenue from allocated quotas.  
Catch quotas should also reduce stock fishing mortality compared to under the existing landings 
quotas, dependent upon the accuracy of the stock discard estimates and the percentage of 
discards that can be allocated as additional quota. In this analysis the additional quota of which 
fleets receive a share is limited to 75% of the stock discards; fishing mortality would fall even if all 
fleets exploiting a stock were to fully utilise the catch quota TAC, as total catches are capped at a 
lower level than under the existing system of total allowable landings. If the additional quota was 
not limited, but instead all the TAC currently set aside to account for discards was allocated as 
quota, any change in fishing mortality would be dependent upon the accuracy of the estimated 
stock discards. If discard estimates are accurate catch quotas would match existing catches and 
fishing mortality should be maintained. If however discards were lower than estimated, full 
utilisation of a catch quota set in line with the TAC would result in an increase in catches, 
potentially resulting in a rise in the fishing mortality of the regulated stock.  
5. Conclusions 
Catch quotas in combination with a discard ban, are a management measure that could help 
realise the European Commission’s aim of low discarding fisheries with minimal waste. Stock 
fishing mortalities will be capped, providing all fleets exploiting a stock operate under the catch 
quota and any uplift in quota is less than the previous stock discards. A long term economic 
benefit may result as reduced fishing mortality may aid the building of stocks, allowing larger 
quotas in the future (Sigler and Lunsford, 2001, Valdemarsen, 2003). Incentives for more selective 
fishing and the reduction of unwanted catches will be created, in line with the objectives of the 
reformed CFP. Reducing catches of the regulated species will delay the fulfilment of catch quotas, 
allowing continued fishing for other valuable species. This will be reliant upon the effective 
management of total catches. The initial economic impact of catch quotas, dependent upon the 
existing catch and discard characteristic of vessels and the uplift and distribution of additional 
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quota, will determine the strength of the incentive. Fleets with high discards are more likely to 
see declining operating profits, particularly if the uplift in quota is small. Fishing could become 
unprofitable for some vessels, increasing the need for catches to be better aligned with the 
available quota and creating a strong incentive for more selective fishing. Adopting more selective 
gear could help to reduce unwanted catches. However, as highlighted in this study, the selective 
gears currently available may require refinement to improve their efficacy and economic 
performance. Catch quotas will provide the incentive and freedom for fisher-led development of 
such gears, but this will take time and economic investment. Fishers may have to find other 
means to improve selectivity, such as changing the timing of fishing trips, fishing grounds or target 
species. The ability and speed with which fishers can adapt and develop selective fishing 
techniques will ultimately determine what the economic impact of catch quotas is likely to be. 
So catch quota management provides a simple and transparent framework in which fishers can be 
incentivised to develop more selective fishing practices, whilst also placing a cap on fishing 
mortality. Transitioning to such a system will not be without challenges, especially as the benefits 
of selective fishing practices are currently in debate. The initial setting and allocation of catch 
quotas will need to be carefully undertaken. The need for strong incentives for the improvement 
in practices by the least selective vessels must be balanced against the actual ability of fishers to 
rapidly refine and adopt more selective fishing methods, if catch quotas are not to drive some 
vessels out of business. Applying the model and scenarios constructed in this study to data from 
other fisheries will help predict the impacts of different catch quotas and resultant changes in 
fishing behaviour, and provide an indication of how additional quota could be appropriately set 
and distributed.    
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Abstract 
Reforms of EU Common Fisheries Policy agreed in 2013 will make fundamental changes to 
European fisheries management. These include a discard ban, catch quotas for regulated species 
and management to achieve MSY. Here, the Fcube (Fleet and Fisheries Forecast) model is used to 
evaluate its impact on revenue and behaviour of North Sea demersal finfish fleets. With no 
change in behaviour, revenue is reduced by a mean of 19% compared to 2012, but with 
substantial variation between years, catch quota setting protocols and fleets. Revenue will reduce 
by 27% in the first year, rising to -9% in year 3, as fishing mortality is reduced and stocks rebuild. 
Impacts will be greatest if catch quotas are set equal to current landings quotas and reduce as the 
uplift allowed to reflect current discarding is increased. The greatest differences are between 
individual fleets, varying from -99% to +34% as a function of catch characteristics. The change 
depends upon whether the limiting species is a target and the rate at which it is caught relative to 
other species. Large reductions in revenue create a strong incentive to avoid catching the limiting 
species, particularly if it is not a primary target. A 30% reduction in the CPUE of cod increases 
revenue by up to 42% for fleets limited by this species. However, a change in selectivity may not 
prevent a decline in revenue for all fleets, and increased quota transfer, exemptions and 
substitutions will be important in maintaining the profitability of fishing.  
 
 
Keywords: North Sea demersal fisheries, catch quotas, discard ban, selective fishing, cod. 
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1. Introduction 
Eliminating discards and reducing unwanted catches by 2019 is a key objective of the reformed 
European Union’s (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (European Commission, 2013). These 
reforms will introduce a discard ban for regulated species combined with catch quotas, where 
total catches rather than just landings are documented and counted against an allocated quota 
(European Commission, 2013). Alongside this is a legally binding requirement to manage each fish 
stock in a way that achieves maximum sustainable yield (European Commission, 2013). At present, 
a total allowable catch (TAC) is set for regulated fish stocks to achieve a fishing mortality target. 
For some stocks a proportion of this TAC is set aside to account for discards, with the remainder 
being made available to the fishing fleet as landings quotas. If catches are fully documented, and 
estimated levels of discarding are accurate, then the same level of fishing mortality would be 
achieved by setting catch quotas equal to the quantity of discards plus existing landings quotas. 
Once this catch quota is exhausted, fishers must halt any activities that risk the capture of the 
regulated species within the designated fishing grounds (Course et al., 2011). Fish that are below 
the minimum landing size (MLS) must be returned to port, but cannot be sold for human 
consumption. This creates an incentive to reduce unwanted catches that would previously have 
been discarded. These catches now count towards the catch quota, so avoiding them will allow 
fishers to increase income by using a greater proportion of their quota on marketable catch. The 
potential incentives are even greater in mixed fisheries. Here, avoiding species where catch 
quotas are limiting allows fishing for other species to continue for longer (Condie et al., 2013b, 
Condie et al., 2013a). Pilot schemes have shown that catch quotas do indeed lead to changes in 
fishing behaviour, including avoidance of fish below MLS, reduced targeting of quota species 
(European Commission, 2013) and adoption of more selective gear and changes in the timing and 
location of fishing (Course et al., 2011).  
Reliable estimates on the total annual catch from regulated stocks (landings plus discards) are 
required if fishing mortalities are to be maintained at current levels or reduced during this 
transition from landings quotas to catch quotas (Uhlmann et al., 2013). Fisheries observer 
programmes represent the most comprehensive source of information, but can be biased and 
may lack precision (Murawski, 1992, Cook, 2003, Rochet and Trenkel, 2005). This presents a 
problem. If actual discard rates differ from estimated rates the accuracy of stock assessments may 
be reduced (Alverson and Hughes, 1996, Branch et al., 2006) and the quotas set may not achieve 
the target fishing mortality in future years (Alverson et al., 1994). If catch quotas are set too high 
during the transition period, fishing mortalities could exceed management targets (Cotter, 2010, 
Chen et al., 2007, Cook, 2003). However, once catch quotas and a discard ban are introduced, the 
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accuracy of catch data and stock assessments should improve as total catches will be fully 
documented, provided compliance is high (European Commission, 2002). To account for the 
uncertainty in discards data during the transition from landings quotas, catch quotas could be set 
at less than the estimated total catch, incorporating current landings quotas plus only a part of 
the estimated discards. However, the impact of the introduction of a discard ban combined with 
catch quotas, and the incentives for more selective fishing practices that this creates, could be 
dependent on the scale of this uplift in quota. Our previous work has shown that the strength of 
incentives and their distribution across fleet segments is substantially altered by the details of 
catch quota setting and distribution (Condie et al., 2013a, Condie et al., 2013b). When all vessels 
receive the same uplift, catch quotas create the strongest incentives for the least selective. 
Vessels discarding a high proportion of quota species benefit most from avoiding these regulated 
species and delaying the fulfilment of catch quotas. Avoiding <MLS fish also maximises the value 
of catch quotas (Condie et al., 2013a, Condie et al., 2013b). The incentive is strongest when the 
uplift in current landings quota is small in relation to total catch, particularly for vessels where the 
regulated species is not a primary target (Condie et al., 2013a).  
Our previous work has examined the likely impact of the reformed CFP on the behaviour of a 
single North Sea fleet, without taking into account effects of changes in fishing activity on fish 
stocks in subsequent years. Here we extend this analysis to examine its impacts on the EU 
demersal fishery of the North Sea over the initial 3 years of implementation of the reformed CFP. 
Our analysis uses the Fcube (Fleet and Fisheries Forecast) model (Ulrich et al., 2011) to 
incorporate information on the population dynamics and current state of the most important 
commercial finfish stocks and data on the landings, discards, effort and revenue of 42 demersal 
fleets and technical interactions in the mixed fishery. 
We estimate future catches and revenues for each fleet in the fishery under a range of possible 
catch quota protocols, allowing us to address four key questions: 
1. What is the potential economic impact of transitioning to catch quotas if no change in 
fishing behaviour occurs? 
2. Which catch quota protocol results in the highest revenue for fleets? 
3. Are there relative economic winners and losers if no change in behaviour is made? 
4. Will the modelled fleets be incentivised to change their behaviour and avoid catching 
“unwanted” fish, those that are undersized or with limited quotas?  
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Data 
Data on EU North Sea fisheries, and their target fish stocks have been collated by the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) working group on mixed fisheries 
(WGMIXFISH) (ICES, 2013c). Information is available on effort, capacity, catches, discards, landings 
and price of landings per tonne achieved by 42 different North Sea fleets between 2003 and 2012, 
encompassing 19 different metiers and 9 North Sea states. A fleet is defined as a group of vessels 
of the same length and using the same fishing gear for the majority of the year. A metier is 
defined as a group of vessels with a particular exploitation pattern, targeting similar species using 
similar gear in the same area and or during the same period (ICES, 2013c). A fleet may operate in 
multiple metiers during a year. This information is combined with biological data on the six most 
important target species of demersal finfish fisheries in the North Sea, namely cod (Gadus 
morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), plaice (Pleuronectes platessa), saithe (Pollachius 
virens), sole (Solea solea) and whiting (Merlangius merlangus). Stock data were taken from the 
2013 assessments by the ICES North Sea and Skagerrak working group (ICES, 2013d), and included 
time series of the total landings, discards, fishing mortality (F), stock size and spawning stock 
biomass (SSB), spanning decades. These stock and fleet data were converted into FLR (Fisheries 
Library for R, an open source framework that facilitates evaluation of fisheries management 
strategies) fleet and stock data objects (Kell et al., 2007) for input into FLR stock projection 
models and Fcube.  
2.2 Fcube: projections of stocks, catches and revenues for 2012-2016 
Fcube (described in detail by Ulrich et al, 2011) estimates the potential level of effort that could 
be exerted by each fleet in future years based on the available fishing opportunities (TACs and 
target fishing mortalities), the relative distribution of effort between a fleet’s metiers and 
estimates of the past catchabilities of those metiers (Box 1). Here, Fcube was used to forecast 
fishing effort under different catch quota protocols, allowing evaluation of the potential change in 
fleet landings and revenue between 2012 and 2016 (Box 1). A summary of our assumptions is 
presented in Table 1. The fishing opportunities were defined by catch quotas, which were 
assumed to come into force in 2014. In reality, catch quotas may not be implemented in the 
North Sea until 2016 (European Commission, 2013). However, assuming that all catch quotas are 
introduced from 2014 allows their longer term impacts to be evaluated using a recent year of 
actual, rather than projected, fisheries data (2012). The catch quotas for each year were 
calculated by a FLR short-term stock forecasting model based on the total removals needed to 
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achieve a target F for each stock in the following year. These in turn were defined by the long 
term management plan for each stock (European Commission, 2007, European Commission, 2008, 
ICES, 2013b). The proportion of target removals included in catch quotas were defined using the 
protocols described in section 2.3. 100 replicate projections were carried out, with values of 
recruitment drawn randomly from a normal distribution with the same mean and variance as in 
the historical data. Constant catchability was assumed in each year of all projections. It was also 
assumed that all fishers would fully comply with the discard ban modelled to come into force in 
2014. The landings selectivity of each stock and fleet object, a measure of the proportion of catch 
that is landed rather than being discarded, was altered from 2014 onwards to reflect the 
assumption that all catch would be landed. Full documentation of catches was also assumed, so 
total catches will not exceed the catch quota.  
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          (                                                                          )   
Box 1 Summary of the modelling process using FLR projections (1-3, 9) and Fcube (4-8) 
1. Target F is defined by the long term management plans for each stock. FLR short- term 
stock forecasting model uses stock data to estimate the level of catch (landings and 
discards) that would achieve a target F for each stock in the following year.  
2. The catch quota is set based on the landings quota plus an uplift defined in the catch quota 
setting protocol described in Table 2. 
3. The actual F of each stock is projected for the following year based on the catch quota for 
each species being achieved.  
4. Fcube then uses the projected F of each stock, Fy+1 s, and calculates each fleet’s share of 
that F, Fy+1sf, based on the proportion of landings from each stock, Ly-1 s landed by the 
fleet, Ly-1 sf in a previous year,y-1. The discards of each fleet were not taken into account 
in this calculation. This results in a partial F for each stock by each fleet if the fleet were 
to fully utilise its share of the catch quota for each species. 
         (
       
      
       )                                                          
    
5. Fcube calculates the catchability of each stock for each fleet in the future year, qy+1sf, based 
on the sum of the catchability of each metier, m, q y+1sfm, and a metier’s landing 
selectivity for each stock, l y+1sfm relative to the amount of effort a fleet spends in each 
metier, ey+1fm; 
         ∑        (                 )     
 
 
 
    
6. Using the partial F of each fleet calculated in equation 1 and the catchability of each fleet 
(equation 2), Fcube calculates the level of effort each fleet could exert if they were to 
fulfil their share of the catch quota for each stock, Ey+1sf:  
                              
7. Under catch quotas a fleet must stop fishing if any of its quota allocations are exhausted, so 
Fcube calculates the level of effort each fleet could exert before any one of its six quota 
allocations are exhausted, Ey+1 f ; 
     
8. Fcube then calculates the partial F by each metier for each stock that results from this level 
of effort; 
                               (               )                       
9. The sum of partial Fs by stocks gives a new F for each species which is then used to 
estimate stock catches using the Baranov catch equation, implemented using the fwd 
procedure in FLR (Kell et al., 2007). Landings and revenue of each individual fleet can 
then be calculated (section 2.5). 
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Table 1 A summary of all assumptions made by Fcube and under the catch quota setting protocols 
and selectivity scenarios. 
Assumptions in model projections 
Assumptions of Fcube  
  The share of the effort exerted by each fleet in a metier will be constant in all years 
of projections based on the effort shares of 2012.  
 Recruitment for each year of a projection is a random variable drawn from a 
distribution with the same mean and variance as the historic recruitment of each 
stock.  
 Catchability is constant in all years of the projections. 
 Full compliance with the discard ban, all catches are landed. 
 All catches are documented; total catches cannot exceed catch quotas unless 
defined overages are permitted. 
Assumptions of catch quota setting protocols 
  Catch quotas will be set for all six stocks.  
 Catch quotas calculated in the forecast model under each catch quota setting 
protocol will be implemented without any change, for example from political 
negotiations. 
 A uniform percentage of quota uplift will apply to all stocks. 
 The proportion of catch quota allocated to fleets will be based on their past 
landings.  
 This distribution of quota between fleets assumes that the level of quota transfer 
is constant in all years of the projections, and is equal to that of 2012.  
 Catch quotas will apply to all fleets without exemptions. 
 A 10% overage will only apply to the cod catch quota.  
 Substitutions are not available; catches of each species may only be counted 
against the quota for that stock. 
Assumptions of selectivity scenarios 
  The catches of other species are not affected by any changes in selectivity towards 
cod. 
 All fleets will adopt the behaviour described in each scenario. 
Assumptions in estimating revenue 
  All >MLS catch will achieve the same market value. 
 Market values will not be affected by any change in supply, prices will be constant 
and equal to those achieved in 2012 
 All <MLS catch will acquire a value of €93 independent of the size, species and 
quality of catch, and the fleet in which it is caught. 
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2.3 Catch quota setting protocols 
Deterministic short-term stock forecasting models were used in each year of a projection to 
predict the total catch that would achieve a defined target fishing mortality for the following year. 
The target fishing mortalities were calculated in line with the existing long term management 
plans for each of the 6 stocks (European Commission, 2007, European Commission, 2008, ICES, 
2013b). These plans detail how the annual TACs of a stock should be set, and if these should be 
supported by technical measures (Kraak et al., 2013). For example, the plan for cod (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008) determines fishing effort for each year and changes in the TAC. 
These are based on the actual F level relative to a long term target of 0.4 and a comparison of 
predicted SSB for the beginning of the year in which the TAC will apply with defined reference 
targets (Bpa and Blim) (European Commission, 2008). Blim is defined as the SSB below which 
reproduction and recruitment may be reduced; Bpa is a precautionary reference that is larger than 
Blim and is used as target for managers to account for uncertainty in data (ICES, 2013a). The 
management plans also include constraints that prevent dramatic changes in the size of the TAC 
relative to the previous year. For example, the TAC for cod cannot vary by more than 20% from 
that in the previous year (European Commission, 2008). These constraints were applied to the 
catch quotas.  
Currently, the TAC recommended by ICES is set equal to the landings component of the total 
catch predicted to give the target F in the forecasting models. Consequently, TACs are actually 
landings quotas, rather than being the restriction on catch that the term implies. So, in the first 
year of the projections, catch quotas were set by increasing the landings quotas with a defined 
uplift to account for discards. The uplift that should be used in the first year of transition has not 
been defined in the CFP reforms. However, recent Danish and English cod catch quota pilot 
schemes have taken a conservative approach to deal with the possibility that there may be 
inaccuracies in existing catch or discards data. Catch quotas were limited to a 30% increase above 
existing landings quota (Dalskov et al., 2011, MMO, 2012) and the additional quota could not 
exceed 75% of the predicted discards (MMO, 2012). We used these examples in our protocols 
separately; the 30%c protocol described in Table 2 increases the 2014 landings quotas projected 
by the stock forecasting model by 30%, whilst the 75% protocol uplifts 2014 landings quotas by 75% 
of the estimated discards. We also examined the impact of two more extreme protocols. 0% 
where no uplift in landings quota is applied and 100% with an uplift equal to predicted 2014 
discards (Table 2). Individual projections were performed for each of the protocols with the same 
level of uplift applied for all six species. Stock assessments for saithe and sole do not include 
discard data, so the 2014 catch quotas for these stocks were set at the same level under the 0%, 
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75% and 100% protocols. The different uplifts only apply in the first year of management. In 
subsequent years the total catch of vessels will be fully documented. So in 2015 and 2016 catch 
quotas were set so that total removals estimated from the TAC constraints combined with the 
estimated SSBs achieved the target Fs generated by the management plans. The same values of 
recruitment were used when comparing the results of projections across different protocol or 
behaviour scenarios to ensure the results were comparable. 
 
Table 2 Catch quota setting protocols evaluated in the Fcube model. Under each protocol catch 
quotas are set at a defined level of the total removals estimated in the stock forecast model. In 
2015 and 2016 catch quotas will be set equal to the total removals estimated in the stock 
forecasting models as the uncertainty in catch data will be reduced. 
Protocol 2014 catch quota level 
  0% Catch quotas are based on the estimated landings only: 
Landings quotas + 0% of estimated discards 
75% Catch quotas are based on landings and 75% of estimated 
discards: 
Landings quotas + 75% of estimated discards 
100% Catch quotas are based on the estimated total removals in 
the forecast model: 
Landings quotas + 100% of estimated discards 
30%c Catch quotas are set at 30% higher than the estimated 
landings: 
Landings quotas + 30% of landings quotas 
 
Under the reformed CFP, 10% overages of quotas will be allowed but will be subtracted from the 
catch quota in the following year (European Commission, 2013). Each projection was repeated 
based on the assumption that fishers would fully utilise a 10% overage of cod in each year, and 
that this overage would be deducted for the cod catch quota in the following year. The 10% 
overage was applied only to cod as previous studies have indicated that cod catch quotas will be 
the most limiting (Condie et al., 2013b, Condie et al., 2013a). Other flexibilities in catch quotas 
have been included in the CFP reforms but were not investigated here. These include de minimis 
exemptions for certain fleets or exemptions for catch with high discard survival rates, and the 
ability to offset up to 9% of one catch quota against another.  
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2.4 Selectivity scenarios 
Fish that are under minimum landing size cannot be sold for human consumption (European 
Commission, 2013), so improvements in selectivity of fishing that reduce catches of <MLS fish will 
increase profits. Where a quota allocation for one species is exhausted before allocations for 
others are fully utilised, profits can be increased by reducing catches of the limiting species. Such 
changes in fishing behaviour can be simulated within FLR/Fcube by setting the landings selectivity 
for a species to <1 while setting discards selectivity at 0. This produces a reduction in the CPUE of 
the species for which these parameters have been altered without altering the catches of other 
species. Landings selectivities of fleet objects were altered between 2014 and 2016 to reflect the 
following changes behaviour and selectivity;  
i) No change in fishing selectivity - fishers make no attempt to alter how they fish. Landings 
selectivities are set to 1. 
ii) Avoidance of all undersized catch - fishers alter how they operate to avoid all catches of 
<MLS fish. Landings selectivities are reduced by the proportion of catch estimated to be 
below MLS for each species. The proportion of catch estimated to be below <MLS was 
estimated through the following process; i) survey data were used to generate an Age-
Length Key (ALK) for each species; ii) as catch-at-age was not available in the fleet data 
collected by ICES (section 2.1), this was approximated by using catch-at-age data for the 
same metier definitions as used in the model in the STECF catch database (STECF, 2013); 
then, iii) the ALK was used to allocate the numbers-at-age discarded into <MLS and >MLS 
based on the proportion of fish at a particular age above or below the MLS for that 
species; iv) length-weight relationships were then used to raise number-at-age to weight-
at-age and the proportion of catch >MLS and <MLS approximated as the sum of the 
weight-at-age in each category across all ages. The proportion of catch <MLS was 
calculated for each species, metier, area, and member state. 
iii) Avoidance of all undersized cod catch - fishers alter how they operate to avoid all catches 
of <MLS cod. Landings selectivities for cod were reduced by the proportion of the cod 
catch estimated to be below MLS; landings selectivities for the other five species were set 
to 1. As in section 2.3, cod was chosen as previous studies have indicated that cod catch 
quotas will be the most limiting (Condie et al., 2013b, Condie et al., 2013a). 
iv) 30% reduction in cod catches per unit of effort - fishers adopt selective practices to 
reduce the capture of cod including all <MLS catch by 30%; cod landing selectivities are 
set to 0.7, landings selectivities for the other five species were set to 1.  
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The knife-edged selectivity described in scenarios ii) and iii), where 100% of <MLS catch of all 
species or cod only is avoided is unlikely to be achievable, however, these scenarios give an 
indication of the strongest possible incentive to reduce catches of undersized fish. Under 
scenarios iii) and iv) it was assumed that the selectivity of fishing for other species was unaffected. 
The behaviour described in each scenario was also assumed to be adopted by all fleets included in 
the projections. The impact of each of the selectivity scenarios was assessed separately and a 
projection was performed for each, resulting in 32 projections in total, each with 100 replicates 
(Figure 1). The revenue generated from the six stocks by each fleet under scenarios ii) to iv) were 
compared with those estimated under scenario i) providing an indication of how each change in 
selectivity may or may not benefit each fleet in the model.  
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Figure 1. 32 projections using FLR forecasting models and Fcube were performed, each with a different protocol and selectivity scenario. 
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2.5 Fleet landings and revenues 
The landings of each fleet were estimated from the projected total catch of each stock based on 
the partial fishing mortality generated by each fleet compared to the partial fishing mortality of all 
fleets; 
             ⁄  
Cs is the total catch of a species s, Fsf and Fs are the partial fishing mortality of the fleet, f, and all 
fleets for that species, respectively, giving the catch of each species by each fleet, denoted by Csf. 
Under selectivity scenarios i) and iii), no change in selectivity and avoidance of <MLS cod, fleet 
landings were divided into catch above or below MLS. The revenue generated from the >MLS, 
marketable landings was estimated using the data on the price of catch per tonne in 2011, 
included in the fleet objects. Full 2012 price information was not available, but prices have 
remained relatively stable in previous years. It was assumed that prices would remain the same in 
2014-2016, and that any changes in supply would not affect prices. Price information was only 
available for 35 of the 42 fleets included in the model, and the analysis in section 3 is focused on 
these fleets. Under the CFP reforms the unmarketable landings cannot be sold for human 
consumption, but can be used as a raw material for production of other goods such as fish meal 
(European Commission, 2012). So, the revenue generated by <MLS landings was calculated based 
on a value of €93 per tonne, based on the mean of an estimate supplied by a British industrial fish 
meal plant of £60-£100 pounds per tonne. It was assumed that a similar value would be obtained 
by fleets in other states, and that this value was independent of the species, size and quality of 
unmarketable catch. The cost of processing and landing catch was not included in the estimated 
revenues.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 What is the potential economic impact of transitioning to catch quotas if no change in 
fishing behaviour occurs?  
Taken over all fleets, protocols and years, a transition to catch quotas results in a median 19% 
reduction in the fleet revenue generated from the six stocks, compared to 2012. This reduction in 
revenue is not only due to the transition to catch quotas. For example, the management plan for 
cod requires a reduction in F. In 2014 the target F for cod is 0.22, compared to an actual F of 0.39 
in 2012. This reduction in the target F would require a smaller cod TAC to be set in 2014 even if 
catch quotas were not introduced. Catch quotas set under the 0% protocol are set equal to 
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estimated landings quotas, providing an indication of how TACs may have changed between 2012 
and 2014 if catch quotas had not been introduced. The 2014 cod catch quota set under the 0% 
protocol is 5% smaller than cod landings in 2012, so the modelled fleets would have incurred a 
reduction in cod landings and revenue even if catch quotas had not been introduced. 
A three way analysis of variance shows that the effects of fleet, protocol, year and all two way 
interactions between them are significant (Table 3). Only the three way interaction between the 
factors is not significant. The pooled standard error of the mean revenue change for each 
combination of fleet, scenario and year is 1.5%, so even rather small effects will be statistically 
significant. These factors and their interactions explain 81% of the variance in the results. Most of 
the variance (69%) is between fleets, a smaller amount is between protocols and between years 
(5% each) while the interactions between factors each account for less than 1% of the variation. 
We therefore focus on the differences between fleets, protocols and years, knowing that the 
marginal means for each level of these factors capture the most important features of the data, 
but will comment briefly on the largest components of the two-way interactions.  
 
Table 3 ANOVA of the percentage change in revenue of the modelled North Sea demersal finfish 
fleets versus projection year, catch quota protocol and fleet. 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 82,884,050 839 98,789 426 0.00 0.81 
       
Year 4,753,080 2 2,376,540 10,251 0.00 0.05 
Fleet 70,594,461 34 2,076,308 8,956 0.00 0.69 
Protocol 5,473,339 7 781,906 3,373 0.00 0.05 
Year * Fleet 968,958 68 14,249 61 0.00 0.01 
Year * Protocol 141,844 14 10,132 44 0.00 0.00 
Fleet * Protocol 894,988 238 3,760 16 0.00 0.01 
Year * Fleet * Protocol 57,379 476 121 0.5 1.00 0.00 
Error 19,279,714 83,160 232    
       
Total 102,163,764 83,999     
a. R Squared = 0.811 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.809)    
 
The greatest reduction in revenues (-27%) is in 2014, decreasing to -20% in 2015 and -9% in 2016 
(Figure 2). This improvement in revenue over time is due to the impact of catch quotas on the F 
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and SSB of the six stocks. Full documentation of catches results in the total F being capped at the 
level defined by the management plan. In addition, current landings quotas are set based on a 
target F assuming that fleets will discard catch at an estimated rate. However, under catch quotas 
no discarding occurs, so if the uplift applied to the landings quota in 2014 is less than current 
discards, the target F is undershot (Table S1). The target F of each stock can only be achieved if 
the landings quota is uplifted by 100% of the discards, and the resulting catch quota is fully 
utilised. However, none of the catch quotas set in 2014-2016 are fully utilised (Table S1), as not all 
fleets are limited by quota allocations for the same species. Consequently, fishing mortality is 
reduced well below 2012 levels and the target defined by the management plan for each stock. By 
2016 the fishing mortality of all stocks will be below the FMSY values, which are 0.19 for cod, 0.3 
for haddock and saithe, 0.25 for plaice, and 0.22 for sole (Table S1). A lower F in 2014-2016 allows 
the SSB of stocks to increase, which allows progressively larger catch quotas to be set for cod, 
plaice and whiting, the three species which limit fleets if no change in behaviour occurs (Table S1). 
The cod catch quota increases from >39,600 t in 2014 to >57,000 t in 2016 under the 30%c 
protocol. Similarly, the plaice catch quota increases from >145,000 t in 2014 to >190,000 t in 2016, 
whilst the whiting catch quota increases form >37,000 t in 2014 to >49,000 t in 2016. A larger 
catch quota results in a larger quota allocation for fleets, leading to revenue increases from 
increased landings of the limiting species (Table S2).  
 
 
Figure 2 Mean percentage change in the revenue compared to 2012 of modelled North Sea 
demersal finfish fleets in 2014-2016 after transitioning to catch quota management, across all 
catch quota protocols. The pooled standard error is ± 0.1, so is not plotted. 
Not all fleets will see the same trend in the increase in revenue between years, as indicated by the 
small but significant interaction between year and fleet (Table 3 and Figure 3). The increases of 
SSB in 2015 and 2016 results in higher CPUE for all species (Table S2). Fleets may potentially also 
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see an increase in catches of non-limiting species. The largest relative increase in SSB is for cod 
and saithe (Table S1). So fleets will see relatively large increases in the CPUE of these species 
compared to 2014 (Table S2). Fleets limited by cod will see increased landings of both cod and 
saithe. If cod and saithe are target species, fleets could see a larger than average increase in 
revenue between 2014 and 2015 (Table S2). For example the increase in revenue of the 
Norwegian (NO) static fleet between 2014 and 2015 is slightly larger than the average for most 
fleets, increasing from a mean value of -1% in 2014 across all protocols, to an increase of 12% in 
2015 (Figure 2). The Danish (DK) beam trawl fleet, the English (EN) beam, and 24-40m and 40m 
and over otter trawler fleets, the Belgian (BE) otter trawler fleet, and the German (GE) <24m otter 
and >24m beam trawl fleets do not see a large year on year increase in revenue (Figure 2). The 
limiting species of each of these fleets, cod or whiting, are not target species, so even a large 
percentage increase in landings of these species in 2015 and 2016 would only result in a small 
increase in revenue at best. The target species of these fleets is plaice, which contributed 81-99% 
of landings in 2012 (Table S2). The plaice stock gains only a relatively small increase in SSB in 2015 
and 2016 (Table S1), and the increase in the CPUE is relatively small (Table S2). Moreover, 
although the cod and whiting quota allocations increase in size in 2015 and 2016, the increase in 
the CPUE of these species in these years means that the quota allocations will be utilised by a 
lower level of effort than in 2014. The lower level of effort combined with the relatively small 
increase in the CPUE of plaice results in fleets achieving only a small increase in plaice landings at 
best in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014 (Table S2). Consequently the increase in revenue will be 
minimal between 2014 and 2016 (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 The mean percentage change in revenue of each of the modelled North Sea demersal finfish fleets operating across all protocols in 3 projected 
years, 2014-2016, compared to the revenue achieved in 2012 under landings quotas. The pooled standard error is small, ±0.5% and so is not plotted.  
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3.2 Which catch quota protocol results in the highest revenue for fleets? 
Marginal means show that the 0% protocol with no cod overage results in a 33% reduction in 
average fleet revenue. The 75% protocol results in a much smaller reduction of 20% whilst the 
100% and 30%c protocols result in 16% and 12% reductions respectively (Figure 4). So, not 
surprisingly, the larger uplift in quota under the 30%c and 100% protocol results in higher revenue 
for fleets relative to the other protocols.  
 
 
Figure 4 Mean percentage change in the revenue of all modelled North Sea demersal finfish fleets 
across 2014-2016 compared to 2012 under 4 different catch quota setting protocols with no cod 
overage allowed. The pooled standard error is only ± 0.1, so is not plotted. 
The smaller reduction in revenue under the 30%c protocol with no cod overage is a consequence 
of the vast majority of fleets (27 out of 35) being limited by their cod quota allocations. The 30%c 
protocol results in the largest catch quota for cod, and thus the highest revenues for these fleets 
(Figure 5). A 30% increase in the cod landings quota exceeds estimated cod discards for 2014, so 
the 30% protocol results in a larger catch quota in 2014 than either the 75% or 100% protocols 
(see section 2.3, Figure 5). The larger quota allocations allow fishing to continue for longer in 2014, 
resulting in higher fleet revenues. The cod catch quota continues to be largest under the 30%c 
protocol in 2015 and 2016 (Figure 4). This is a result of the influence of the cod management plan. 
The relatively large catch quota in 2014 results in a higher F and smaller estimated cod SSB at the 
beginning of 2015 and 2016 than under the other protocols (Table S1). However the larger cod 
SSBs generated under the other protocols cannot result in a larger cod catch quota being set as 
the cod management plan (European Commission, 2008) prevents the catch quota changing by 
more than 20% relative to the previous year (Figure 5). If this constraint were not applied the cod 
catch quota would be smallest under the 30%c protocol in 2015 and 2016 and largest under the 0% 
protocol, as the latter results in larger SSB and lower F (Figure 5, Table S1). Moreover, the cod 
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catch quota would be substantially larger in 2016 under all protocols if the constraints were 
removed (Figure 5). So, the impact of different catch quota setting protocols and catch quotas 
themselves will be heavily influenced by the quota constraints under management plan of each 
stock. 
 
 
Figure 5 The size of the cod catch quota under 4 different catch quota setting protocols when no 
cod overage allowed, if existing constraints on change in quota size within the cod management 
plan are continued under catch quota management (closed diamonds) or removed (open squares).  
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whiting exceed a 30% increase in the whiting landings quotas. The 100% protocol continues to 
result in the highest catch quotas being set in 2015 and 2016 (Figure 6) due to the whiting 
management plan limiting the year-on-year change in quota size to 15% (ICES, 2013a). As above, if 
the constraint was removed the whiting catch quota would be largest under the 0% protocol in 
2015 and 2016 (Figure 6, Table S1).  
 
Table 4 The mean percentage change in revenue across 2014-2016 of 7 of the modelled North Sea 
demersal finfish fleets which are limited by their whiting allocations compared to the revenue 
achieved in 2012 under landings quotas, based on if a 10% cod overage is allowed (+ ov.) or not 
allowed (- ov.) under 4 different catch quota setting protocol; 0%, 75%, 100% and 30%c.  
 Change in revenue (%) 
 0% 75% 100% 30%c 
Fleet - ov. + ov. - ov. + ov. - ov. + ov. - ov. + ov. 
DK Static -99 -99 -98 -98 -98 -98 -98 -98 
EN Otter >=40m -55 -55 -37 -37 -32 -32 -41 -41 
EN Otter 24-40m -48 -48 -30 -29 -24 -24 -33 -33 
GE Beam >=24m -81 -81 -73 -73 -71 -71 -75 -75 
NL Beam <24m -72 -72 -60 -60 -57 -57 -63 -63 
NL Beam >=40m -69 -69 -56 -56 -52 -53 -59 -59 
NL Beam 24-40m -66 -66 -52 -52 -48 -48 -56 -56 
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Figure 6 The size of the whiting catch quota under 4 different catch quota setting protocols, if 
existing constraints on quota size are continued under catch quota management (closed 
diamonds) or removed (open squares).  
 
3.2.1 Impact of allowing a 10% cod overage  
Allowing a 10% overage of a cod catch quota in 2014 increases the revenue of fleets. The marginal 
mean change in revenues is reduced to -30% under the 0% protocol, -17% under the 75% protocol, 
-13% under the 100% protocol and -9% under the 30%c protocol. However, the benefit of utilising 
a cod overage is not uniform across years (Figure 7). The increase in revenue is much smaller in 
2015 and 2016. Applying an overage results in a higher F and a smaller cod SSB at the beginning of 
2015 and 2016 (Table 5). This reduces the size of the catch quota that can be set compared to if 
no overage had been applied. The size of the catch quota is further reduced by deduction of the 
overage used in the previous year. Consequently, there is only a small increase in the amount of 
cod that can be landed in 2015 and 2016, even if an overage is also allowed in these years (Table 
5). In addition there is no increase in revenue for fleets limited by plaice or whiting (Table 4). 
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Figure 7 Mean percentage change in the revenue across 2014-2016 compared to 2012 of all 
modelled North Sea demersal finfish fleets after transitioning to catch quota management under 
4 different catch quota setting protocols when no cod overage is allowed (closed disamond), and 
the influence of allowing an overage (open square). The pooled standard error is small ±0.9% and 
so is not plotted.  
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Table 5 Percentage change in SSB, F and cod catch quota size if a rolling 10% overage of the cod 
catch quota is allowed between 2014 and 2016, compared to if no overage is allowed, based on 4 
different catch quota setting protocols. 
Protocol Year 
Change 
in F (%) 
Change in 
SSB (%) 
Change in 
catch 
quota (%) 
0% 2014 10 0 10 
 2015 2 -2 1 
 2016 4 -2 3 
75% 2014 11 0 10 
 2015 2 -2 1 
 2016 4 -2 3 
100% 2014 11 0 10 
 2015 2 -2 1 
 2016 4 -2 3 
30%c 2014 11 0 10 
 2015 2 -2 1 
 2016 4 -2 3 
 
 
3.3 Are there relative economic winners and losers if no change in behaviour is made? 
The variation in change in revenue between fleets is much higher than that between years or 
protocols (Figure 8a). The mean change in revenue compared to 2012 varies from an increase of 
34% for the French 10-40m otter trawler fleet to a reduction of 98% for the Danish static fleet 
(Figure 8a).  
 
146 
 
 
Figure 8 (a) Mean percentage change in fleet revenue of modelled North Sea demersal fleets 
between 2014 and 2016, compared to 2012. The pooled standard error is small, ±0.3%, so is not 
plotted. (b) Mean percentage changes grouped by country, and (c) by basic gear groups. 
 
This high level of variation is not related to the Member State in which each fleet is registered 
(Figure 8b). For, example, English fleets see changes in revenue between -41% and +7% and 
French fleets see changes between -25% and +34%. Change in revenue is not linked to gear type 
(Figure 8c). Changes in revenue of beam trawler fleets vary from -75% to +1%. Otter trawler fleets 
see changes in revenue varying from -60% to +34%. The major determinant of the change in 
revenue is the catch characteristics of each fleet, with relative winners being those that are 
limited by a target species or have a high catching efficiency for their target species compared to 
the limiting species, preventing or reducing forgone catches. If forgone catches are small they 
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could be compensated for by an increase in landings of the limiting species, allowing revenue to 
be maintained or increased compared to 2012. An increase in landings of the limiting species can 
occur as the catch quotas for all species are larger than landings in 2012, except for cod under the 
0% protocol (31,987 t of cod, 46,941 t of haddock, 73,830 t of plaice, 77,100 t saithe, 11,610 t of 
sole and 17,105 t of whiting were landed in 2012, Table S1). A large absolute increase in the 
landings of the limiting species compared to foregone catches is more likely in fleets where the 
limiting species is an important target, contributing a large percentage of landings. Relative losers 
are those fleets that are limited by a non-target species and have a relatively high CPUE for the 
limiting species compared to their target species, resulting in relatively large foregone catches. 
This is more likely in high discarding fleets.  
For example, amongst the relative winners is the French 10-40m otter trawler fleet, whose 
revenue increases by 34% in 2014 (Figure 8a). This fleet is limited by its cod quota allocation, and 
this is the second most important species for the fishery, contributing 32% of revenue and 14% of 
landings in 2012. However, 66% of revenue and 84% of landings in 2012 came from whiting (Table 
S2). Exhaustion of the cod quota allocation could result in a substantial reduction in landings of 
the more important target species. However, this fleet catches whiting with a higher efficiency 
than cod, catching 1.41 t and 0.1 t per unit of effort (1000 kW days) respectively. This allows the 
fleet to maintain its landings of whiting despite being limited by cod. Marketable landings of 
whiting are increased by 37% in 2014 under the 30%c protocol as whiting that would previously 
have been discarded is landed (Table S2). >MLS whiting may have been discarded for a number of 
reasons including poor quality, a lack of market or low prices, or because it exceeds the quota 
allowance of the fleet. As mentioned above, this fleet will also see an increase in cod landings 
under all but the 0% protocol; cod landings increase by 25% in 2014 under the 30%c protocol 
(Table S2). The combined increase in cod and whiting landings results in the 34% mean increase in 
revenue mentioned above. Another winner is the Scottish static fleet. Here, the mean revenue 
increases by 26% (Figure 8a). Cod contributed 90% of the revenue and 80% of the landings of this 
fleet in 2012 (Table S2). Therefore, the increase in cod under all but the 0% protocol results in an 
increase in the total landings and revenue of the fleet. This increase in cod compensates for the 
reduction in landings of haddock and saithe. For example, these are reduced by 37% and 11% 
respectively under the 30%c protocol (Table S2). The CPUE of haddock and saithe are both low, at 
<0.01 t per unit of effort, compared to 0.03 t of cod per unit of effort. Consequently the cod quota 
allocation is exhausted before enough haddock and saithe can be caught to match 2012 levels 
(Table S2). However, haddock and saithe together only contributed 10% of the revenue in 2012 
and 19% of the landings (Table S2). So reductions in landings of these species do not represent 
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substantial foregone catches. As cod dominates the landings of this fleet, the increase in cod 
landings will exceed the reduction in haddock and saithe landings and revenue will increase 
(Figure 8a, Table S2).  
If the limiting species is not a main target, any increase in landings may not compensate for a 
reduction in non-limiting species, particularly if the CPUE of non-limiting species is relatively low. 
For example, the English 24-40m and >40m otter trawler fleets, the Danish static fleet, the 
German >24m beam trawler fleet, and the Dutch <24m, 24-40m and >40m beam trawler fleets 
are limited by their whiting allocation (Table S2). The whiting catch quotas exceed the amount 
landed in 2012 under all protocols, leading to an increase in whiting landings (Table S2). However, 
whiting is not a target species and contributed 1% or less of landings and revenue for the majority 
of these fleets in 2012. Even a large percentage increase in whiting landings will be of low value 
relative to landings of other species (Table S2). As whiting contributes so little to the landings of 
these fleets a relatively low CPUE could be expected for this species. However, these fleets 
discarded between 79% and 99% of their whiting catch in 2012, far exceeding the proportion of 
catch of the target species (plaice and sole) that was discarded (Table S2). So the CPUE of whiting 
for each of these fleets is relatively much higher than for their target species (Table S2). They 
exhaust their whiting quota allocation with a very low level of effort and landings of their target 
species cannot be maintained (Table S2), resulting in dramatic reductions in revenue between 34 
and 98% (Figure 8a).  
3.4 Will a change in fishing behaviour benefit the modelled fleets? 
3.4.1 Avoidance of <MLS cod catch 
Taken over all fleets, protocols and years, avoiding catching all <MLS cod results in a median 14% 
reduction in the fleet revenue generated from the six stocks, compared to -19% if no change in 
behaviour occurs. So higher revenue can be achieved if fishers change their behaviour to achieve 
this. As above when no change in behaviour is made, fleet revenue is significantly affected by fleet, 
protocol, year and all two way interactions between them. These factors and their interactions 
explain 80% of the variance in the results.  
Variation in the change in revenue between fleets is the most important factor, explaining 68% of 
the overall variation. The impacts of the behaviour change will also vary between fleets (Figure 9). 
Avoiding <MLS cod results in a reduction in a fleet’s cod CPUE (Figure 10). A lower CPUE results in 
a fleet having to exert a higher level of effort if they want to fulfil their cod quota allocation. So, 
avoiding <MLS cod could allow fleets limited by cod to operate for longer (Figure 10). With more 
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time to operate fleets can increase their landings of non-limiting species. In addition avoiding 
<MLS cod allows the cod quota allocation to be fulfilled by higher value >MLS catch. Together, the 
increase in landings of non-limiting species and marketable cod will increase revenue, compared 
to if no change in behaviour is made (Figure 10). The reduction in the cod CPUE, and the resulting 
increase in effort, landings and revenue will be largest for those fleets that currently catch 
relatively higher levels of <MLS cod (Figure 11). For example, in 2014 under the 30%c protocol the 
Belgian otter trawler fleet sees a 33% increase in revenue when all <MLS cod are avoided (Figure 
10). The fleet is limited by cod, 25% of which is <MLS, more than any other fleet. However, if a 
fleet is not limited by cod, avoiding catching <MLS fish of this species will not offer any benefit 
(Figure 10). For example, the 40m and over English otter trawler fleet is limited by whiting. The 
limiting whiting quota allocation will still be exhausted by the same level of effort as when no 
change in behaviour occurs, as the CPUE of whiting is not affected by avoiding the 1% of the cod 
catch which is <MLS. If there is no increase in effort, the fleet cannot increase landings of non-
limiting species. Instead the fleet will forgo the very small amount of revenue that could be 
generated from the <MLS cod if it is sold for fish meal. The impact on revenue will be minimal due 
to the low volume and value of the foregone <MLS cod catch (Figure 10).  
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Figure 9 Mean percentage change in fleet revenue of modelled North Sea demersal fleets 
between 2014 and 2016, compared to 2012, if there is no change in behaviour (open squares) or 
if fishers change their behaviour to avoid all <MLS cod (closed diamonds). The pooled standard 
error of the behaviour change is small, ±0.3%.  
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Figure 10 Median percentage change in the cod CPUE of modelled North Sea demersal finfish 
fleets and the resultant median percentage change in effort, total landings and revenue under the 
30%c protocol in 2014 if fishers change their behaviour to avoid catching <MLS cod, compared to 
if no behaviour change is made. Fleets are limited by either their cod quota allocation (closed 
diamond), plaice (open square) or whiting (open triangle). 
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Figure 11 Percentage of the cod catch that is <MLS if no change in behaviour is made by the 
modelled North Sea demersal finfish fleets, compared to the percentage change in fleet revenue 
if this <MLS catch is avoided when operating under the 30%c protocol in 2014. Fleets are limited 
by either their cod quota allocation (closed diamond), plaice (open square) or whiting (open 
triangle). 
 
Once again the fleet revenue will increase between 2014 and 2016 due to the influence of catch 
quotas on the F and SSB of stocks, allowing larger catch quotas to be set for limiting species 
(Figure 12a). Similarly, marginal mean change in revenue will continue to be highest under the 
30%c protocol (Figure 12b). The year explains 4% of the variation in the change in fleet revenue 
whilst protocol explains 5%. The economic benefit of avoiding <MLS cod is uniform across years 
and protocols (Figure 12). The model assumes that the same proportion of a fleet’s cod catch will 
be <MLS in all years, so avoiding <MLS cod results in the same relative reduction in the cod CPUE 
in all years. Consequently, the relative increase in effort, landings and revenue is also the same. 
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Figure 12 Marginal mean percentage change in revenue compared to 2012 of modelled North Sea 
demersal finfish fleets if no change in behaviour is made (open squares) or all <MLS cod is avoided 
(closed diamonds), (a) in 2014 to 2016, (b) under 4 different catch quota setting protocols where 
a cod overage has not been allowed. The pooled standard errors are ±0.1% for year and ±0.2% for 
protocol when a change in behaviour is made, so are not plotted.  
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<MLS cod may differ for some fleets that are limited by a species other than cod (Figure 13). For 
example, in 2014 under the 30%c protocol the Belgian <24m beam trawl fleet will see revenue 
increase by 12% if <MLS catch of all species is avoided, compared to when no change in behaviour 
is made; conversely if only <MLS cod is avoided revenue will be unchanged (Figure 13). This fleet 
is limited by its plaice allocation; avoiding the 11% of the plaice catch that is <MLS increases the 
level of effort this fleet can exert before the plaice allocation is exhausted, allowing the fleet to 
catch more non-limiting species, resulting in an increase in revenue of 12% (Figure 13). However, 
an increase in revenue will not be achieved by all fleets limited by a species other than cod. For 
example, the 3 Dutch beam trawl fleets, and the German >24m beam trawl fleet incur a small 
reduction in revenue if all <MLS catch relative to that when only <MLS cod is avoided. These fleets 
are limited by whiting but have no documented <MLS whiting catch included in the model. So, 
avoiding <MLS catch of all species will not affect the level of effort by these fleets. Instead the 
fleets will forgo <MLS catch of other species, particularly plaice, that could be sold for fish meal 
production. For these fleets the sheer scale of plaice landings means that forgoing <MLS plaice 
impacts on revenue, although only slightly (Figure 13). Some fleets that are limited by cod will also 
see a small reduction in revenue due to forgone catches of <MLS fish (Figure 13). These include 
the Danish <24m otter trawler and seine fleets, the English <24m otter trawler, the Dutch otter 
trawler fleet and the Scottish <24m otter trawler and <10m fleets.  
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Figure 13 Median percentage change in the landings and revenue of modelled North Sea 
demersal finfish fleets under the 30%c protocol in 2014, if fishers change their behaviour to avoid 
catching <MLS cod (open shapes) or <MLS catch of all species (closed shapes), compared to if no 
behaviour change is made. Fleets are limited by either their cod quota allocation (circle), plaice 
(square) or whiting (triangle). 
 
3.4.3 Reducing cod catch rates by 30%  
Reducing cod catch rates by 30% results in the largest increases in revenue of all the selectivity 
change scenarios. Taken over all fleets, protocols and years, reducing the CPUE of cod by 30% 
results in a median 4% reduction in fleet revenue, compared to 2012. This reduction is much less 
than if no change in behaviour occurred, or if only <MLS catch of cod or all species is avoided. 
Once again fleet, year and protocol all significantly affect the change in fleet revenue, although 
the impact of year and protocol is less than if no behaviour change is made. The model explains 
76% of the variation in results, year explains 2% and protocol explains 4%. Fleet continues to have 
the strongest impact on revenue, explaining 68% of the variance in the results. This is due to the 
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different catch compositions of the modelled fleets. Reducing the CPUE of cod by 30% will reduce 
the rate at which a cod quota allocation is exhausted, in the same way as avoiding only <MLS 
catch. This will allow fleets limited by cod to increase effort, and consequently landings of non-
limiting species (Table S3). The resulting increase in revenue will be largest for fleets where cod is 
not a target species (Figure 14), as these fleets incur the highest levels of foregone catches if no 
change in fishing behaviour occurs. If cod is a target species, any increase in landings of non-
limiting species is unlikely to result in a large increase in total landings and revenue (Figure 14). 
The increase in revenue will also be affected by the proportion of the cod catch that is <MLS if no 
change in behaviour is made. Under this selectivity scenario it is assumed that all <MLS cod are 
avoided. As above avoiding <MLS cod allows a fleet’s cod quota allocation to be fulfilled by higher 
value >MLS catch. The increase in marketable cod is greatest for those fleets that are least size 
selective, where a high proportion of cod catches are currently <MLS. For example, the German 
<24m otter trawler fleet sees a 40% increase in total landings in 2014, whilst the Belgian otter 
trawler fleet sees a smaller 34% increase, and yet both fleets benefit from a 40% increase in 
revenue. 25% of the cod caught by the Belgian fleet would be <MLS if no change in behaviour 
were made, whilst 16% of the cod catch of the German fleet would be undersized. Consequently, 
marketable landings of cod increase by 34% for the Belgian fleet and only 20% for the German 
fleet. The greater increase in marketable cod landings gives the Belgian fleet the same increase in 
revenue as the German fleet (Table S3). For fleets not limited by cod, reducing the CPUE of this 
species offers no economic benefit (Figure 14) and reducing the CPUE of a non-limiting species 
results in foregone catches (Table S3). The scale of any reduction in revenue will be dependent 
upon whether cod is a target species or not.  
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Figure 14 Percentage change in the revenue of modelled North Sea demersal finfish fleets under 
the 30%c protocol between 2014 and 2016 if the cod CPUE is reduced by 30% compared to that if 
no change in behaviour is made, plotted against the relative importance of cod as a target species. 
Fleets are limited by either their quota allocation for cod (closed diamond), haddock (open circle), 
plaice (open square), sole (open triangle) or whiting (cross). 
 
As can be seen from the changes in revenue, the effect of the change in behaviour is relatively 
uniform across the different protocols (Figure 15a). However, the benefit of reducing the CPUE of 
cod does reduce across the years. The increase in revenue is lower in each year of the projection 
(Figure 15b). This occurs due to the combined influence of the behaviour change and the 
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relatively large improvement in the SSB of cod compared to other stocks. As mentioned above, 
catch quotas result in an increase in stock size between 2014 and 2016 due to a reduction in F. 
However, the improvement in the cod stock far outweighs that of the other stocks (Table S1). 
Consequently, the increase in the size of the catch quota between 2014 and 2016 will also be 
largest for the cod stock. A larger cod catch quota results in relatively less limiting quota 
allocations. When the CPUE of cod is reduced by 30%, the likelihood that fleet will become limited 
by another species increases, particularly for haddock and sole which see the smallest increases in 
quota size (Table S1). This change in the limiting species is influenced by the level of recruitment 
in each stock. A relatively high level of recruitment in the previous year will increase a fleet’s CPUE 
for that species reducing the amount of effort that will exhaust the associated quota allocation, 
increasing the likelihood that a fleet will become limited by this species (Table S4). For example, in 
2014 under the 30%c protocol the English fully documented fleet is limited by cod in 70 of the 100 
replicate runs in which recruitment is varied (see section 2.2). The fleet is limited by sole in only 4 
runs. However, by 2016 the fleet is limited by cod in only 10 runs and sole in 54. Haddock is the 
limiting species on the majority of the remaining runs (Table S4). This change in the limiting 
species can result in a reduction in fleet revenue compared to that without a change in behaviour 
(Figure 14). Quota allocations for these newly limiting species will be exhausted by a higher level 
of effort than the cod allocation if no change in behaviour is made, so the fleet will still see an 
increase in landings of non-limiting species other than cod (Table S3). However, the change in the 
limiting species prevents the cod allocation from being fully utilised. This results in a reduction in 
cod landings compared to those if no change in behaviour were made (Table S3). The scale of the 
foregone cod catches will be dependent upon whether cod is a target species and the CPUE of 
sole (or other limiting species) relative to cod (Table S3). If the CPUE of the new limiting species is 
relatively high compared to that of cod, foregone cod catches are likely to be larger. Dependent 
upon the scale of additional landings of non-limiting species, a large reduction in cod catches can 
result in a fall in revenue, compared to that if no change in behaviour occurred (Figure 14, Table 
S3).  
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Figure 15 Percentage change in the revenue compared to 2012 of modelled North Sea demersal 
finfish fleets (a) in 2014 to 2016 and (b) under 4 different catch quota setting protocols where a 
cod overage has not been allowed, if no change in behaviour is made (open squares) or if the 
CPUE of cod is reduced by 30% (closed diamonds). The pooled standard error is ±0.1% for year 
and ±0.2% for protocol when a change in behaviour is made. 
 
In summary, transitioning to catch quotas results in a substantial increase in revenue for some 
fleets and a reduction in revenue for others. The impact is dependent upon the year, catch quota 
protocol used and individual characteristics of fleets. Under existing management plans, a larger 
uplift in 2014 results in higher revenues for all fleets. Revenue of all fleets increases over time due 
to the improvement in the SSB of the 6 stocks, resulting from catch quotas limiting the F of stocks 
to below levels defined in the management plans. Whether the revenue of a fleet increases 
compared to before catch quotas were introduced is dependent upon the catch characteristics of 
the fleet; whether the limiting species is a target species and the CPUE of the limiting species 
relative to other target species. Reducing catch rates of the limiting species, through avoiding 
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<MLS catch or reducing catch rates of all sizes, can result in a dramatic increase in revenue. 
Reducing catch rates of the limiting species allows a higher level of effort to be exerted before the 
limiting quota allocation is exhausted. A higher level of effort allows a fleet to catch more non-
limiting species, increasing revenue. A large reduction in the CPUE of the limiting species, such as 
the 30% reduction in the cod CPUE discussed above, results in the greatest increases in revenue. 
The incentive for this behaviour change will be greatest for fleets that are limited by a non-target 
species, particularly if a high proportion of their catch of this species is <MLS. However, reducing 
the catch rate of the limiting species will offer little benefit if the fleet then becomes limited by 
another species, due to foregone catches. This change in limiting species will be influenced by the 
level of recruitment in each stock.  
 
4. Discussion 
In the introduction, we posed four questions:  
1. What is the potential economic impact of transitioning to catch quotas if no change in 
fishing behaviour occurs?  
2. Which catch quota protocol results in the highest revenue for fleets?  
3. Are there relative economic winners and losers if no change in behaviour is made? 
4. Will the modelled fleets be incentivised to change their behaviour and avoid catching 
“unwanted” fish, those that are undersized or with limited quotas?  
The answers to these questions are not straight forward and will vary between fleets. The model 
suggests that the mean revenue of fleets will be reduced when catch quotas are implemented. 
However, this reduction may not be solely due to the introduction of catch quotas. The cod 
management plan requires a reduction in F, reducing the amount of cod that can be caught in 
2014 compared to 2012. However, the impact of catch quotas will vary between years and will be 
dependent upon how catch quotas are implemented and the individual fleet. Revenue will be 
lowest in the first year of implementation. This reflects evidence from Norwegian fisheries, where 
the introduction of a discard ban and supporting measures alongside catch quotas resulted in a 
short-term decline in the revenue of fleets due to a reduction in fishing opportunities (Diamond 
and Beukers-Stewart, 2011). Revenue will increase in subsequent years due to an improvement in 
the condition of stocks. Catch quotas result in a year-on-year reduction in F; by 2016 the 
exploitation of all modelled stocks is below their FMSY. This reduction in F allows the SSBs to 
increase, as was seen in Northeast Artic stocks after the change in Norwegian fisheries 
161 
 
management mentioned above. Diamond and Beukers-Stewart estimate that SSBs increased by 
approximately 18% per year (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011). The increase in SSB allows 
larger catch quotas to be set for limiting species in each year of the projection. This allows fleets 
to land more catch resulting in an increase in revenue between 2014 and 2016. In fact by 2016 
the revenue of many fleets exceeds that achieved in 2012 under landings quotas. This suggests 
that a decline in revenue as a result of catch quota implementation may be only temporary, at 
least for some fleets. The annual increase in revenue is heavily influenced by the quota 
constraints within each management plan. The increase in SSB could allow much larger catch 
quotas to be set, however, the between year change in quota size is restricted to a maximum of 
15% increase (20% for cod). Consequently, the modelled fleets are operating under much more 
restrictive catch quotas than is necessary in 2015 and 2016, and revenue could be much higher 
than estimated if the quota constraints were relaxed. If managers wish to see the fleets achieving 
higher revenues during the transition to catch quotas existing management plans may need to be 
revised. 
The level of initial uplift applied under each protocol will also influence the impact of catch quotas 
on revenue. The larger the initial uplift applied to landings quotas, the larger the revenue of fleets 
in the first year of transition. A larger uplift results in larger catch quotas and quota allocations. 
Larger quota allocations allow fleets to land more of their limiting species and will be exhausted 
by a higher level of effort. With more time to fish, fleets can land more non-limiting species. The 
catch quota protocol that results in the largest catch quota will vary between species dependent 
upon what proportion of catch is currently discarded. A 30% increase in a landings quota may 
exceed estimated discards of a stock, or vice versa. So, the catch quota protocol that results in the 
highest revenue for fleets will vary dependent upon the limiting species of each fleet. Using 
different catch quota protocols for different species would allow the revenue of all fleets to be 
maximised in the first year of transition. For example, using the 30%c protocol to set the cod 
catch quota and the 100% protocol to set the whiting catch quota would maximised the 2014 
revenue of all modelled fleets. 
The longer term impact of the initial quota uplift level is heavily influenced by the quota 
constraints within each management plan. A smaller initial uplift in 2014 will result in lower Fs as 
less catch can be landed, allowing a more rapid rebuilding of SSBs than if the uplift was larger. 
However, the quota constraints within each management plan prevent larger catch quotas being 
set. Consequently, fleets continue to see higher revenues in subsequent years when a larger initial 
uplift is applied. 
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The characteristics of individual fleets are likely to have the strongest influence on revenues. The 
impact of transitioning to catch quotas and a discard ban varies greatly between the modelled 
fleets. Some see large increases in revenue whilst others see dramatic declines. This supports 
evidence from previous studies where the impact of catch quotas was found to vary greatly 
between different vessel segments (Condie et al., 2013a, Condie et al., 2013b). The change in 
revenue is not determined by gear type. Fleets using static, otter or beam trawls rank amongst 
those with the greatest increases or largest declines in revenue. Similarly, fleets from each of the 
different Member States are found amongst both the economic winners and losers. Instead the 
relative change in revenue is determined by the catch characteristics of each fleet. Whether the 
limiting species is a target will influence the change in revenue, as has been seen in previous 
studies (Condie et al., 2013a). When the quota allocation for the limiting species is exhausted 
fishing must stop which could result in foregone catches of other species. If the limiting species is 
the main target, contributing a high proportion of landings, then foregone catches will be 
relatively small. This small reduction in catches of non-limiting species could be compensated for 
by an increase in landings of the limiting species. Conversely, if the limiting species is not a main 
target foregone catches will be much higher, reducing revenue. The level of foregone catches will 
also be influenced by a fleet’s catching efficiency for the limiting species compared to the CPUE of 
other species. A relatively high CPUE for the limiting species will result in rapid exhaustion of the 
limiting quota allocation. This can result in a reduction in catches of other species if the rate at 
which these species are caught is relatively low. The larger the discrepancy between CPUEs of 
limiting and non-limiting species the greater the reduction in landings and revenue will be. This 
discrepancy is more likely to be large for fleets that currently discard a high proportion of their 
catch of the limiting species. However, some relatively high discarding fleets may still see revenue 
increase under catch quotas.  
So, the relative impact of transitioning to catch quotas on each fleet will be dependent upon: 
 The limiting species – is it a key target species? 
 The relative CPUE of the limiting species – how does the CPUE of the limiting species 
compare to the target species?  
The model shows that an incentive to change fishing behaviour and adopt more selective fishing 
practices to avoid catching the limiting species, particularly if a high proportion is <MLS, is created 
under catch quotas. This supports the findings of previous models (Condie et al., 2013a, Condie et 
al., 2013b) and evidence from fisheries where fishing mortality is fully documented (Diamond and 
Beukers-Stewart, 2011, Grafton et al., 2005, Graham et al., 2007). If all catch is documented and 
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compliance is high the only way income can be maximised is through reducing operating costs, 
improving the value of catch by avoiding undersized or poor quality fish, or by shifting targeting 
away from limiting species (Branch et al., 2006). For example, fishers in the British Columbia 
groundfish trawl fishery reduced catches of rougheye (Sebastes aleutianus), shortraker (S. borealis) 
and yelloweye rockfish (S. ruberrimus) by more than 50% when TACs for these species were 
reduced, and maximised income through targeting other species with more available quota 
instead (Branch and Hilborn, 2008). The incentive to adopt more selective fishing practices and 
reduce the catch rate of limiting species will be strongest for;  
 the least size-selective fleets,  
 fleets limited by a non-target species.  
Improving selectivity to avoid capturing <MLS fish will reduce the CPUE of the limiting species. A 
lower CPUE will delay the fulfilment of the limiting quota allocation, increasing the opportunity to 
catch other species and improving revenue. Moreover, more higher value >MLS fish of the 
limiting species can be landed increasing the value of the limiting quota allocation. The incentive 
to adopt this change in selectivity will be greatest for the least size-selective vessels as the more 
<MLS catch that is avoided, the larger the increase in revenue will be. This supports the findings of 
Condie et al (2013a) where the incentive to avoid <MLS catch was strongest for the least selective 
vessels of the North Sea English otter trawler fleet. Moreover, fishers in the UK cod catch quota 
trial were seen to avoid fishing, change fishing grounds or switch target species during periods 
when <MLS cod were more abundant (Course et al., 2011, Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011). The 
improvement in revenue will be larger if catches of the limiting species are avoided all together. 
Larger reductions in the CPUE of the limiting species will allow more effort to be exerted, 
increasing the amount of time fleets can spend fishing for non-limiting species. This will be 
particularly important for fleets limited by a non-target species. However, a large increase in 
revenue will not occur if the fleet then becomes limited by another species, due to foregone 
landings of the previously limiting species. The benefit of the behaviour changes evaluated may 
differ from the values shown here. In reality it is unlikely that fishers could avoid all <MLS catch 
and changes in selectivity to avoid catching the limiting species may also impact on capture rates 
of non-limiting species. However, the selectivity changes here highlight the maximum potential 
benefit fishers could see if they were to adopt more selective fishing practices, providing an 
indication of how strong the incentive for behaviour change could be and in which fleets such 
changes are more likely to be seen.  
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The economic impact of transitioning to catch quotas and any resulting incentive to change 
fishing practices will differ from the changes estimated here. This analysis does not include all 
stocks that are exploited by the North Sea demersal finfish fishery, and for many fleets the target 
species may not be included in this assessment. Moreover, the level of <MLS catch is based on an 
average for each species, metier, area and Member State, rather than on estimates for each fleet. 
The value of this <MLS catch is uniform between fleets and is based on an estimate from the UK 
fishmeal industry. In reality the value of <MLS catch may not be uniform within and between 
fishing nations. A higher value of <MLS catch in a particular country could reduce any loss in 
revenue during the transition. It could also reduce the incentive to <MLS catch, but only if its 
value matches that of >MLS catch. The model also assumes that all fish >MLS are marketable and 
will acquire the same value, i.e. no market grades exist. In addition it is assumed that the change 
in supply of each of the species to European markets will not impact on prices, and this may not 
be the case. Consequently, the estimates of revenue generated by fleets may be higher than 
could be attained in reality. However it is still possible to discern how different levels of <MLS 
catch and changes in the landings may impact on fleets when operating under catch quotas, 
allowing us to identify where the greatest impacts are likely to be felt and which fleets are likely 
to benefit the most through a change in behaviour and additional support or flexibility in the 
quota system.   
For example, in this model catch quotas for all six species are introduced simultaneously, however 
catch quotas for non-target species could be introduced by as late as 2019, three years after catch 
quotas for the defining species of a fishery (European Commission, 2013). Staggering the 
introduction of catch quotas could allow fleets to develop more selective fishing practices before 
potentially limiting catch quotas for non-target species are implemented. This could benefit fleets 
such as the modelled Belgian otter trawler and English beam trawler fleets, which are both limited 
by cod, a non-target species. Another assumption of the model is that the catch quota will be 
allocated to fleets based on their share of the total landings of each stock in 2012. However, how 
a quota is distributed is the responsibility of each Member State, and need not be based on 
historic landings (European Commission, 2013). A State could choose to distribute quota 
unequally amongst fleets in order to spread the impact of transitioning to catch quotas more 
evenly. For example, in the model, the Scottish static fleet sees a large increase in revenue whilst 
the revenues of the four other Scottish fleets are reduced. All five fleets are limited by cod. The 
amount of quota allocated to each of the five fleets could be altered. The static fleet could be 
given a smaller allocation for cod and the additional quota could be distributed between the other 
four fleets. The additional quota would prevent cod quota allocations being so restrictive, 
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spreading the impact of the transition to catch quotas more evenly between the five Scottish 
fleets. Alternatively, such fleets could benefit through transfer of quota allocations. The model 
assumes that the level of quota transfer in 2012 is maintained in all years of the projections. 
However, quota transfer could increase under catch quotas (European Commission, 2013), 
allowing fleets to better match fishing opportunities to catch compositions. Whether this will 
occur is uncertain, fishers may choose to hold on to quota if they are concerned about running 
out at the end of the year or because they think prices might be higher then. Substitutions are 
another option, allowing non-target species to be deducted from 9% of the catch quota for 
another species (European Commission, 2013). These mechanisms for quota flexibility will be 
particularly useful for those fleets where quota allocations for more than one species are limiting. 
Such flexibility may reduce the incentive for fleets to adopt more selective fishing practices and 
avoid capturing limiting species, but it is very unlikely that the incentive will be removed all 
together. Unless <MLS catch can generate a value that can compare to that of >MLS catch, fleets 
will continue to maximise the revenue from the limiting quota allocation through avoidance of 
undersized catch. In addition, buying or leasing additional quota to match any overages will incur 
a cost and the incentive to reduce the catch rate of limiting species through more selective fishing 
practices should be maintained, dependent on the relative cost of the additional quota. An 
incentive to avoid catching the most limiting species will also be created for vessels that are least 
constrained by their quota allocations. If fishers could prevent their limiting quota allocation from 
being exhausted they could sell the excess, maximising revenue, particularly if the value of surplus 
quota exceeds the market price of catch (Hutton et al., 2010). 
For some fleets the cost of introducing more selective practices to reduce capture of limiting 
species may be prohibitively expensive, or may be hugely disproportionate to the level of catch 
(European Commission, 2013). This could particularly benefit fleets that are limited by a species 
which is very rarely caught and nearly always discarded. For example, in the model, the English 
24-40m and 40m and over otter trawler fleets are limited by very small quota allocations for 
whiting, a species that contributed only 1% of landings in 2012. Measures have been included in 
the reformed CFP to prevent such a situation occurring (European Commission, 2013). Fleets 
where landing and documenting unwanted catches will result in a disproportionate cost for 
fishers will have access to de minimis exemptions. This measure will allow up to 7% of the total 
catch of regulated species to be discarded; catches will be recorded but not deducted from quota 
(European Commission, 2013). Fleets may also be exempted if scientific evidence of high discard 
survival rates is available (European Commission, 2013).  
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A very important point to note is that the incentives that are created by catch quotas are reliant 
upon catches being fully documented and catch quotas constraining fishing. However the 
economic impact of limiting quota allocations will generate an incentive to illegally discard the 
constraining species. High observer coverage, such as that used in the British Columbia groundfish 
fishery, may prevent discarding but is likely to be very expensive (Branch et al., 2006). Alternatives 
include on board cameras and sensors which have shown promise in trials (Kindt-Larsen et al., 
2011) but have their own associated costs surrounding installation, maintenance and data 
validation (Mangi et al., 2013). Self-sampling or the use of a reference fleet are other options 
favoured by fishers but may have issues with bias (Mangi et al., 2013). In reality, to ensure that 
monitoring and surveillance is cost-effective, representative and logistically possible, tailored 
systems may have to be implemented in individual fleets and fisheries (Mangi et al., 2013). 
Finding an appropriate method or combination of methods to ensure a sufficiently high level of 
monitoring and enforcement in each fleet is one of the many challenges faced by managers as 
they implement the large scale changes to the CFP. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The changes in management regimes that will be introduced under the reformed CFP are likely to 
have substantial impacts on the economic status of many fleets. The distribution of economic 
impacts will not be uniform; some fleets may see dramatic reductions in revenues whilst other 
benefit from an increase in landings. Potentially large reductions in revenue will create strong 
incentives to improve the selectivity of fishing practices. Reducing catches of the most limiting 
species should enable fishers to better match catches to available fishing opportunities. The 
incentive will be strongest for the least selective vessels, and those fleets that do not target the 
most limiting species. However, the relative benefit of improving selectivity will be dependent 
upon catch compositions. Improving selectivity for one limiting species will have less benefit if 
other species within the catch become restrictive. For other fleets adopting more selective 
practices may not be economically viable, or may not prevent dramatic reductions in revenue. 
Flexible transferable quotas or access to the de minimis exemptions and substitutions may be 
particularly important in these situations, if fishers are to prevent fishing becoming unprofitable. 
Moreover, strong incentives to avoid the most limiting species will be generated, but so will 
incentives to illegally discard catch. High levels of monitoring and enforcement may be required 
to ensure that fishers improve revenue through adopting more selective fishing practices rather 
than non-compliance. How fleets should be monitored is just one of the issues that will face 
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managers in European fisheries as these fundamental changes in how fishing is regulated come 
into force.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Discards are widely viewed as morally wrong (Bellido et al., 2011, Paramor et al., 2005). They 
represent a waste of food and economic resources, and have contributed to unsustainable fishing 
(European Commission, 2011b). However, current regulations require un-mandated catch to be 
discarded in European fisheries. These regulatory discards are due to MLS, landings quotas and 
catch composition regulations (European-Commission, 2002). Fishers are also allowed to legally 
discard catch due to its low economic value, lack of market, or relatively high landings and 
processing costs (Catchpole et al., 2005). Discarding these unwanted over-quota and 
unmarketable catches prevents a reduction in profits, either through having to stop fishing due to 
exhausted quotas, having to buy additional quota to cover catches (Bellido et al., 2011) or having 
to pay landing costs that might not be recouped  (Arnason, 1994).  So, under the current CFP no 
incentive is created for fishers to improve the selectivity of their fishing practices and align their 
catch compositions with available fishing opportunities and market demand.     
The reform of the CFP intends to address the current poor management of European fisheries, 
including these perverse incentives created to discard unwanted catch (European Commission, 
2011a). The Commission aims to eliminate discarding and reduce unwanted catches through the 
phased introduction of a discard ban for regulated species from 2016 (European Commission, 
2013). The ban will be supported by additional measures including effort controls or catch quotas 
for key commercial species (European Commission, 2013). However, as highlighted in Chapter 2, 
little evidence is available to suggest that a discard ban itself creates incentives for more selective 
fishing. In many non-European fisheries where a discard ban has been introduced, a lack of data 
collection has made it difficult to assess whether any changes in selectivity have occurred due to 
the ban itself. However, experience from these fisheries suggests that the nature of any 
supporting measures will determine if fishers are encouraged to change how they operate. The 
most effective are those that result in a reduction in fishing opportunities due to the capture of 
unwanted catch. For example, in response to real-time area closures triggered by exceeding a 
threshold level of undersized fish, the Barents Sea Pandulus shrimp fishery has developed more 
selective gear (Graham et al., 2007).  
This importance of combining the discard ban with additional measures under the CFP reforms is 
highlighted in Chapter 3. We found that a discard ban in isolation would not have resulted in an 
incentive to avoid <MLS or unmarketable catch in the English North Sea otter trawler fleet. We 
showed that having to retain and land <MLS catch is unlikely to result in a reduction in profits for 
this fleet. Hold capacity will not have been exhausted by the additional landings, and existing 
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levels of marketable catch could have been maintained. Moreover, undersized and unmarketable 
catch would have generated a small profit if sold for fishmeal production. Supporting the discard 
ban with controls that reduce fishing effort is also unlikely to create an incentive for more 
selective fishing practices. In our model sufficient hold space was available for fishers to increase 
their catch per trip of the most valuable species limiting reductions in income, despite unwanted 
catch being retained. Unwanted catches may be reduced dependent on their co-occurrence with 
the most valuable target species (Kraak et al., 2013, van Oostenbrugge et al., 2008), but 
generation of an incentive for fishers to change their behaviour and actively avoid this catch is 
unlikely. Introducing catch quotas in combination with the discard ban has a much greater 
potential to incentivise more selective fishing practices in our case study fleet. Under this system 
total catches are capped and exhaustion of the quota requires fishing to stop (Course et al., 2011). 
Here, catching unwanted catch will reduce the income of fishers, creating an incentive to avoid it. 
Avoiding <MLS and unmarketable catch of the regulated species will increase the amount of 
valuable fish that can be landed under the quota. Moreover, in mixed fisheries avoiding 
undersized and unmarketable catches of the regulated species will delay the fulfilment of the 
catch quota allowing continued fishing for other species. If the catch quota is particularly 
restrictive an incentive to avoid marketable catch of the regulated species will also be created. 
This incentive is a result of the catch quotas and not the discard ban, however a discard ban may 
facilitate the full documentation of catches (European Commission, 2002).  
In Chapters 3 and 4 we show that the incentive created by catch quotas will vary between 
different vessels segments within our case study fleet. The incentive will also vary between 
different fleets within a fishery, as shown in Chapter 5. The incentive is likely to be strongest for 
those vessels that incur the greatest reduction in income. The reduction in income will be 
determined by a number of key factors;  
 the species regulated under catch quotas;  
 the uplift in catch quota compared to existing landings quotas;  
 the distribution of quotas between fleets and fleet segments;  
 the size and species composition of catches;  
 the catching efficiency for the limiting species relative to other species in the catch.  
The incentive to introduce more selective fishing practices will be strongest for the vessels that 
are currently least selective, particularly if the most limiting species is not a primary target. If 
allocated quota of the limiting species is exhausted by a small level of effort and the catching 
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efficiency of target species is relatively low, the quotas for this species may be used up before a 
large amount of target species can be caught, further reducing the value of landings.  
Fishers could adopt a number of different practices that may increase selectivity, allowing catch 
compositions to better match available quota. These include adoption of more selective fishing 
gears, a change in target species, or a change in fishing grounds or season (Course et al., 2011). 
Reducing fishing in certain months when catches of regulated species were high allowed English 
North Sea otter trawlers to maximise fleet operating profit in the model in Chapter 4. However, 
the adoption of a number of more selective gears that are currently available did not benefit 
fishers due to a reduction in both limiting and valuable un-regulated catches. However, given 
sufficient time and economic support the fishing industry could potentially improve the 
performance of these gears, as was seen in the 50% project detailed in Chapter 2 (Armstrong and 
Revill, 2010). Giving fishers sufficient time to adapt to the changes in selectivity required under 
catch quotas will be a very important duty of fisheries managers. It will take time to develop new 
fishing techniques to suit the management system, and these are likely to vary between different 
fisheries, fleets and vessels, dependent upon the regulated species and the existing selectivity of 
vessels. If catch quotas are introduced too rapidly fishing may become economically 
unsustainable for some fleets, before they can adjust their catch compositions. Under the reforms 
of the CFP catch quotas for species that define a fishery should be introduced by 2016, however, 
catch quotas for other species can be introduced as late as 2019 (European Commission, 2013). 
This staggered introduction of catch quotas may give fishers adequate time to develop methods 
of reducing catches of non-target species, the quotas for which may be limiting. If vessels or fleets 
are limited by a target species, the economic impact of catch quotas may be reduced by buying or 
leasing additional quota. If reductions in revenue are less severe due to this additional quota the 
strength of the incentive to adopt more selective fishing practices may be reduced. However, the 
cost of acquiring extra quota should still provide an incentive for fishers to adjust their catch 
composition to better match their quota allocations.  
Even with sufficient time it may not be possible for fishers to change their practices sufficiently to 
match available quota. A number of measures are included under the CFP reforms that may 
reduce the likelihood that operating under catch quotas becomes unprofitable for these fleets 
(European Commission, 2013). If the cost of altering the selectivity of fishing is prohibitively 
expensive or unwanted catches represent only a minimal defined percentage of total annual 
catches, fleets may be granted access to a de minimis exemption. This will allow these fleets to 
continue to discard up to 7% of the total annual catches of the regulated species in the first few 
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years of the reforms (European Commission, 2013). Fleets may also be allowed to continue to 
discard catch if evidence of high discard survival rates can be provided (European Commission, 
2013). The impact of limiting non-target quota species on fleets excluded from these exemptions 
may be reduced by allowing the non-target species to be counted against up to 9% of the quota 
for the target species (European Commission, 2013). Alternatively managers could allocate a 
larger proportion of the limiting catch quota to these fleets, reducing the prospect that fishing will 
be constrained by a species that is rarely caught. These provisions should not allow fleets to 
continue to discard large amounts of unwanted catch, or exceed non-target quotas by a large 
degree. Consequently an incentive should still be created for fishers to adopt more selective 
fishing practices and adjust catch compositions as far as is possible, whilst reducing the likelihood 
that fishing will become unprofitable.  
The incentive for more selective fishing is reliant upon the full documentation of catches. 
However, the same qualities of catch quotas that create the incentives for more selective fishing 
will also create incentives for non-compliance. Illegal discarding may prevent the total catch being 
counted against quota, delaying the fulfilment of quota and allowing fishing to continue for longer. 
High levels of surveillance and enforcement may be needed to prevent such behaviour. Observer 
programmes with 100% coverage have been used to document total catches in the British 
Columbia fisheries to great success (Grafton et al., 2005). However, implementing a similar 
programme in EU fisheries may be prohibitively expensive (Graham et al., 2007, Vestergaard, 
1996). Recent catch quota pilot schemes have utilised on-board cameras and sensors to 
document catches (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011, Course et al., 2011), but these have their own cost 
implications. Self-sampling or the use of a reference fleet are other options favoured by fishers 
but may have issues with bias (Mangi et al., 2013). Consequently, ensuring a high level of 
monitoring and compliance may be a significant challenge for fisheries managers under the 
reforms of the CFP.     
In this body of work we have shown how catch quotas and a discard ban may create an incentive 
for more selective fishing practices, how this incentive will be distributed within and between 
fleets, and the factors that will affect its strength. The findings of the models are based on a 
multitude of assumptions; however, such assumptions have allowed us to pinpoint which vessels, 
segments and fleets are likely to see the greatest changes in revenue when the reforms of the CFP 
come into force. We have identified the nature of the fleets most likely to benefit or lose out 
under catch quotas, and highlighted which fleets or segments are likely to need support during 
the transition from landings quotas. This represents new and important information about how 
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fishing activity and behaviour may change in the UK, and in the wider context of European 
fisheries under the reformed CFP. The take home message is that the reforms of the CFP have the 
potential to fundamentally change how fisheries are managed and how fishers operate.  As the 
CFP reforms come into force the face of European fishing is likely to see a substantial change.  
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Appendix 1 – Supplementary material for Chapter 3. 
 
Figure S1 The influence of the increases in cost of boxes (solid line), ice (thick dashed line) and 
landings charges (thin dashed line) on overall landings costs of 1 t of unmarketable catch. 
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Figure S2 The distribution of the volume of landings (number of fish boxes) achieved on trips documented in the FAD between 2008 and 2010 for <10m, 
Nephrops and whitefish otter trawlers.   
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Figure S3 The distribution of the volume of discards (number of fish boxes) achieved on trips sampled in the COP between 2008 and 2010 for <10m, 
Nephrops and whitefish otter trawlers. The volume of marketable (>MLS and >MMS) discards is shown in dark grey, the volume of unmarketable discards 
(<MLS and <MMS) is shown in light grey. 
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Table S1. Change in number of trips, marketable catches and income of English North Sea otter trawlers under a discard ban and a catch quota for cod, 
haddock, plaice, sole, or whiting compared to 2008-2010, based on retention of all catch (C&U), or avoidance of unmarketable fish of the quota species (No Uq). Parentheses show range due to uncertainty in catch estimates and value of unmarketable catch.  
Vessel segment Catch quota 
species 
Change in annual trips (%) Change in marketable catch (%) Change in income (%) C &U No Uq C &U No Uq C &U No Uq 
        
<10m trawlers 
Cod -33  (-50, 3)         32  (20, 45)           13  (1, 38) 121  (95, 143) -18  (-34, 14)       60  (51, 71)           
Haddock -3  (-11, 7)           15  (12, 20)           63  (44, 79) 94  (59, 127) 18  (14, 22)           40  (31, 50)           
Plaice -49  (-65, -3)       58  (26, 113)         -13  (-29, 30) 166  (134, 212) -37  (-54, 7)         92  (65, 137)         
Sole 30  (21, 40)           47  (44, 51)           119  (89, 144) 147  (102, 191) 58  (53, 63)           79  (65, 92)           
Whiting -25  (-33, -16)     0  (-6, 7)               25  (13, 35) 68  (44, 89) -9  (-12, -7)         21  (19, 25)           
        
Nephrops 
trawlers 
<300kW 
Cod -11  (-22, 2)         25  (18, 32)           36  (30, 43) 92  (68, 114) 11  (6, 16)             56  (46, 66)           
Haddock -21  (-31, -6)       8  (1, 16)               22  (16, 28) 66  (51, 80) -1  (-7, 7)             35  (29, 41)           
Plaice -27  (-37, -13)     46  (33, 60)           13  (7, 18) 124  (101, 145) -8  (-14, -1)         82  (68, 98)           
Sole 30  (21, 41)           43  (36, 51)           100  (83, 114) 120  (89, 150) 62  (53, 72)           79  (64, 94)           
Whiting -54  (-64, -33)     -22  (-37, 1)         -29  (-37, -13) 19  (12, 31) -42  (-52, -24)     -3  (-14, 14)         
       
Nephrops 
trawlers  
>300kW 
Cod -52  (-71, 34)       -22  (-48, 62)       -25  (-43, 58) 23  (2, 90) -38  (-56, 46)       2  (-21, 76)           
Haddock -39  (-59, 18)       -18  (-40, 28)       -5  (-20, 39) 29  (16, 51) -21  (-38, 29)       7  (-8, 39)             
Plaice 29  (1, 80)             34  (4, 89)             103  (52, 199) 110  (56, 214) 68  (27, 144)         74  (31, 156)         
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Table S1 continued. 
Vessel segment Catch quota 
species 
Change in annual trips (%) Change in marketable catch (%) Change in income (%) C &U No Uq C &U No Uq C &U No Uq 
 Sole 30  (8, 64)             36  (12, 74)           104  (60, 173) 114  (60, 189) 69  (36, 122)         77  (41, 136)         
 Whiting -35  (-46, -16)     -21  (-33, -4)       3  (-5, 13) 24  (13, 37) -15  (-20, -8)       3  (-4, 12)             
       
Whitefish 
trawlers 
<300kW  
<15m 
Cod -22  (-35, -2)       15  (6, 26)             14  (8, 21) 67  (55, 80) -6  (-16, 9)           38  (29, 48)           
Haddock 8  (3, 14)               15  (9, 21)             57  (40, 74) 67  (45, 88) 30  (22, 39)           38  (29, 47)           
Plaice -28  (-44, 1)         26  (9, 49)             4  (-7, 25) 83  (72, 95) -14  (-28, 13)       51  (40, 66)           
Sole 30  (24, 36)           32  (26, 38)           89  (62, 115) 92  (63, 120) 56  (45, 67)           58  (46, 71)           
Whiting -19  (-29, -5)       -1  (-10, 9)           18  (13, 24) 44  (35, 52) -2  (-8, 6)             19  (13, 25)           
       
Whitefish 
trawlers 
<300kW    
>15m 
 
Cod 4  (-4, 13)             23  (18, 29)           46  (37, 55) 73  (55, 90) 25  (19, 33)           49  (40, 59)           
Haddock 11  (4, 18)             15  (8, 22)             55  (41, 69) 61  (44, 78) 34  (24, 44)           39  (29, 50)           
Plaice 5  (-12, 30)           31  (20, 45)           47  (34, 62) 84  (65, 108) 26  (13, 45)           58  (43, 78)           
Sole 30  (22, 39)           31  (23, 40)           82  (60, 104) 84  (61, 106) 57  (46, 70)           58  (46, 72)           
Whiting -35  (-45, -21)     -29  (-39, -15)     -9  (-13, -3) -1  (-5, 4) -22  (-29, -12)     -15  (-21, -5)       
       
Whitefish 
trawlers    
>300kW 
 
Cod 14  (8, 20)             20  (13, 27)           28  (20, 36) 35  (26, 44) 23  (16, 31)           29  (22, 38)           
Haddock 5  (-1, 11)             9  (3, 15)               18  (11, 26) 22  (15, 31) 13  (7, 21)             17  (10, 25)           
Plaice 26  (20, 34)           33  (27, 39)           42  (35, 50) 50  (41, 58) 36  (30, 43)           44  (37, 51)           
Sole 30  (11, 56)           30  (11, 56)           46  (24, 77) 46  (24, 77) 40  (20, 70)           40  (20, 70)           
Whiting -19  (-29, -5)       -11  (-20, 2)         -8  (-14, -1) 0  (-5, 6) -12  (-19, -2)       -4  (-10, 4)           
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Appendix 2 – Supplementary material for Chapter 4. 
Table S1 Percentage change in fishing effort (no. of trips), marketable(>MLS) landings in tonnes 
and operating profits of English North Sea otter trawler segments under a cod, haddock, plaice, or 
whiting catch quota, or a combination of cod, haddock and plaice (CHP), cod, haddock and whiting 
(CHW), cod, plaice and whiting (CPW) or cod, haddock, plaice and whiting catch quotas (CHPW), 
compared to under the existing landings quotas of 2010, assuming no change in fishing behaviour. 
Numbers in parentheses show estimates derived using the upper and lower 95% confidence 
intervals of the mean discard and <MLS catch proportions. 
Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in fishing 
effort (%) 
Change in 
marketable landings 
(%) 
Change in 
operating profits 
(%) 
Mixed trawlers 
<10m length 
overall (LOA) and  
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -14 (-48,0)   -6 (-32,2)       -7 (-34,2)      
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      0 (-1,1)         0 (-2,0)        
Plaice -10 (-29,0)   -9 (-28,1)       -9 (-28,0)      
Whiting -14 (-28,-4)  -11 (-24,-2)     -13 (-25,-3)    
CHP -14 (-48,-10) -4 (-31,-1)      -6 (-33,-3)     
CHW -15 (-48,-14) -3 (-29,0)       -6 (-33,-3)     
CPW -15 (-48,-14) -2 (-28,1)       -5 (-32,-2)     
CHPW -15 (-48,-14) -3 (-29,1)       -5 (-32,-3)     
Nephrops  trawlers 
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -14 (-48,0)   -11 (-44,1)      -11 (-43,1)     
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      0 (-1,1)         0 (-1,0)        
Plaice -10 (-29,0)   -9 (-27,1)       -7 (-24,2)      
Whiting -14 (-28,-5)  -11 (-22,-2)     -11 (-23,-3)    
CHP -14 (-48,-10) -9 (-42,-7)      -7 (-41,-6)     
CHW -15 (-48,-14) -8 (-41,-6)      -8 (-40,-8)     
CPW -15 (-48,-14) -7 (-40,-6)      -5 (-39,-5)     
CHPW -15 (-48,-14) -7 (-40,-6)      -5 (-38,-5)     
Nephrops  
trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -14 (-48,0)   -11 (-44,1)      -10 (-43,2)     
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      1 (-1,1)         0 (-1,0)        
Plaice -10 (-29,0)   -9 (-29,1)       -8 (-27,1)      
Whiting -14 (-28,-4)  -9 (-20,0)       -10 (-22,-1)    
CHP -15 (-48,-11) -11 (-43,-9)     -9 (-41,-8)     
CHW -15 (-48,-15) -5 (-37,-4)      -6 (-37,-5)     
CPW -14 (-47,-14) -5 (-39,-3)      -4 (-38,-3)     
CHPW -16 (-49,-14) -7 (-41,-5)      -6 (-40,-5)     
Whitefish trawlers 
<15m LOA and 
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -14 (-48,0)   -9 (-41,3)       -6 (-38,4)      
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      2 (1,2)          2 (1,2)         
Plaice -11 (-30,0)   -10 (-28,1)      -8 (-26,2)      
Whiting -14 (-28,-4)  -10 (-22,-1)     -10 (-23,-1)    
CHP -14 (-48,-11) -6 (-39,-4)      -1 (-34,0)      
CHW -15 (-48,-14) -3 (-37,-1)      0 (-34,1)       
CPW -15 (-48,-14) -3 (-38,-2)      0 (-34,1)       
CHPW -15 (-48,-14) -2 (-36,-1)      2 (-32,3)       
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Table S1 continued. 
Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in fishing 
effort (%) 
Change in 
marketable landings 
(%) 
Change in 
operating profits 
(%) 
Whitefish 
trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW 
engine power 
Cod -14 (-48,0)   -12 (-46,1)      -10 (-43,2)     
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      1 (-1,1)         1 (0,1)         
Plaice -10 (-29,0)   -4 (-22,5)       14 (-2,19)      
Whiting -14 (-28,-4)  -10 (-22,-1)     -10 (-23,-1)    
CHP -14 (-48,-11) -4 (-41,-2)      15 (-28,17)     
CHW -15 (-48,-14) -8 (-44,-7)      -6 (-41,-5)     
CPW -15 (-48,-14) -2 (-39,-1)      16 (-27,17)     
CHPW -15 (-48,-14) -2 (-38,-1)      17 (-24,18)     
Whitefish 
trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -14 (-49,0)   -13 (-47,0)      -13 (-47,0)     
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      0 (-2,0)         0 (-2,0)        
Plaice -10 (-29,0)   -3 (-21,6)       8 (-6,14)       
Whiting -14 (-28,-5)  -14 (-27,-4)     -14 (-27,-4)    
CHP -14 (-48,-10) -6 (-43,-3)      5 (-36,9)       
CHW -15 (-48,-14) -15 (-47,-14)    -14 (-47,-13)   
CPW -15 (-48,-14) -7 (-42,-3)      5 (-35,7)       
CHPW -15 (-47,-14) -7 (-42,-3)      4 (-35,7)       
Fleet 
Cod -14 (-48,0)   -12 (-44,1)      -10 (-41,1)     
Haddock 0 (-2,0)      0 (-1,1)         0 (-1,0)        
Plaice -10 (-29,0)   -5 (-23,4)       -1 (-17,7)      
Whiting -14 (-28,-4)  -12 (-25,-3)     -13 (-26,-3)    
CHP -14 (-48,-10) -6 (-41,-4)      0 (-35,1)       
CHW -15 (-48,-14) -11 (-43,-10)    -9 (-39,-8)     
CPW -15 (-48,-14) -5 (-39,-3)      1 (-33,2)       
CHPW -15 (-48,-14) -5 (-39,-3)      0 (-33,2)       
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Table S2 Percentage change in fishing effort (no. of trips), marketable(>MLS) landings in tonnes 
and operating profits of English North Sea otter trawler segments under a cod, haddock, plaice, or 
whiting catch quota, or a combination of cod, haddock and plaice (CHP), cod, haddock and whiting 
(CHW), cod, plaice and whiting (CPW) or cod, haddock, plaice and whiting catch quotas (CHPW), 
compared to under the existing landings quotas of 2010 based on 5 different changes in gear 
selectivity (described in Table 2 of main text). Numbers in parentheses show estimates derived 
using the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals of the mean discard and <MLS catch 
proportions. 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 1: Adoption of more selective gear by Nephrops trawlers 
 
Mixed trawlers <10m length 
overall (LOA) and  <300kW 
engine power 
Cod -13 (-47,0) -11 (-34,-5) -10 (-35,-3) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) -7 (-7,-7) -5 (-5,-4) 
 Plaice -10 (-29,0) -16 (-33,-7) -13 (-31,-4) 
 Whiting -3 (-19,0) -7 (-21,-5) -6 (-21,-4) 
 CHP -13 (-46,-10) -10 (-33,-6) -9 (-34,-6) 
 CHW -13 (-47,-3) -8 (-33,-4) -8 (-34,-4) 
 CPW -13 (-47,-10) -8 (-32,-4) -8 (-33,-5) 
 CHPW -13 (-47,-10) -7 (-32,-4) -7 (-34,-5) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers <300kW 
engine power 
Cod -12 (-47,0) -21 (-49,-12) -19 (-48,-10) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) -12 (-12,-12) -11 (-11,-10) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -20 (-36,-11) -17 (-33,-9) 
 Whiting -3 (-19,0) -12 (-25,-11) -11 (-24,-9) 
 CHP -13 (-46,-10) -19 (-48,-18) -17 (-46,-16) 
 CHW -12 (-47,-3) -18 (-48,-11) -16 (-46,-10) 
 CPW -13 (-47,-10) -18 (-48,-17) -15 (-45,-14) 
 CHPW -13 (-47,-10) -17 (-47,-16) -14 (-45,-14) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -12 (-46,0) -22 (-51,-14) -19 (-48,-11) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) -15 (-15,-14) -12 (-12,-12) 
 Plaice -10 (-29,0) -24 (-40,-15) -21 (-37,-11) 
 Whiting -3 (-20,0) -14 (-26,-12) -11 (-24,-10) 
 CHP -13 (-47,-11) -22 (-49,-21) -18 (-47,-18) 
 CHW -13 (-48,-3) -21 (-50,-12) -18 (-48,-10) 
 CPW -13 (-47,-10) -20 (-49,-19) -16 (-46,-15) 
 CHPW -13 (-47,-10) -18 (-48,-17) -15 (-45,-14) 
 
Whitefish trawlers <15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod -12 (-47,0) -6 (-39,3) -4 (-35,4) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) 2 (1,3) 2 (1,4) 
 Plaice -10 (-29,0) -9 (-28,1) -7 (-25,2) 
 Whiting -3 (-19,0) 3 (-11,5) 2 (-12,3) 
 CHP -13 (-46,-10) -5 (-37,-3) 0 (-33,2) 
 CHW -12 (-47,-3) 0 (-35,7) 2 (-31,8) 
 CPW -13 (-47,-10) -1 (-36,1) 3 (-32,4) 
 CHPW -13 (-47,-10) 1 (-35,2) 5 (-30,6) 
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Table S2 continued. 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod -13 (-47,0) -10 (-44,1) -8 (-42,2) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) 1 (0,1) 1 (1,2) 
 Plaice -10 (-29,0) -3 (-22,5) 15 (-2,19) 
 Whiting -3 (-19,0) 2 (-13,4) 2 (-13,3) 
 CHP -13 (-47,-10) -4 (-40,-2) 15 (-27,17) 
 CHW -13 (-47,-3) -5 (-41,3) -3 (-39,5) 
 CPW -13 (-47,-10) 1 (-36,3) 20 (-23,22) 
 CHPW -13 (-47,-10) 1 (-38,3) 21 (-24,22) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -12 (-47,0) -12 (-46,0) -12 (-47,0) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
 Plaice -10 (-29,0) -3 (-19,6) 9 (-5,14) 
 Whiting -3 (-19,0) -2 (-18,1) -2 (-18,1) 
 CHP -13 (-46,-11) -5 (-41,-2) 6 (-34,9) 
 CHW -12 (-47,-3) -11 (-47,-2) -11 (-46,-2) 
 CPW -13 (-47,-10) -4 (-41,0) 7 (-35,10) 
 CHPW -13 (-46,-10) -4 (-40,-1) 7 (-33,10) 
 2: Adoption of more selective gear by Nephrops trawlers 
 
Mixed trawlers <10m length 
overall (LOA) and  <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-36,0) -10 (-33,-7) -2 (-29,0) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) -16 (-16,-16) -8 (-8,-8) 
 Plaice -9 (-28,0) -23 (-38,-16) -16 (-32,-8) 
 Whiting 0 (-4,0) -14 (-17,-13) -7 (-10,-7) 
 CHP -10 (-37,0) -17 (-33,-9) -10 (-29,-2) 
 CHW 0 (-36,0) -7 (-31,-4) -1 (-27,2) 
 CPW -10 (-37,0) -15 (-33,-7) -9 (-28,0) 
 CHPW -10 (-36,0) -15 (-33,-7) -9 (-28,0) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-36,0) -24 (-51,-24) -15 (-45,-15) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) -25 (-25,-25) -16 (-16,-16) 
 Plaice -9 (-28,0) -31 (-45,-25) -21 (-36,-14) 
 Whiting 0 (-4,0) -24 (-27,-24) -15 (-18,-15) 
 CHP -10 (-37,0) -31 (-51,-24) -21 (-43,-13) 
 CHW 0 (-36,0) -23 (-50,-23) -14 (-44,-14) 
 CPW -9 (-37,0) -30 (-50,-23) -20 (-43,-12) 
 CHPW -10 (-36,0) -30 (-50,-23) -19 (-42,-12) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-37,0) -28 (-52,-27) -18 (-46,-18) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) -28 (-29,-28) -20 (-20,-19) 
 Plaice -9 (-28,0) -35 (-46,-28) -25 (-38,-19) 
 Whiting 0 (-4,0) -27 (-29,-27) -18 (-20,-18) 
 CHP -10 (-37,0) -34 (-53,-27) -25 (-46,-17) 
 CHW 0 (-36,0) -26 (-50,-26) -16 (-44,-16) 
 CPW -10 (-37,0) -32 (-52,-26) -23 (-45,-16) 
 CHPW -10 (-37,0) -33 (-51,-26) -24 (-44,-16) 
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Table S2 continued. 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 
Whitefish trawlers <15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-36,0) 6 (-28,8) 9 (-23,11) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) 2 (1,3) 2 (1,4) 
 Plaice -9 (-28,0) -9 (-27,1) -7 (-24,2) 
 Whiting 0 (-4,0) 6 (4,8) 5 (3,5) 
 CHP -9 (-37,0) -1 (-25,9) 4 (-19,14) 
 CHW 0 (-36,0) 14 (-22,16) 17 (-18,19) 
 CPW -9 (-37,0) 3 (-23,13) 7 (-18,17) 
 CHPW -10 (-37,0) 4 (-22,15) 8 (-17,19) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-36,0) 3 (-32,3) 5 (-29,6) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) 1 (0,1) 1 (1,2) 
 Plaice -9 (-28,0) -3 (-20,5) 15 (1,19) 
 Whiting 0 (-4,0) 5 (2,6) 5 (2,5) 
 CHP -10 (-37,0) 0 (-28,9) 20 (-13,25) 
 CHW 0 (-36,0) 8 (-29,9) 11 (-26,12) 
 CPW -9 (-37,0) 5 (-24,13) 25 (-9,29) 
 CHPW -10 (-37,0) 5 (-25,14) 26 (-10,30) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-36,0) 0 (-36,1) 1 (-36,1) 
 Haddock 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
 Plaice -10 (-28,0) -2 (-19,6) 10 (-4,14) 
 Whiting 0 (-4,0) 1 (-3,1) 1 (-3,1) 
 CHP -10 (-37,0) -2 (-32,6) 10 (-24,15) 
 CHW 0 (-36,0) 1 (-34,2) 2 (-34,2) 
 CPW -10 (-37,0) -1 (-31,7) 11 (-22,16) 
 CHPW -10 (-37,0) -1 (-30,7) 11 (-21,16) 
 3: Adoption of more selective gear by whitefish trawlers 
 
Mixed trawlers <10m length 
overall (LOA) and  <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-9,0) -10 (-16,-6) -22 (-25,-18) 
 Haddock -8 (-16,-4) -23 (-29,-20) -33 (-38,-29) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -24 (-39,-16) -33 (-47,-26) 
 Whiting -10 (-25,0) -21 (-33,-14) -32 (-42,-25) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-8) -19 (-34,-6) -29 (-42,-19) 
 CHW -10 (-24,-8) -16 (-27,-3) -27 (-38,-17) 
 CPW -11 (-29,-10) -16 (-32,-4) -27 (-41,-17) 
 CHPW -11 (-30,-10) -16 (-33,-3) -27 (-42,-17) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-9,0) 3 (-2,4) 3 (-1,4) 
 Haddock -8 (-16,-4) -8 (-15,-4) -8 (-15,-4) 
 Plaice -10 (-29,0) -9 (-27,1) -7 (-24,2) 
 Whiting -10 (-25,0) -6 (-18,3) -7 (-20,2) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-8) -7 (-24,-3) -4 (-22,0) 
 CHW -10 (-24,-8) -3 (-16,1) -3 (-17,2) 
 CPW -11 (-29,-10) -3 (-22,1) -1 (-19,4) 
 CHPW -11 (-29,-10) -3 (-22,2) -1 (-19,4) 
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Table S2 continued. 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-9,0) 4 (-2,5) 5 (0,5) 
 Haddock -8 (-15,-4) -8 (-15,-3) -8 (-15,-3) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -9 (-28,1) -8 (-27,1) 
 Whiting -10 (-25,0) -4 (-16,4) -5 (-17,4) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-8) -7 (-26,-3) -5 (-24,0) 
 CHW -10 (-24,-8) 1 (-13,4) 0 (-13,5) 
 CPW -11 (-30,-10) -1 (-21,3) 0 (-19,5) 
 CHPW -11 (-29,-10) 0 (-21,3) 1 (-19,6) 
 
Whitefish trawlers <15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-9,0) -17 (-22,-17) -29 (-31,-28) 
 Haddock -8 (-16,-4) -25 (-30,-22) -36 (-39,-34) 
 Plaice -11 (-30,0) -28 (-43,-19) -37 (-49,-30) 
 Whiting -10 (-24,0) -23 (-33,-16) -34 (-42,-29) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-8) -24 (-39,-21) -31 (-44,-27) 
 CHW -10 (-24,-8) -19 (-30,-16) -29 (-38,-25) 
 CPW -11 (-29,-10) -21 (-36,-18) -29 (-42,-25) 
 CHPW -11 (-30,-10) -19 (-35,-16) -27 (-41,-23) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-9,0) -18 (-24,-18) -25 (-30,-24) 
 Haddock -9 (-16,-4) -25 (-31,-22) -32 (-36,-29) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -21 (-36,-14) -11 (-21,-8) 
 Whiting -10 (-25,0) -23 (-34,-16) -30 (-40,-24) 
 CHP -11 (-28,-8) -19 (-33,-17) -7 (-17,-5) 
 CHW -10 (-25,-9) -21 (-32,-20) -27 (-37,-25) 
 CPW -11 (-29,-10) -16 (-31,-15) -5 (-18,-4) 
 CHPW -11 (-30,-10) -16 (-31,-14) -4 (-17,-2) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-9,0) -23 (-30,-23) -27 (-33,-27) 
 Haddock -8 (-15,-4) -30 (-35,-27) -32 (-37,-30) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -24 (-37,-18) -16 (-25,-13) 
 Whiting -10 (-24,0) -31 (-41,-23) -33 (-43,-27) 
 CHP -11 (-30,-8) -24 (-36,-21) -16 (-24,-13) 
 CHW -10 (-25,-8) -30 (-42,-29) -33 (-44,-32) 
 CPW -11 (-30,-10) -24 (-36,-20) -15 (-29,-13) 
 CHPW -11 (-30,-10) -24 (-36,-20) -16 (-28,-13) 
 4: Adoption of more selective gear by Nephrops and whitefish trawlers 
 
Mixed trawlers <10m length 
overall (LOA) and  <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-6,0) -18 (-23,-10) -26 (-30,-20) 
 Haddock -6 (-14,-2) -28 (-34,-25) -35 (-40,-33) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -31 (-45,-23) -37 (-50,-31) 
 Whiting 0 (-14,0) -21 (-30,-20) -30 (-38,-29) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-7) -26 (-40,-13) -33 (-46,-23) 
 CHW -7 (-14,-2) -21 (-27,-8) -30 (-35,-19) 
 CPW -11 (-30,0) -23 (-39,-11) -32 (-46,-22) 
 CHPW -10 (-29,-7) -23 (-38,-10) -31 (-45,-21) 
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Table S2 continued. 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-6,0) -10 (-12,-9) -8 (-10,-7) 
 Haddock -6 (-14,-2) -18 (-24,-14) -16 (-22,-13) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -20 (-36,-11) -17 (-33,-9) 
 Whiting 0 (-14,0) -10 (-20,-9) -8 (-20,-8) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-7) -18 (-34,-14) -14 (-31,-10) 
 CHW -7 (-14,-2) -13 (-19,-9) -11 (-18,-6) 
 CPW -11 (-30,0) -15 (-33,-6) -13 (-30,-3) 
 CHPW -10 (-30,-7) -15 (-32,-11) -12 (-29,-7) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-6,0) -12 (-14,-11) -8 (-11,-8) 
 Haddock -6 (-13,-2) -21 (-27,-17) -18 (-24,-14) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -24 (-38,-15) -21 (-35,-11) 
 Whiting 0 (-14,0) -11 (-22,-10) -9 (-20,-8) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-7) -21 (-36,-17) -17 (-32,-12) 
 CHW -7 (-14,-2) -14 (-20,-10) -11 (-17,-6) 
 CPW -11 (-31,0) -17 (-35,-7) -13 (-32,-3) 
 CHPW -10 (-30,-7) -17 (-33,-13) -13 (-29,-8) 
 
Whitefish trawlers <15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-6,0) -17 (-19,-17) -29 (-31,-28) 
 Haddock -6 (-14,-2) -23 (-28,-21) -34 (-38,-33) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -27 (-43,-19) -36 (-49,-30) 
 Whiting 0 (-14,0) -15 (-24,-13) -27 (-35,-27) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-6) -23 (-39,-20) -31 (-44,-27) 
 CHW -7 (-14,-2) -16 (-21,-13) -26 (-31,-22) 
 CPW -10 (-30,0) -20 (-37,-11) -28 (-43,-22) 
 CHPW -10 (-30,-7) -18 (-35,-15) -26 (-41,-22) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-5,0) -18 (-21,-18) -25 (-27,-24) 
 Haddock -7 (-14,-2) -24 (-29,-20) -31 (-36,-28) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -21 (-35,-14) -10 (-20,-8) 
 Whiting 0 (-14,0) -14 (-24,-13) -22 (-31,-22) 
 CHP -11 (-30,-7) -19 (-34,-18) -7 (-18,-6) 
 CHW -7 (-15,-2) -18 (-24,-15) -24 (-30,-21) 
 CPW -11 (-30,0) -16 (-31,-8) -4 (-15,-1) 
 CHPW -11 (-30,-7) -14 (-30,-13) -2 (-14,-1) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-6,0) -23 (-28,-23) -27 (-31,-27) 
 Haddock -6 (-13,-2) -29 (-34,-25) -32 (-37,-28) 
 Plaice -10 (-30,0) -24 (-36,-18) -16 (-24,-13) 
 Whiting 0 (-14,0) -23 (-34,-23) -26 (-37,-26) 
 CHP -11 (-29,-7) -24 (-36,-20) -15 (-24,-13) 
 CHW -6 (-14,-2) -28 (-33,-24) -31 (-36,-27) 
 CPW -11 (-30,0) -23 (-37,-17) -15 (-24,-12) 
 CHPW -10 (-29,-7) -23 (-36,-20) -15 (-24,-12) 
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Table S2 continued. 
 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 5: Adoption of more selective gear by Nephrops and whitefish trawlers 
 
Mixed trawlers <10m length 
overall (LOA) and  <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (0,0) -30 (-33,-22) -32 (-34,-25) 
 Haddock 0 (-5,0) -33 (-36,-33) -35 (-38,-35) 
 Plaice -9 (-29,0) -38 (-51,-32) -40 (-52,-34) 
 Whiting 0 (0,0) -31 (-32,-29) -33 (-34,-33) 
 CHP -9 (-28,0) -35 (-48,-28) -37 (-49,-31) 
 CHW 0 (-5,0) -27 (-30,-19) -30 (-34,-23) 
 CPW -10 (-28,0) -34 (-47,-26) -36 (-49,-30) 
 CHPW -11 (-29,0) -34 (-47,-27) -37 (-49,-30) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers <300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (0,0) -24 (-25,-23) -15 (-16,-13) 
 Haddock 0 (-5,0) -25 (-29,-25) -16 (-20,-16) 
 Plaice -9 (-29,0) -31 (-46,-25) -22 (-37,-14) 
 Whiting 0 (0,0) -24 (-25,-23) -15 (-15,-14) 
 CHP -9 (-29,0) -30 (-45,-24) -20 (-36,-13) 
 CHW 0 (-5,0) -23 (-27,-22) -14 (-18,-12) 
 CPW -10 (-28,0) -30 (-44,-23) -20 (-34,-12) 
 CHPW -11 (-29,0) -31 (-44,-23) -21 (-35,-12) 
 
Nephrops  trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (0,0) -28 (-28,-26) -18 (-19,-17) 
 Haddock 0 (-5,0) -28 (-32,-28) -20 (-24,-20) 
 Plaice -9 (-29,0) -34 (-48,-28) -25 (-41,-19) 
 Whiting 0 (0,0) -27 (-28,-26) -18 (-19,-17) 
 CHP -9 (-29,0) -34 (-47,-27) -24 (-39,-17) 
 CHW 0 (-5,0) -26 (-29,-25) -16 (-20,-15) 
 CPW -9 (-27,0) -33 (-45,-26) -23 (-37,-16) 
 CHPW -11 (-30,0) -33 (-47,-26) -24 (-40,-16) 
 
Whitefish trawlers <15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (0,0) -17 (-19,-14) -29 (-31,-24) 
 Haddock 0 (-5,0) -18 (-21,-17) -30 (-31,-30) 
 Plaice -9 (-29,0) -27 (-42,-19) -36 (-48,-30) 
 Whiting 0 (0,0) -15 (-16,-12) -27 (-29,-25) 
 CHP -9 (-28,0) -22 (-38,-15) -30 (-43,-24) 
 CHW 0 (-5,0) -10 (-13,-7) -21 (-23,-16) 
 CPW -10 (-29,0) -20 (-36,-11) -28 (-42,-22) 
 CHPW -11 (-29,0) -18 (-34,-9) -26 (-39,-19) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (0,0) -18 (-18,-17) -25 (-26,-23) 
 Haddock 0 (-5,0) -18 (-22,-18) -26 (-28,-25) 
 Plaice -9 (-29,0) -20 (-34,-14) -9 (-18,-8) 
 Whiting 0 (0,0) -14 (-16,-12) -22 (-24,-20) 
 CHP -9 (-28,0) -18 (-33,-12) -5 (-17,-4) 
 CHW 0 (-5,0) -12 (-16,-10) -19 (-22,-17) 
 CPW -10 (-28,0) -15 (-30,-8) -4 (-14,-1) 
 CHPW -11 (-29,0) -14 (-30,-7) -2 (-14,0) 
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Table S2 continued 
Selectivity 
change Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in 
fishing effort 
(%) 
Change in 
marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating 
profits (%) 
 
Whitefish trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (0,0) -23 (-24,-23) -27 (-27,-26) 
 Haddock 0 (-5,0) -24 (-27,-23) -27 (-30,-27) 
 Plaice -9 (-29,0) -23 (-36,-18) -15 (-23,-12) 
 Whiting 0 (0,0) -23 (-23,-23) -26 (-27,-26) 
 CHP -9 (-28,0) -23 (-36,-18) -15 (-23,-12) 
 CHW 0 (-5,0) -23 (-27,-22) -26 (-29,-25) 
 CPW -10 (-29,0) -23 (-35,-17) -14 (-23,-11) 
 CHPW -10 (-29,0) -23 (-35,-17) -14 (-23,-11) 
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Table S3 Percentage change in fishing effort (no. of trips), marketable(>MLS) landings in tonnes 
and operating profits of English North Sea otter trawler segments under a cod, haddock, plaice, or 
whiting catch quota, or a combination of cod, haddock and plaice (CHP), cod, haddock and whiting 
(CHW), cod, plaice and whiting (CPW) or cod, haddock, plaice and whiting catch quotas (CHPW), 
compared to under the existing landings quotas of 2010, based on the assumption that fishers will 
select trips that will maximise fleet operating profit (see Table 3 in main text). Numbers in 
parentheses show estimates derived using the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals of the 
mean discard and <MLS catch proportions. 
Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in fishing 
effort (%) 
Change in marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating profits 
(%) 
Mixed trawlers 
<10m length 
overall (LOA) and  
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-14,0) 9 (1,14) 8 (2,11) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 0 (0,1) 0 (0,0) 
Plaice 0 (0,0) 1 (1,2) 1 (0,2) 
Whiting -2 (-7,0) 1 (-3,2) 1 (0,2) 
CHP 0 (-14,0) 11 (-4,15) 9 (1,12) 
CHW -1 (-14,-1) 11 (1,17) 9 (3,13) 
CPW -7 (-18,-1) -1 (-12,12) 2 (-5,10) 
CHPW -1 (-14,-1) 12 (-6,13) 10 (-1,10) 
Nephrops  trawlers 
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod 0 (-19,0) 3 (-16,4) 3 (-13,4) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 0 (0,1) 0 (0,1) 
Plaice 0 (0,0) 2 (1,3) 4 (2,7) 
Whiting -10 (-24,-1) -3 (-14,2) -2 (-10,2) 
CHP 0 (-11,0) 2 (-10,6) 5 (-6,9) 
CHW -7 (-18,-7) -3 (-12,-2) -1 (-9,0) 
CPW -8 (-32,-5) -3 (-24,-2) 0 (-21,1) 
CHPW -4 (-31,-4) -13 (-23,1) -8 (-20,4) 
Nephrops  
trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod 0 (-16,0) 4 (-3,5) 5 (0,5) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 1 (0,1) 0 (0,1) 
Plaice 0 (0,0) 1 (1,2) 2 (1,4) 
Whiting -4 (-12,0) 5 (3,7) 5 (3,5) 
CHP 0 (-6,0) 5 (1,6) 7 (4,9) 
CHW -6 (-16,-2) 5 (3,7) 6 (5,7) 
CPW -7 (-10,-3) 1 (-1,7) 3 (1,8) 
CHPW -10 (-12,-3) -11 (-12,7) -8 (-9,9) 
Whitefish trawlers 
<15m LOA and 
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -1 (-24,0) -5 (-36,3) -2 (-30,4) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 2 (1,3) 2 (1,4) 
Plaice 0 (0,0) 1 (1,2) 3 (2,5) 
Whiting -7 (-19,-1) 0 (-5,3) 1 (-2,3) 
CHP -2 (-14,0) -4 (-19,6) 0 (-12,9) 
CHW -11 (-22,-5) -8 (-26,4) -1 (-22,7) 
CPW -7 (-25,-6) 4 (-16,5) 10 (-9,11) 
CHPW -6 (-25,-6) -16 (-28,0) -4 (-17,5) 
 
 
  
210 
 
Table S3 continued. 
Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in fishing 
effort (%) 
Change in marketable 
landings (%) 
Change in 
operating profits 
(%) 
Whitefish 
trawlers >15m LOA 
and <300kW 
engine power 
Cod -1 (-24,0) 1 (-14,1) 2 (-13,3) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 1 (0,1) 1 (1,1) 
Plaice -2 (-3,0) -10 (-16,5) 2 (-7,19) 
Whiting -23 (-31,-13) -3 (-5,-1) -1 (-2,1) 
CHP -3 (-30,-1) 0 (-8,7) 19 (5,33) 
CHW -11 (-27,-8) 1 (-7,2) 4 (-6,5) 
CPW -17 (-47,-8) 6 (-47,8) 29 (-37,30) 
CHPW -12 (-46,-11) -9 (-41,7) 14 (-28,25) 
Whitefish 
trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -1 (-2,0) -2 (-2,1) -2 (-2,2) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Plaice -1 (-6,0) 5 (-4,10) 17 (12,21) 
Whiting -4 (-10,0) 1 (0,1) 1 (0,1) 
CHP -7 (-16,-1) -1 (-14,5) 10 (-1,17) 
CHW -3 (-13,-1) 0 (-2,2) 1 (-1,2) 
CPW -13 (-18,-3) 3 (0,6) 15 (12,23) 
CHPW -18 (-20,-3) -2 (-5,6) 9 (7,19) 
Fleet 
Cod 0 (-16,0) 0 (-4,1) 3 (0,4) 
Haddock 0 (0,0) 0 (0,1) 0 (0,1) 
Plaice 0 (0,0) 2 (-3,4) 8 (6,9) 
Whiting -5 (-12,-1) 0 (-2,1) 1 (-1,1) 
CHP -1 (-12,0) 1 (-5,5) 10 (5,11) 
CHW -4 (-15,-4) 1 (-1,2) 4 (1,6) 
CPW -8 (-20,-4) 2 (-5,5) 9 (6,11) 
CHPW -3 (-19,-3) -3 (-6,5) 8 (5,12) 
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Table S4 Percentage change in fishing effort (no. of trips), marketable(>MLS) landings in tonnes 
and operating profits of English North Sea otter trawler segments under a cod, haddock, plaice, or 
whiting catch quota, or a combination of cod, haddock and plaice (CHP), cod, haddock and whiting 
(CHW), cod, plaice and whiting (CPW) or cod, haddock, plaice and whiting catch quotas (CHPW), 
compared to under the existing landings quotas of 2010, based on the worst case scenario in 
which fishers select trips that will minimise fleet operating profit (see Table 3 in main text). 
Numbers in parentheses show estimates derived using the upper and lower 95% confidence 
intervals of the mean discard and <MLS catch proportions. 
Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in fishing 
effort (%) 
Change in 
marketable landings 
(%) 
Change in 
operating profits 
(%) 
Mixed trawlers 
<10m length 
overall (LOA) and  
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -44 (-95,0) -41 (-75,2) -56 (-78,2) 
Haddock 0 (-69,0) 0 (-55,1) 0 (-72,0) 
Plaice -100 (-100,0) -100 (-100,1) -100 (-100,0) 
Whiting -77 (-79,-73) -58 (-61,-53) -77 (-79,-73) 
CHP -45 (-100,-45) -100 (-100,-38) -100 (-100,-56) 
CHW -70 (-95,-50) -51 (-74,-47) -64 (-78,-62) 
CPW -100 (-100,-50) -100 (-100,-51) -100 (-100,-64) 
CHPW -100 (-100,-50) -100 (-100,-50) -100 (-100,-64) 
Nephrops  trawlers 
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -63 (-98,0) -66 (-88,1) -71 (-90,1) 
Haddock 0 (-65,0) 0 (-50,1) 0 (-56,0) 
Plaice -100 (-100,0) -97 (-98,1) -98 (-99,2) 
Whiting -75 (-80,-65) -70 (-78,-53) -77 (-84,-62) 
CHP -65 (-100,-61) -96 (-96,-68) -97 (-97,-68) 
CHW -83 (-98,-33) -41 (-88,-39) -45 (-89,-44) 
CPW -100 (-100,-33) -97 (-98,-40) -98 (-99,-44) 
CHPW -100 (-100,-33) -97 (-98,-31) -98 (-99,-36) 
Nephrops  
trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -66 (-98,0) -75 (-96,1) -76 (-95,2) 
Haddock 0 (-62,0) 1 (-61,1) 0 (-65,0) 
Plaice -100 (-100,0) -100 (-100,1) -100 (-100,1) 
Whiting -63 (-70,-52) -57 (-64,-51) -63 (-71,-57) 
CHP -67 (-100,-67) -100 (-100,-76) -100 (-100,-76) 
CHW -72 (-98,-57) -68 (-95,-59) -69 (-95,-64) 
CPW -100 (-100,-58) -100 (-100,-69) -100 (-100,-70) 
CHPW -100 (-100,-100) -100 (-100,-100) -100 (-100,-100) 
Whitefish trawlers 
<15m LOA and 
<300kW engine 
power 
Cod -45 (-95,0) -47 (-66,3) -50 (-62,4) 
Haddock 0 (-75,0) 2 (-29,2) 2 (-45,2) 
Plaice -100 (-100,0) -100 (-100,1) -100 (-100,2) 
Whiting -77 (-82,-68) -62 (-70,-43) -73 (-79,-58) 
CHP -44 (-100,-44) -100 (-100,-31) -100 (-100,-38) 
CHW -74 (-94,-20) -27 (-65,-25) -30 (-61,-29) 
CPW -100 (-100,-20) -100 (-100,-27) -100 (-100,-30) 
CHPW -100 (-100,-100) -100 (-100,-100) -100 (-100,-100) 
 
 
  
212 
 
Table S4 continued. 
Segment 
Catch 
Quota(s) 
Change in fishing 
effort (%) 
Change in 
marketable landings 
(%) 
Change in 
operating profits 
(%) 
Whitefish 
trawlers >15m 
LOA and <300kW 
engine power 
Cod -51 (-91,0) -68 (-82,1) -66 (-78,2) 
Haddock 0 (-50,0) 1 (-58,1) 1 (-63,1) 
Plaice -94 (-94,0) -54 (-56,5) -36 (-36,19) 
Whiting -60 (-69,-50) -72 (-80,-61) -77 (-84,-66) 
CHP -46 (-94,-42) -52 (-84,-37) -33 (-82,-24) 
CHW -58 (-91,-28) -51 (-82,-51) -52 (-77,-51) 
CPW -94 (-94,-30) -54 (-55,-41) -36 (-51,-20) 
CHPW -94 (-94,-30) -54 (-55,-28) -35 (-50,-23) 
Whitefish 
trawlers >300kW 
engine power 
Cod -67 (-91,0) -74 (-82,0) -76 (-82,0) 
Haddock 0 (-61,0) 0 (-55,0) 0 (-62,0) 
Plaice -64 (-69,0) -40 (-56,6) -21 (-44,14) 
Whiting -74 (-86,-59) -90 (-98,-78) -92 (-98,-82) 
CHP -61 (-90,-50) -40 (-84,-36) -21 (-85,-18) 
CHW -67 (-91,-54) -78 (-81,-53) -78 (-82,-59) 
CPW -64 (-70,-54) -40 (-77,-36) -21 (-77,-18) 
CHPW -64 (-64,-31) -40 (-77,-36) -20 (-77,-17) 
Fleet 
Cod -49 (-95,0) -66 (-80,1) -66 (-80,1) 
Haddock 0 (-68,0) 0 (-53,1) 0 (-65,0) 
Plaice -98 (-98,0) -59 (-63,4) -64 (-65,7) 
Whiting -75 (-79,-69) -79 (-87,-68) -82 (-87,-74) 
CHP -49 (-98,-48) -59 (-80,-50) -64 (-79,-49) 
CHW -72 (-95,-44) -65 (-80,-53) -66 (-80,-62) 
CPW -98 (-98,-44) -59 (-64,-57) -64 (-66,-63) 
CHPW -98 (-98,-44) -59 (-64,-39) -64 (-65,-48) 
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Appendix 3 – Supplementary material from Chapter 5 
Table S1 The target F, actual resulting F and SSB of 6 North Sea demersal stocks between 2014 and 2016, based on the 4 different catch quota setting 
protocols, with (+ ov) or without a 10% cod overage.  
  Target F F SSB (t) Catch quota (t) Landings (t) 
Stock Protocol 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
Cod 0% 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.14 0.13 0.13 79,066 118,255 163,291 30,506 36,607 43,928 27,910 33,578 40,139 
 75% 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.17 0.16 0.16 79,066 114,842 154,636 35,572 42,687 51,224 32,753 39,335 46,978 
 100% 0.22 0.31 0.39 0.18 0.17 0.17 79,066 113,722 151,833 37,261 44,713 53,656 34,367 41,247 49,093 
 30%c 0.22 0.31 0.38 0.19 0.18 0.18 79,066 112,392 148,225 39,658 47,589 57,107 36,349 43,588 51,944 
 0% + ov 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.16 0.14 0.13 79,066 116,480 161,059 33,556 36,912 45,033 30,595 33,825 41,111 
 75% + ov 0.22 0.31 0.39 0.19 0.17 0.17 79,066 112,910 151,784 39,129 43,042 52,512 35,934 39,632 47,972 
 100% + ov 0.22 0.30 0.38 0.20 0.18 0.18 79,066 111,701 148,793 40,987 45,086 55,005 37,690 41,553 50,108 
 30%c + ov 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.21 0.19 0.19 79,066 110,227 144,841 43,623 47,986 58,543 39,834 43,905 52,864 
Haddock 0% 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.07 0.06 0.06 232,750 232,884 263,785 41,179 47,355 54,459 12,134 12,791 17,473 
 75% 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.08 0.08 0.08 232,750 230,964 260,199 49,211 51,750 58,091 14,311 15,340 21,344 
 100% 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.09 0.08 0.08 232,750 230,316 258,995 51,889 51,750 57,982 15,047 16,218 22,510 
 30%c 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.09 0.09 0.09 232,750 229,443 257,625 53,532 51,750 57,848 16,048 17,115 24,368 
 0% + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.08 0.07 0.06 232,750 231,768 262,589 41,179 47,355 54,459 13,407 13,020 18,117 
 75% + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.09 0.08 0.08 232,750 229,632 258,757 49,211 51,750 57,870 15,829 15,647 22,105 
 100% + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.10 0.08 0.08 232,750 228,911 257,589 51,889 51,750 57,783 16,648 16,554 23,231 
 30%c + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.10 0.09 0.09 232,750 227,942 255,957 53,532 51,750 57,667 17,766 17,445 25,033 
Plaice 0% 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.05 0.05 0.05 743,214 873,685 1,011,217 111,631 128,375 147,631 47,025 49,349 53,845 
 75% 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.06 0.06 0.06 743,214 864,429 989,587 147,927 170,116 195,633 59,777 63,680 69,013 
 100% 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.07 0.07 0.07 743,214 861,127 982,819 160,026 184,029 211,634 64,059 67,547 73,091 
 30%c 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.07 0.07 0.07 743,214 862,999 986,704 145,120 166,888 191,921 61,817 65,807 71,612 
 0% + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.05 0.05 0.05 743,214 871,776 1,008,662 111,631 128,375 147,631 49,383 49,900 54,787 
 75% + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.07 0.06 0.07 743,214 862,005 986,789 147,927 170,116 195,633 63,094 64,159 70,224 
 100% + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.07 0.07 0.07 743,214 858,553 979,558 160,026 184,029 211,634 67,566 68,340 74,209 
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Table S1 continued. 
  Target F F SSB (t) Catch quota (t) Landings (t) 
Stock Protocol 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
 30%c + ov 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.07 0.07 0.07 743,214 860,461 985,127 145,120 166,888 191,921 64,971 66,332 72,951 
Saithe 0% 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.12 0.11 0.11 162,360 222,918 318,558 85,581 92,260 106,099 38,739 46,211 56,194 
 75% 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.14 0.13 0.13 162,360 217,447 302,748 85,581 92,260 106,099 45,489 54,527 66,190 
 100% 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.14 0.14 162,360 215,622 298,127 85,581 92,260 106,099 47,743 57,315 69,314 
 30%c 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.16 0.15 0.15 162,360 213,550 293,408 111,256 94,567 108,753 50,481 60,519 71,971 
 0% + ov 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.13 0.11 0.11 162,360 219,843 314,055 85,581 92,260 106,099 42,486 46,644 57,582 
 75% + ov 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.13 0.13 162,360 213,989 297,973 85,581 92,260 106,099 49,869 55,045 67,753 
 100% + ov 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.16 0.14 0.14 162,360 212,198 294,336 85,581 92,260 106,099 52,335 57,872 70,129 
 30%c + ov 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.17 0.15 0.15 162,360 210,468 290,345 111,256 94,567 108,753 55,381 61,106 73,549 
Sole 0% 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 44,592 52,265 66,308 11,900 11,780 12,905 2,815 3,301 3,827 
 75% 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.07 0.07 0.07 44,592 51,266 64,075 11,900 11,780 12,830 3,727 4,364 4,967 
 100% 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.08 0.08 0.08 44,592 50,930 63,463 11,900 11,780 12,749 4,025 4,663 5,276 
 30%c 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.07 0.07 0.07 44,592 51,321 64,179 15,470 13,150 13,673 3,688 4,320 4,934 
 0% + ov 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.06 0.05 0.05 44,592 52,152 66,194 11,900 11,780 12,874 2,923 3,324 3,879 
 75% + ov 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.08 0.07 0.07 44,592 51,128 63,893 11,900 11,780 12,830 3,864 4,394 5,011 
 100% + ov 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.08 0.08 0.08 44,592 50,784 63,269 11,900 11,780 12,688 4,180 4,701 5,312 
 30%c + ov 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.07 0.07 0.07 44,592 51,171 63,975 15,470 13,150 13,624 3,831 4,320 4,992 
Whiting 0% 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.05 330,809 389,326 441,852 28,681 32,983 37,930 13,109 14,169 15,973 
 75% 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.06 0.06 330,809 387,351 438,342 40,435 46,500 53,475 15,611 17,131 19,400 
 100% 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.07 330,809 386,699 437,127 44,353 51,006 58,657 16,453 18,168 20,582 
 30%c 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.07 330,809 386,071 435,945 37,285 42,878 49,309 17,250 19,175 21,873 
 0% + ov 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.05 330,809 388,340 440,926 28,681 32,983 37,930 14,382 14,402 16,501 
 75% + ov 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.06 0.06 330,809 386,159 437,116 40,435 46,500 53,475 17,119 17,439 20,014 
 100% + ov 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.07 0.07 330,809 385,430 435,827 44,353 51,006 58,657 18,041 18,465 21,312 
 30%c + ov 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.07 0.07 330,809 384,759 434,547 37,285 42,878 49,309 18,950 19,413 22,682 
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Table S2 Median percentage change in the effort of each fleet, the species landings and the revenue of modelled North Sea demersal finfish fleets 
compared to 2012 when operating under catch quotas set using the 30%c protocol. The species for which the quota allocation is most limiting. The 
proportion of 2012 landings from 6 stocks contributed by each species. The catch per unit effort (CPUE) of each species in each projection year, 2014-2016.  
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
BE Beam <24m Plaice Cod 7 5 0.14 0.18 0.21 -46 -44 -43 3 35 57 -20 -8 8 
  Haddock 12 0 0 0 0    -50 -47 -22    
  Plaice 57 56 2.94 3.14 3.33    105 134 159    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -34 -14 5    
  Sole 0 35 0.5 0.59 0.71    -42 -31 -21    
  Whiting 33 3 0.1 0.11 0.13    18 33 53    
BE Beam >=24m Cod Cod 25 16 0.57 0.69 0.83 -47 -49 -49 25 50 80 1 8 23 
  Haddock 12 2 0.02 0.02 0.03    -51 -48 -26    
  Plaice 30 76 2.76 2.95 3.12    23 23 35    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -33 -20 -3    
  Sole 0 6 0.09 0.11 0.13    -44 -38 -27    
  Whiting 33 1 0.03 0.04 0.04    11 24 40    
BE Otter Cod Cod 69 7 0.64 0.78 0.93 -78 -78 -78 25 50 81 -62 -58 -52 
  Haddock 12 0 0 0 0    -80 -78 -69    
  Plaice 0 86 2.35 2.51 2.66    -64 -63 -60    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -72 -66 -59    
  Sole 0 6 0.11 0.13 0.15    -77 -74 -69    
  Whiting 33 1 0.04 0.04 0.05    -53 -48 -39    
DK Beam Cod Cod 29 6 0.32 0.39 0.47 -50 -53 -52 25 50 80 -15 -12 -1 
  Haddock 12 0 0.01 0.01 0.01    -54 -51 -31    
  Plaice 0 94 3.52 3.76 3.99    -19 -19 -10    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -37 -25 -9    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
  Sole 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01    -47 -42 -31    
  Whiting 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
DK FDF Cod Cod 3 30 2.26 2.77 3.33 -32 -35 -35 25 50 79 4 21 39 
  Haddock 9 12 0.41 0.45 0.65    -39 -35 -8    
  Plaice 0 23 1.53 1.64 1.73    11 11 17    
  Saithe 0 34 1.74 2.2 2.69    -13 3 20    
  Sole 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01    -28 -22 -10    
  Whiting 10 1 0.05 0.06 0.07    6 17 29    
DK Otter <24m Cod Cod 43 23 1.24 1.51 1.82 -60 -62 -61 25 50 80 -25 -14 1 
  Haddock 27 13 0.24 0.26 0.38    -55 -52 -32    
  Plaice 2 45 1.31 1.4 1.48    -33 -33 -26    
  Saithe 0 19 0.42 0.53 0.65    -49 -39 -26    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -58 -53 -44    
  Whiting 49 0 0 0 0    10 22 41    
DK Otter 24-
40m Cod Cod 26 14 0.56 0.69 0.83 -48 -50 -50 25 50 80 -7 2 14 
  Haddock 27 6 0.11 0.13 0.18    -42 -39 -11    
  Plaice 2 65 1.82 1.95 2.07    -13 -13 -7    
  Saithe 0 14 0.3 0.38 0.46    -34 -21 -8    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -45 -40 -29    
  Whiting 43 1 0.03 0.03 0.03    29 43 61    
DK Seine Cod Cod 27 29 3.53 4.32 5.19 -48 -51 -50 25 50 80 -9 3 21 
  Haddock 15 29 1.36 1.5 2.19    -50 -48 -25    
  Plaice 0 38 3.15 3.36 3.57    -16 -16 -8    
  Saithe 0 4 0.27 0.34 0.41    -35 -22 -6    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -45 -39 -29    
  Whiting 49 0 0.01 0.01 0.02    43 59 80    
DK Static Whiting Cod 4 40 2.32 2.85 3.42 -99 -99 -99 -98 -98 -98 -99 -98 -98 
  Haddock 8 1 0.01 0.02 0.02    -99 -99 -99    
  Plaice 0 51 2.66 2.84 3.01    -99 -98 -98    
  Saithe 0 1 0.04 0.05 0.06    -99 -99 -98    
  Sole 0 7 0.24 0.28 0.35    -99 -99 -99    
  Whiting 99 0 0 0 0    125 158 197    
EN Beam Cod Cod 15 0 0.03 0.04 0.04 -40 -43 -43 25 50 80 -9 -7 3 
  Haddock 12 0 0 0 0    -45 -42 -17    
  Plaice 0 97 4.63 4.94 5.24    -3 -3 4    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -24 -10 5    
  Sole 0 3 0.09 0.1 0.12    -37 -31 -19    
  Whiting 35 0 0 0.01 0.01    29 43 63    
EN FDF Cod Cod 0 23 2.34 2.87 3.44 -30 -33 -33 25 50 79 0 16 37 
  Haddock 0 19 0.85 0.94 1.36    -43 -40 -14    
  Plaice 0 6 0.55 0.58 0.62    15 14 19    
  Saithe 0 47 3.37 4.25 5.2    -11 6 23    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -26 -19 -6    
  Whiting 0 5 0.42 0.48 0.55    -1 8 22    
EN Otter <24m Cod Cod 46 12 0.69 0.85 1.02 -62 -63 -63 25 50 80 -33 -26 -13 
  Haddock 5 25 0.37 0.41 0.59    -68 -66 -51    
  Plaice 0 33 0.99 1.06 1.12    -38 -37 -32    
  Saithe 0 5 0.12 0.15 0.18    -52 -42 -29    
  Sole 0 2 0.03 0.04 0.04    -60 -55 -47    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
  Whiting 51 24 1.24 1.4 1.6    9 20 40    
EN Otter >=40m Whiting Cod 16 1 0.04 0.05 0.06 -68 -68 -68 -31 -15 -5 -48 -43 -38 
  Haddock 2 0 0 0 0    -74 -69 -59    
  Plaice 0 99 3.69 3.94 4.17    -48 -44 -40    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -61 -50 -38    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -66 -60 -54    
  Whiting 80 0 0.07 0.08 0.09    125 158 196    
EN Otter 24-
40m Whiting Cod 34 1 0.12 0.14 0.17 -67 -67 -67 -10 11 24 -41 -34 -27 
  Haddock 2 11 0.29 0.32 0.46    -73 -68 -58    
  Plaice 0 81 4.43 4.73 5.01    -47 -42 -39    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -60 -49 -36    
  Sole 0 0 0 0.01 0.01    -65 -59 -53    
  Whiting 79 6 1.45 1.64 1.88    125 157 196    
EN <10m Cod Cod 35 35 0.25 0.3 0.36 -54 -55 -56 25 50 80 -28 -19 -3 
  Haddock 6 13 0.03 0.03 0.05    -61 -58 -41    
  Plaice 0 4 0.02 0.02 0.02    -25 -26 -18    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -42 -31 -16    
  Sole 0 20 0.05 0.06 0.08    -52 -47 -36    
  Whiting 48 27 0.19 0.22 0.25    24 37 59    
FR Nets Cod Cod 3 32 0.22 0.26 0.32 -32 -33 -33 25 50 81 -20 -9 9 
  Haddock 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
  Plaice 0 14 0.08 0.09 0.1    12 13 24    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
  Sole 0 52 0.2 0.23 0.28    -28 -20 -3    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
FR OTH Cod Cod 14 10 0.02 0.03 0.03 -40 -42 -42 25 50 80 6 21 42 
  Haddock 5 1 0 0 0    -48 -44 -21    
  Plaice 0 1 0 0 0    -1 -2 7    
  Saithe 0 21 0.03 0.03 0.04    -23 -9 10    
  Sole 0 1 0 0 0    -36 -30 -17    
  Whiting 14 66 0.11 0.13 0.15    -1 10 25    
FR Otter >=40m Cod Cod 27 1 0.06 0.07 0.09 -49 -51 -51 25 50 80 -34 -21 -5 
  Haddock 12 1 0.02 0.02 0.04    -53 -50 -28    
  Plaice 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
  Saithe 0 98 3.2 4.05 4.95    -35 -22 -7    
  Whiting 33 0 0.02 0.02 0.02    8 20 38    
FR Otter 10-40m Cod Cod 15 14 0.2 0.25 0.3 -41 -43 -43 25 50 80 29 45 69 
  Haddock 12 2 0.01 0.01 0.02    -45 -42 -17    
  Plaice 0 1 0.01 0.01 0.01    -3 -4 3    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -25 -10 5    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -37 -31 -20    
  Whiting 39 84 1.41 1.59 1.82    37 51 72    
FR <10m Cod Cod 11 22 0.02 0.03 0.03 -38 -39 -39 25 50 81 -6 6 29 
  Plaice 0 20 0.02 0.02 0.02    2 3 15    
  Sole 0 21 0.01 0.01 0.02    -34 -26 -11    
  Whiting 40 36 0.04 0.05 0.05    49 64 93    
GE Beam >=24m Whiting Cod 27 2 0.06 0.07 0.09 -87 -87 -87 -68 -61 -54 -79 -76 -74 
  Haddock 12 0 0 0 0    -88 -86 -82    
  Plaice 40 83 3.7 3.96 4.2    -65 -62 -58    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
  Sole 0 15 0.26 0.31 0.37    -86 -84 -81    
  Whiting 92 0 0.04 0.04 0.05    125 158 197    
GE Otter <24m Cod Cod 43 3 0.76 0.93 1.12 -60 -61 -61 25 50 80 -29 -27 -19 
  Haddock 4 1 0.06 0.07 0.1    -66 -64 -49    
  Plaice 6 95 11.81 12.61 13.37    -31 -30 -23    
  Saithe 0 1 0.06 0.07 0.09    -50 -39 -26    
  Sole 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.03    -58 -53 -44    
  Whiting 33 0 0.02 0.02 0.02    -15 -7 8    
GE Otter >=40m Cod Cod 1 2 0.34 0.41 0.49 -31 -34 -34 25 50 80 -11 6 24 
  Haddock 1 1 0.08 0.09 0.13    -43 -40 -13    
  Plaice 6 0 0 0 0    20 20 27    
  Saithe 0 96 10.19 12.86 15.73    -12 5 22    
  Whiting 24 0 0.01 0.02 0.02    28 41 61    
GE Otter 24-
40m Cod Cod 10 22 2.47 3.03 3.63 -37 -40 -40 25 50 80 -4 13 33 
  Haddock 4 6 0.26 0.29 0.42    -47 -43 -19    
  Plaice 2 11 1 1.07 1.14    5 4 13    
  Saithe 0 61 4.34 5.48 6.7    -20 -5 14    
  Sole 0 0 0 0.01 0.01    -33 -27 -14    
  Whiting 27 0 0.04 0.05 0.05    22 35 54    
GE Static Cod Cod 20 58 3.6 4.41 5.29 -43 -46 -46 25 50 80 -31 -22 -7 
  Haddock 12 1 0.03 0.04 0.05    -48 -44 -21    
  Plaice 0 4 0.18 0.19 0.2    -8 -8 1    
  Saithe 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01    -28 -15 2    
  Sole 0 37 1.09 1.27 1.55    -40 -34 -23    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
  Whiting 33 0 0 0 0    19 32 50    
NL Beam <24m Whiting Cod 9 2 0.01 0.02 0.02 -77 -76 -76 -53 -42 -32 -71 -66 -61 
  Haddock 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
  Plaice 56 40 0.48 0.51 0.54    -13 -4 5    
  Sole 0 56 0.19 0.22 0.27    -75 -71 -66    
  Whiting 85 2 0.06 0.06 0.07    125 158 197    
NL Beam >=40m Whiting Cod 12 2 0.08 0.09 0.11 -78 -78 -77 -54 -43 -34 -66 -61 -56 
  Haddock 0 0 0 0 0    -82 -79 -72    
  Plaice 43 75 3.38 3.61 3.83    -37 -30 -24    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
  Sole 0 21 0.35 0.41 0.5    -76 -72 -67    
  Whiting 86 1 0.1 0.11 0.13    125 158 197    
NL Beam 24-
40m Whiting Cod 12 2 0.05 0.06 0.07 -75 -74 -74 -48 -36 -25 -64 -58 -52 
  Haddock 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0    
  Plaice 48 68 2.86 3.05 3.24    -20 -12 -3    
  Saithe 0 0 0 0 0    -69 -59 -49    
  Sole 0 30 0.41 0.48 0.59    -73 -68 -63    
  Whiting 84 1 0.09 0.1 0.11    125 158 197    
NL Otter Cod Cod 26 18 1.27 1.56 1.87 -49 -52 -52 24 49 79 17 29 43 
  Haddock 12 3 0.07 0.08 0.12    -55 -50 -30    
  Plaice 38 75 5.67 6.05 6.42    30 33 46    
  Saithe 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.02    -37 -27 -9    
  Sole 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01    -47 -42 -32    
  Whiting 64 4 0.42 0.47 0.54    102 125 155    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
NO Static Cod Cod 0 33 3.76 4.61 5.53 -30 -33 -33 25 50 80 4 25 49 
  Haddock 0 6 0.31 0.34 0.49    -43 -39 -13    
  Plaice 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.02    15 14 21    
  Saithe 0 61 4.85 6.12 7.48    -11 6 24    
  Whiting 0 0 0 0 0    -1 9 25    
SC FDF Cod Cod 0 26 2.89 3.55 4.26 -30 -33 -33 25 50 80 -11 1 21 
  Haddock 5 49 2.48 2.74 3.98    -40 -36 -9    
  Plaice 0 1 0.09 0.09 0.1    15 14 21    
  Saithe 0 13 1.04 1.31 1.6    -11 6 24    
  Whiting 7 11 1.03 1.16 1.33    6 18 31    
SC Otter <24m Cod Cod 43 17 1.01 1.23 1.48 -60 -62 -62 25 50 80 -34 -25 -9 
  Haddock 25 49 0.96 1.06 1.54    -57 -54 -35    
  Plaice 0 3 0.09 0.1 0.1    -35 -35 -28    
  Saithe 0 7 0.17 0.22 0.26    -50 -40 -26    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -58 -53 -44    
  Whiting 31 24 0.96 1.08 1.24    -18 -10 4    
SC Otter >=24m Cod Cod 28 17 1.87 2.3 2.76 -49 -52 -51 25 50 80 -26 -17 0 
  Haddock 6 47 1.72 1.9 2.77    -56 -53 -33    
  Plaice 0 10 0.71 0.76 0.81    -17 -18 -9    
  Saithe 0 10 0.57 0.72 0.89    -36 -23 -7    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -46 -40 -29    
  Whiting 9 16 1.13 1.28 1.46    -21 -13 0    
SC Static Cod Cod 0 80 0.03 0.04 0.05 -30 -33 -34 25 50 78 21 44 70 
  Haddock 9 7 0 0 0    -37 -34 -6    
  Plaice 0 1 0 0 0    14 14 18    
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Table S2 continued. 
   
2012 
discard 
rate 
(%) 
% of 
2012 
landings 
CPUE Change in effort (%) 
Change in landings 
(%) 
Change in revenue 
(%) 
Fleet 
Limiting 
species Stock 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
  Saithe 0 12 0 0 0.01    -11 5 23    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -26 -19 -7    
  Whiting 0 0 0 0 0    -1 8 18    
SC <10m OTB Cod Cod 41 22 0.06 0.08 0.09 -59 -60 -60 25 50 80 -31 -22 -5 
  Haddock 22 56 0.05 0.06 0.09    -57 -54 -35    
  Plaice 0 9 0.01 0.01 0.02    -33 -33 -26    
  Saithe 0 2 0 0 0    -48 -37 -24    
  Sole 0 0 0 0 0    -56 -51 -42    
  Whiting 45 12 0.03 0.03 0.04    6 16 35    
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Table S3 The limiting species if no change in behaviour is made, compared to if the CPUE of cod is reduced by 30%. The percentage of the cod catch <MLS if 
no change in behaviour is made. The percentage of landings in 2012 contributed by cod or the limiting species. The CPUE of cod and the limiting species. 
The resulting change in cod landings, total landings and revenue under the 30%c protocol. 
Fleet Year 
Limiting 
species 
- no 
change 
Limiting 
species 
% of 
cod 
catch 
<MLS 
– no 
change 
% of 
2012 
landings 
from 
cod 
% of 2012 
landings 
from 
limiting 
species 
cod 
CPUE 
CPUE 
of 
limiting 
species 
Change 
in cod 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in total 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in 
revenue 
(%) 
BE Beam <24m 2014 Plaice Plaice 1 5 56 0.1 2.93 -30 -2 -2 
 2015 Plaice Plaice 1 5 56 0.12 3.1 -28 -1 -2 
 2016 Plaice Plaice 1 5 56 0.15 3.27 -26 -1 -1 
BE Beam >=24m 2014 Cod Cod 0 16 16 0.4 0.4 0 35 31 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 16 16 0.49 0.49 0 32 28 
 2016 Cod Cod 0 16 16 0.6 0.6 -1 27 24 
BE Otter 2014 Cod Cod 25 7 7 0.45 0.45 0 34 40 
 2015 Cod Cod 25 7 7 0.55 0.55 0 31 38 
 2016 Cod Cod 25 7 7 0.67 0.67 1 28 36 
DK Beam 2014 Cod Cod 0 6 6 0.23 0.23 0 38 35 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 6 6 0.28 0.28 0 36 32 
 2016 Cod Cod 0 6 6 0.34 0.34 0 33 29 
DK FDF 2014 Cod Cod 5 30 30 1.59 1.59 0 25 21 
 2015 Cod Cod 5 30 30 1.96 1.96 -4 17 14 
 2016 Cod Sole 5 30 0 2.39 0.01 -22 -7 -9 
DK Otter <24m  2014 Cod Cod 21 23 23 0.87 0.87 0 25 32 
 2015 Cod Cod 21 23 23 1.07 1.07 0 22 30 
 2016 Cod Cod 21 23 23 1.31 1.31 0 19 29 
DK Otter 24-40m 2014 Cod Cod 2 14 14 0.4 0.4 0 33 26 
 2015 Cod Cod 2 14 14 0.49 0.49 0 29 23 
 2016 Cod Cod 2 14 14 0.6 0.6 -6 20 15 
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Table S3 continued. 
Fleet Year 
Limiting 
species 
- no 
change 
Limiting 
species 
% of 
cod 
catch 
<MLS 
– no 
change 
% of 
2012 
landings 
from 
cod 
% of 2012 
landings 
from 
limiting 
species 
cod 
CPUE 
CPUE 
of 
limiting 
species 
Change 
in cod 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in total 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in 
revenue 
(%) 
DK Seine 2014 Cod Cod 9 29 29 2.47 2.47 0 23 21 
 2015 Cod Cod 9 29 29 3.06 3.06 0 19 18 
 2016 Cod Cod 9 29 29 3.73 3.73 -6 12 12 
DK Static 2014 Whiting Whiting 1 40 0 1.63 0 -30 -13 -17 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 1 40 0 2.02 0 -28 -14 -16 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 1 40 0 2.46 0 -27 -13 -16 
EN <10m 2014 Cod Cod 8 35 35 0.17 0.17 0 22 27 
 2015 Cod Cod 8 35 35 0.22 0.22 0 20 25 
 2016 Cod Cod 8 35 35 0.26 0.26 0 18 23 
EN Beam 2014 Cod Cod 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 42 42 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 39 38 
 2016 Cod Sole 0 0 3 0.03 0.12 -12 18 18 
EN FDF 2014 Cod Cod 0 23 23 1.64 1.64 0 27 20 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 23 23 2.03 2.03 -7 15 10 
 2016 Cod Sole 0 23 0 2.47 0 -23 -6 -10 
EN Otter <24m 2014 Cod Cod 12 12 12 0.49 0.49 0 33 33 
 2015 Cod Cod 12 12 12 0.6 0.6 0 30 31 
 2016 Cod Cod 12 12 12 0.73 0.73 0 28 29 
EN Otter >=40m 2014 Whiting Whiting 1 1 0 0.03 0.07 -30 -1 -1 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 1 1 0 0.04 0.08 -28 0 -1 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 1 1 0 0.04 0.09 -27 0 -1 
EN Otter 24-40m 2014 Whiting Whiting 0 1 6 0.08 1.43 -30 -1 -2 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 0 1 6 0.1 1.6 -28 -1 -1 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 0 1 6 0.12 1.82 -27 -1 -1 
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Table S3 continued. 
Fleet Year 
Limiting 
species 
- no 
change 
Limiting 
species 
% of 
cod 
catch 
<MLS 
– no 
change 
% of 
2012 
landings 
from 
cod 
% of 2012 
landings 
from 
limiting 
species 
cod 
CPUE 
CPUE 
of 
limiting 
species 
Change 
in cod 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in total 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in 
revenue 
(%) 
FR <10m 2014 Cod Cod 0 22 22 0.02 0.02 0 31 30 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 22 22 0.02 0.02 0 28 27 
 2016 Cod Sole 0 22 21 0.02 0.02 -5 20 20 
FR Nets 2014 Cod Cod 0 32 32 0.15 0.15 0 24 33 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 32 32 0.19 0.19 0 20 29 
 2016 Cod Sole 0 32 52 0.23 0.28 -12 6 14 
FR OTH 2014 Cod Cod 0 10 10 0.01 0.01 0 36 27 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 10 10 0.02 0.02 0 31 22 
 2016 Cod Sole 0 10 1 0.02 0 -12 14 7 
FR Otter >=40m 2014 Cod Cod 5 1 1 0.04 0.04 0 38 37 
 2015 Cod Cod 5 1 1 0.05 0.05 0 31 31 
 2016 Cod Cod 5 1 1 0.06 0.06 0 25 25 
FR Otter 10-40m 2014 Cod Cod 8 14 14 0.14 0.14 0 36 31 
 2015 Cod Cod 8 14 14 0.18 0.18 -1 31 26 
 2016 Cod Sole 8 14 0 0.22 0 -13 11 9 
GE Beam >=24m 2014 Whiting Whiting 0 2 0 0.04 0.04 -30 -1 -1 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 0 2 0 0.05 0.04 -28 -1 -1 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 0 2 0 0.06 0.04 -27 0 -1 
GE Otter <24m 2014 Cod Cod 16 3 3 0.53 0.53 0 39 40 
 2015 Cod Cod 16 3 3 0.66 0.66 0 37 37 
 2016 Cod Cod 16 3 3 0.8 0.8 1 35 35 
GE Otter >=40m 2014 Cod Cod 2 2 2 0.24 0.24 0 37 35 
 2015 Cod Cod 2 2 2 0.29 0.29 -1 29 28 
 2016 Cod Cod 2 2 2 0.35 0.35 -7 18 17 
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Table S3 continued. 
Fleet Year 
Limiting 
species 
- no 
change 
Limiting 
species 
% of 
cod 
catch 
<MLS 
– no 
change 
% of 
2012 
landings 
from 
cod 
% of 2012 
landings 
from 
limiting 
species 
cod 
CPUE 
CPUE 
of 
limiting 
species 
Change 
in cod 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in total 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in 
revenue 
(%) 
GE Otter 24-40m 2014 Cod Cod 5 22 22 1.73 1.73 0 27 22 
 2015 Cod Cod 5 22 22 2.14 2.14 0 21 18 
 2016 Cod Sole 5 22 0 2.61 0.01 -16 1 -1 
GE Static 2014 Cod Cod 0 58 58 2.52 2.52 0 11 28 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 58 58 3.12 3.12 0 10 26 
 2016 Cod Cod 0 58 58 3.8 3.8 -7 3 16 
NL Beam <24m 2014 Whiting Whiting 0 2 2 0.01 0.06 -30 -1 -1 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 0 2 2 0.01 0.06 -28 -1 -1 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 0 2 2 0.02 0.07 -27 -1 -1 
NL Beam >=40m 2014 Whiting Whiting 0 2 1 0.05 0.1 -30 -1 -2 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 0 2 1 0.07 0.11 -28 -1 -1 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 0 2 1 0.08 0.13 -27 -1 -1 
NL Beam 24-40m 2014 Whiting Whiting 0 2 1 0.04 0.09 -30 -1 -1 
 2015 Whiting Whiting 0 2 1 0.04 0.1 -28 -1 -1 
 2016 Whiting Whiting 0 2 1 0.05 0.11 -27 0 -1 
NL Otter 2014 Cod Whiting 6 18 4 0.89 0.41 -24 2 -3 
 2015 Cod Whiting 6 18 4 1.1 0.46 -22 3 -1 
 2016 Cod Whiting 6 18 4 1.34 0.52 -24 -3 -6 
NO Static 2014 Cod Cod 0 33 33 2.64 2.64 0 22 16 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 33 33 3.26 3.26 0 17 12 
 2016 Cod Cod 0 33 33 3.97 3.97 -4 12 8 
SC <10m OTB 2014 Cod Cod 12 22 22 0.04 0.04 0 26 24 
 2015 Cod Cod 12 22 22 0.05 0.05 0 22 22 
 2016 Cod Cod 12 22 22 0.07 0.07 0 20 21 
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Table S3 continued. 
Fleet Year 
Limiting 
species 
- no 
change 
Limiting 
species 
% of 
cod 
catch 
<MLS 
– no 
change 
% of 
2012 
landings 
from 
cod 
% of 2012 
landings 
from 
limiting 
species 
cod 
CPUE 
CPUE 
of 
limiting 
species 
Change 
in cod 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in total 
landings 
(%) 
Change 
in 
revenue 
(%) 
SC FDF 2014 Cod Cod 5 26 26 2.03 2.03 0 24 22 
 2015 Cod Cod 5 26 26 2.51 2.51 0 20 19 
 2016 Cod Cod 5 26 26 3.06 3.86 -5 14 13 
 2016 Cod Haddock 5 26 49 3.06 3.06 -5 14 13 
SC Otter <24m 2014 Cod Cod 13 17 17 0.71 0.71 0 28 28 
 2015 Cod Cod 13 17 17 0.87 0.87 0 25 25 
 2016 Cod Cod 13 17 17 1.06 1.06 0 23 23 
SC Otter >=24m 2014 Cod Cod 6 17 17 1.31 1.31 0 29 26 
 2015 Cod Cod 6 17 17 1.63 1.63 0 25 22 
 2016 Cod Cod 6 17 17 1.98 1.98 0 22 20 
SC Static 2014 Cod Cod 0 80 80 0.02 0.02 0 5 3 
 2015 Cod Cod 0 80 80 0.03 0.03 -7 -2 -5 
 2016 Cod Sole 0 80 0 0.03 0 -23 -19 -21 
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Table S4 The number of replicate runs with variable recruitment that each fleet is limited by a 
quota allocation for each species under the 30%c protoc0l when fishers change behaviour to 
reduce the CPUE of cod by 30%.  
  Count of no. of runs limited by each species 
Fleet Year Cod Haddock Whiting Plaice Saithe Sole 
BE Beam <24m 2014 0 3 0 97 0 0 
 2015 1 13 1 83 0 2 
 2016 2 23 0 66 0 9 
BE Beam >=24m 2014 72 7 7 13 0 1 
 2015 66 22 1 6 1 4 
 2016 46 32 1 2 3 16 
BE Otter 2014 100 0 0 0 0 0 
 2015 98 2 0 0 0 0 
 2016 95 5 0 0 0 0 
DK Beam 2014 95 5 0 0 0 0 
 2015 78 18 0 0 0 4 
 2016 57 30 0 0 2 11 
DK FDF 2014 69 16 6 5 2 2 
 2015 44 26 0 0 6 24 
 2016 13 35 0 0 4 48 
DK Otter <24m  2014 88 4 8 0 0 0 
 2015 81 17 1 0 0 1 
 2016 66 31 2 0 0 1 
DK Otter 24-40m 2014 70 13 16 0 0 1 
 2015 57 26 13 0 1 3 
 2016 36 42 9 0 3 10 
DK Seine 2014 59 6 35 0 0 0 
 2015 54 22 20 0 0 4 
 2016 37 32 18 0 3 10 
DK Static 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2016 0 0 100 0 0 0 
EN <10m 2014 83 4 13 0 0 0 
 2015 80 11 7 0 0 2 
 2016 62 23 11 0 0 4 
EN Beam 2014 71 11 16 1 0 1 
 2015 51 25 11 0 2 11 
 2016 31 34 3 0 4 28 
EN FDF 2014 70 14 2 7 3 4 
 2015 40 24 0 2 7 27 
 2016 10 32 0 0 4 54 
EN Otter <24m 2014 90 2 8 0 0 0 
 2015 89 8 2 0 0 1 
 2016 80 16 2 0 0 2 
EN Otter >=40m 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 0 2 98 0 0 0 
 2016 0 9 90 0 0 1 
EN Otter 24-40m 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 1 3 96 0 0 0 
 2016 2 9 88 0 0 1 
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Table S4 continued. 
  Count of no. of runs limited by each species 
Fleet Year Cod Haddock Whiting Plaice Saithe Sole 
FR <10m 2014 57 0 41 1 0 1 
 2015 61 0 29 0 0 10 
 2016 41 0 18 1 0 40 
FR Nets 2014 60 0 35 3 0 2 
 2015 53 0 18 1 0 28 
 2016 26 0 6 1 0 67 
FR OTH 2014 84 11 2 2 0 1 
 2015 60 25 1 0 3 11 
 2016 27 33 0 0 4 36 
FR Otter >=40m 2014 86 6 8 0 0 0 
 2015 77 22 1 0 0 0 
 2016 65 31 1 0 3 0 
FR Otter 10-40m 2014 67 10 21 1 0 1 
 2015 49 25 16 0 2 8 
 2016 29 34 8 0 4 25 
GE Beam >=24m 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2016 0 2 98 0 0 0 
GE Otter <24m 2014 97 3 0 0 0 0 
 2015 91 8 0 0 0 1 
 2016 81 17 0 0 0 2 
GE Otter >=40m 2014 59 13 14 11 3 0 
 2015 45 27 11 5 12 0 
 2016 38 39 7 1 15 0 
GE Otter 24-40m 2014 75 10 13 1 0 1 
 2015 52 25 4 0 3 16 
 2016 23 33 0 0 4 40 
GE Static 2014 79 10 10 0 0 1 
 2015 63 25 3 0 1 8 
 2016 35 34 3 0 4 24 
NL Beam <24m 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2016 0 0 100 0 0 0 
NL Beam >=40m 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 0 1 99 0 0 0 
 2016 0 3 97 0 0 0 
NL Beam 24-40m 2014 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2015 0 0 100 0 0 0 
 2016 0 0 100 0 0 0 
NL Otter 2014 5 4 87 4 0 0 
 2015 12 14 71 1 0 2 
 2016 10 20 66 0 1 3 
NO Static 2014 74 14 2 7 3 0 
 2015 57 27 1 3 12 0 
 2016 41 39 0 1 19 0 
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Table S4 continued. 
  Count of no. of runs limited by each species 
Fleet Year Cod Haddock Whiting Plaice Saithe Sole 
SC <10m OTB 2014 90 4 6 0 0 0 
 2015 85 13 1 0 0 1 
 2016 71 27 0 0 0 2 
SC FDF 2014 68 16 6 7 3 0 
 2015 56 28 1 3 12 0 
 2016 39 42 1 1 17 0 
SC Otter <24m 2014 96 4 0 0 0 0 
 2015 86 13 0 0 0 1 
 2016 71 27 0 0 0 2 
SC Otter >=24m 2014 96 4 0 0 0 0 
 2015 81 15 0 0 0 4 
 2016 55 29 0 0 3 13 
SC Static 2014 69 16 2 7 3 3 
 2015 39 26 0 2 7 26 
 2016 9 35 0 0 4 52 
 
